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ABSTRACT 
DETECTING CANDIDATE PREKNOWLEDGE OF ITEMS USING A 
PREDICTIVE CHECKING METHOD 
 
SEPTEMBER 2016 
 
XI WANG, B.S., BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY 
 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Ronald K. Hambleton 
 
In on-demand high-stakes testing programs such as GRE and TOEFL, some items 
are repeatedly used across test administrations to reduce the cost of developing new items 
constantly. Item exposure provides an opportunity for examinees to have knowledge of 
particular test items in advance of their administration. It poses a threat to test security 
and ultimately will result in invalid test scores. Therefore, many testing programs conduct 
quality control to monitor test compromise at individual and/or group level. A predictive 
checking method is proposed in this study to detect examinee preknowledge on exposed 
items. We consider a scenario where a test can be divided into two subsets of items: one 
consisting of secure items with very low exposure rates and the other consisting of 
possibly compromised items (i.e. unsecure items) which have been exposed for a while. 
An examinee’s proficiency distribution is first obtained from secure items and then the 
predictive distribution for the examinee’s test scores on the unsecure items is constructed. 
The extent of test compromise is determined by comparing an individual’s observed 
score on the unsecure items with the predictive distribution. To evaluate the effectiveness 
of this approach, three studies are conducted: the first study investigates the statistical 
 ix 
properties (i.e. type-I error and power) of this method under four factors through Monte 
Carlo simulation; the second study applies this method to two simulated test compromise 
situations that are likely to happen in practice, and compares this method to three other 
detection approaches; the third study applies this method to a real dataset to demonstrate 
its practice use. Findings from the simulation studies suggest that the predictive checking 
method is effective in detecting examinees’ preknowledge in the unsecure subset given a 
moderate to large test compromise rate, while maintaining its type-I error close to or 
lower than the nominal level. It also demonstrates similar or better performance than the 
other approaches under investigation. These results have implications for conducting 
quality control at individual examinee level in an on-demand testing program. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Introduction to the Problem of Test Security  
With the rapid advance of information technology, computer-based testing (CBT) 
is gradually replacing the traditional paper-and-pencil tests and becoming the mainstream 
in large-scale assessments in the 21st century. A number of high-stake testing programs, 
such as the GRE, TOEFL and SAT, have been using computer-based testing for years. 
Currently, the two common-core assessment consortia-the Partnership for Assessment of 
Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) and SMARTER Balanced- are both 
administering their annual as well as their formative tests through computers. One of the 
advantages that CBT offers is the “on-demand” test scheduling, which means a test is 
offered on a large number of time slots within a testing window, and an examinee can 
choose to take the test at any available time slot. Although on-demand testing brings 
much convenience for test takers, it becomes more difficult for the testing agency to 
insure test security.  
Due to the large number of testing administrations in an on-demand testing, it is 
practically impossible to use a different test form for each test administration. The cost 
for item development is high. For example, in a legal case about twenty years ago, 
Educational Testing Service (ETS) reported that it cost them about $1000 to produce a 
quality test item; that figure is undoubtedly much higher today. Due to the high expenses 
of item development, test items are repeatedly used across different test administrations. 
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This provides an opportunity for examinees who take the test earlier to steal the items and 
then share them with future examinees. Of course, examinees are asked not to share 
items, and they are sometimes told that if caught, there can be seriously punished, but not 
all examinees follow the rules.  
Examinees who take the test later can then use item preknowledge to gain score 
increases. Items could be stolen through some “spy” cameras that can be hidden in 
glasses, pens or watches (Wollack & Fremer, 2013, pp. 48), or could be stolen through 
earlier test takers’ memorization. The former type of item stealing could still be detected 
by well-trained proctors, while the later type can never be explicitly detected. The stolen 
items could be shared among friends, posted on the Internet, or distributed through some 
organized efforts. An example of organized item-theft efforts is the well-publicized 1994 
ETS-Kaplan incident, where Kaplan Test Prep sent 20 of its employees to take the 
computerized version of the GRE to memorize as many items as possible and then 
reproduce the items later for some type of distribution to future examinees (Wollack & 
Fremer, 2013). Another example for item sharing occurred on the Graduate Management 
Admissions Test (GMAT). In 2008, the Graduate Management Admissions Council 
(GMAC) cancelled the scores of 84 students as they found those students had access to 
some stolen items that were posted on a website (Hechinger, 2008). GMAC also provided 
an example for an item posted on the website and the actual item used in the test, and 
showed that the memorized items had contained most of the information from the actual 
test item. 
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1.1.2 Test Security in Adaptive Tests 
In this section, discussion is focused on test security problems specific to adaptive 
test designs, as adaptive tests have been widely applied in many high-stake testing 
programs in recent years. The goal of an adaptive test is to “tailor” test items to the 
examinee’s ability level. The idea of using an adaptive test can be traced back to the 
Binet–Simon (1905) intelligence test, where the test questions were adapted to the 
estimate of an examinee’s mental age based on the examinee’s responses to earlier test 
questions. It is the use of computer-based testing that makes it possible to widely 
implement adaptive test in large-scale, high-stakes assessments. Adaptive tests can be 
further categorized into two designs according to the level of adaption: item-level 
adaptive tests and module-level adaptive tests. The former is often known as a 
computerized adaptive test (CAT), while the latter is known as a multistage adaptive test 
(MST). CAT has been implemented in large-scale testing programs for decades (e.g. van 
der Linden & Glas, 2010). Examples include the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) by the U.S. Department of Defense, the nurse licensure and 
certification exam (NCLEX/CAT) by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing, 
and the early CAT-versioned Graduate Record Examination (GRE) by ETS. Currently, 
CAT is being applied in SMARTER Balanced common-core assessments as well. MST, 
as a compromise between CAT and fixed-form test, has received increasing interest in 
recent years, and it is now adopted by several operational testing programs including the 
revised GRE General test and the Certified Public Accountant Exam.  
In CAT, an examinee’s proficiency is estimated after each item is administered 
and the selection of the next item is based on the current proficiency estimate and on 
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constrains for item content and exposure. In CAT, different examinees typically are 
administered different items. This provides an advantage for test security as examinees 
taking the test later may not get exactly the same items as earlier examinees, and thus the 
overall item exposure rate is reduced. However, since CAT aims to select items that can 
provide most statistical information for an examinee’s proficiency, items with the better 
psychometric properties tend to be selected more often than others. This results in uneven 
exposure rates among different items. In addition, examinees at similar proficiency levels 
are likely to receive the same items, albeit in a different order. Therefore, when item-
sharing is among friends, who are more likely to be of similar proficiency levels, even 
some items with low overall exposure rates (among the examinee population) can be 
compromised. Also, in organized item-theft efforts, thieves typically targeted at items 
with middle to high difficulty levels, so items that are more likely to be administered to 
high-proficiency examinees will have higher exposure rates (Stocking & Lewis, 1998).  
The high exposure or conditional exposure rate of some items at a certain 
proficiency level leaves the item pool vulnerable to item-theft. The simulation study 
conducted by McLeod, Lewis, and Thissen(2003) illustrated how quickly an item pool 
could become compromised with an organized item-theft effort. They simulated the item 
memorization-sharing strategy in a 28-item CAT: a group of source examinees were 
simulated to take the test and memorize all the items administered to them, and then a list 
of memorized items was shared with beneficiary examinees who would later take the test 
with item preknowledge. Their results showed that when eight sources were used, 
approximately 125 items out of 494 items in the pool were compromised, and the 
beneficiary examinee could receive an average of about 18-19 memorized items in a later 
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test administration, which could result in an average score gain of 30 points out of 60 
total points for low-proficiency examinees, and an average score gain of 15-20 points for 
medium-proficiency examinees.   
Different from CAT, an MST administers a series of sets of items adaptively to 
examinees (e.g. Yan , von Davier, & Lewis, 2014). Within each item set, which is called 
a module (also called item block or testlet), items are fixed and administered linearly to 
examinees (perhaps in some applications the items within a module may even be 
administered randomly to examinees as an additional way to enhance test security). An 
MST design consists of two or more stages and each stage could consist of one or more 
modules. At each stage, the module whose difficulty level is the most approximate to an 
examinee’s proficiency level is administered, subject to the routing rules implemented. 
Figure 1.1 below shows an example of a three-stage MST design. Stage 1 consists of a 
module of moderate difficulty, and all examinees receive this module. Stage 2 and 3 both 
consist of three modules of different difficulty levels. Based on an examinee’s 
proficiency estimate from a previous stage, one of the modules in Stage 2 or 3 is 
administered adaptively to the examinee. In practice, numerous parallel forms are 
constructed for a given module to ensure the maximum exposure of each module does not 
exceed a particular rate (Luecht, 2003). In this way, the item exposure rate in an MST can 
be controlled prior to test administration simply by specifying the number of parallel 
modules.   
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Figure 1.1: Example of a 1-3-3 MST design 
Although it is easier to control item exposure rate in a MST design compared to a 
CAT design, the study by Wang, Zheng, and Chang (2014) suggests the use of MST may 
create a less secure condition than CAT in the circumstance of item-sharing and 
organized item theft, if an entire MST module is repeated used. To quantify test security, 
they used two types of statistics: the mean and standard deviation (SD) of test overlap 
rate among all possible pairs of examinees, while the test overlap rate is the proportion of 
common items shared by any two examinees. With both analytical and simulation results, 
they showed that the mean test overlap is approximately the same in both CAT and MST, 
but the SD of test overlap rate is always larger in MST. A large SD means certain groups 
of examinees share a larger number of common items than others, and thus the test 
overlap rate in MST tends to be more extreme in certain groups than that in CAT. A more 
intuitive understanding for this is that since modules are used repeated in different test 
administrations in MST, examinees who are administered the same module(s) will share 
the entire module(s) in common, while examinees who are administered different 
module(s) will share no items in common. Wang, Zheng, and Chang (2014) further 
demonstrated the adverse effect of large SD by simulating an organized item-theft 
Medium 
Easy 
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Easy 
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Hard 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
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scenario. They found that on average, a future examinee could receive more 
compromised items that are memorized by earlier test takers in MST than in CAT, which 
ultimately led to larger misclassification rate in MST.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Item preknowlege forms a big threat to test security and ultimately could result in 
invalid test scores for many examinees. When there are a lot of compromised items or 
when a large number of examinees have item preknowledge, measurement accuracy and 
validity will be severely jeopardized and the invalid decisions or inferences made based 
on test scores will cause negative consequences for both the testing program and the 
stake-holders.  
Due to the concern for the potential destructive consequences that item 
preknowledge could have on test score validity, many testing programs have devoted a 
lot of effort to reduce the likelihood of examinees gaining prior knowledge on test items. 
Some preventive procedures include controlling the item exposure rate using some 
exposure-control algorithms in item-selection (e.g., Georgiadou, Triantafillou, & 
Economides, 2007), increasing the size of the item bank, and reducing the testing window 
size. In addition to using preventive procedures, post-hoc analyses are often conducted as 
a quality control tool to monitor test compromise at the individual or the group level. 
Post-hoc analyses are often based on statistical methods and they can be implemented 
after or even during the test administration. By detecting item preknowledge at the 
individual or the group level, on one hand, one can evaluate the severity of test 
compromise in the entire examinee population or in a specific subpopulation, so that 
some actions, such as altering test designs or adjusting testing windows, can be taken in 
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time to enhance test security in a certain examinee population. On the other hand, if there 
is strong statistical evidence showing an examinee has used preknowledge on a large 
number of items in a test administration, a testing agency can conduct further 
investigations to make a decision on score cancellation, so as to ensure the accuracy and 
validity of test scores.  
Numerous statistical procedures can be used to detect examinee preknowledge on 
test items. A comprehensive review of different methodologies is provided in Chapter 2. 
One type of method is to conduct person-fit analysis for an individual’s response vector. 
Various person-fit statistics (e.g., Meijer & Sijtsma, 2001; Karabatsos, 2003), have been 
designed to detect response patterns that are inconsistent with the measurement model 
(called aberrant responses). Since item preknowledge typically results in a type of 
aberrant responses where examinees make correct responses on items that they would not 
have answered correctly based on their proficiency alone, person-fit analysis can be 
applied to detect item preknowledge. However, person-fit statistics share some 
problematic features that, to date, have limited their effectiveness. First of all, the 
calculation of many person-fit statistics, especially item response theory (IRT)-based 
statistics, typically relies on estimates of examinees’ proficiency, which is usually biased 
by the involvement of aberrant responses in determining the proficiency estimates. When 
there are a large proportion of aberrant responses, the bias in the examinee’s proficiency 
estimate may affect the power of the person-fit statistic to a large extent. Second, users of 
person-fit statistics often want to conduct hypothesis testing to see if there is a significant 
statistical difference between a person’s response vector and the expected response vector 
under the null (i.e., model-fit) hypothesis. This requires the knowledge of the sampling 
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distribution for a person-fit statistic. Some statistics have known asymptotic or exact null 
distributions, but most do not. In addition, research has shown that the empirical null 
distribution of some statistics deviate from their theoretical asymptotic distributions when 
the number of items is relatively small (e.g. Li & Olejnik, 1997; Reise, 1995). 
The first problem could be addressed if one draws information about an 
examinee’s proficiency from a known subset of items on which the examinee most likely 
does not have preknowledge. These items could come from items that have never been 
exposed before (i.e. secure items), such as the pretest items on an operational test, or 
could come from pretested items that have rarely been exposed in a certain examinee 
population. The information from the secure subset of items can be used to infer the 
extent to which an examinee uses item preknowledge on a subset of possibly 
compromised items (i.e. unsecure items). The choice of unsecure item subset may depend 
on one’s prior information. For example, a testing agency may be able to find the 
operational items that are posted online, so those items could form the unsecure item-set. 
The choice may also depend on likely item exposure scenarios in specific test designs. 
For example, in MST, if an entire module is reused in different test administrations, two 
examinees may share the same module if they have similar proficiency levels. Therefore, 
exposure will occur at the module level, and thus one module could form the unsecure 
subset. In another circumstance, if modules are re-assembled in different administrations 
but the same items are used for module re-construction, exposure will occur at item level. 
Since it is uncertain which items are compromised, the entire operational section can be 
used to form the unsecure subset.  In CAT, item preknowledge is more likely to happen 
on items with a high exposure/conditional exposure rate. So the unsecure subset could 
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consist of high-exposure items, while the low-exposure items can be added to the set of 
secure items. 
The second problem could be addressed by constructing the empirical distribution 
for a certain statistic through simulation, instead of relying on the exact or asymptotic 
distribution (e.g., Meijer & Nering, 1997; Nering, 1997; Reise, 1995). The empirical 
distribution is usually constructed by simulating response data according to an IRT 
model, and then computing the statistic based on each simulated response dataset. Since 
the true item or person parameters in an IRT context are unknown in practice, response 
data are often simulated based on the point estimate of item or person parameters. 
However, using point estimates does not take into account the uncertainty in the 
estimated item or person parameters, especially when the sample size on which item 
calibration or proficiency estimation is carried out is small. A better way to account for 
estimation error is to use the distribution of the estimated parameters.   
To address the two limitations above, a predictive checking method (Geisser, 
1993) is proposed in this study. The predictive checking method first draws inferences 
about an individual’s proficiency parameter (i.e. person parameter) from responses on the 
secure subset of items. This will provide a valid baseline of the examinee’s performance. 
Then predictions are made for the individual’s responses on the unsecure subset of items 
based on the distribution of the estimated person parameter. An individual’s observed 
response vector on the unsecure subset is then compared to the predicted responses 
through a test statistic. There are several advantages to conduct predictive checking to 
detect misfitting responses. First of all, there is no need to know the asymptotic 
distribution of a test statistic, as the sampling distribution of the statistic will be 
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constructed empirically. Second, the construction of the sampling distribution takes the 
uncertainty about estimated parameters into account. Third, predictive checking is a 
general method to evaluate model fit. In this study, it is applied to the detection of item 
preknowledge specifically, but it can be used to detect other types of aberrant responses, 
such as comparing examinees’ performance on the last few items and on items in the 
earlier stage of the test to detect test speededness. Predictive checking can be conducted 
not only on item responses, but also on item response times, as long as the model for 
generating item responses/ response times is known. It can be implemented to detect 
misfit on a set of items and also on an individual item. As will be seen in Chapter 3, this 
method is very flexible and easy to implement. 
1.3 Research Purpose  
The fundamental research question in this study is how effective the predictive 
checking method is to detect item preknowlege on exposed items in terms of its type-I 
error and power. Three studies were conducted in sequence to answer this research 
question. First of all, a simulation study was conducted to understand the statistical 
properties of the predictive checking method. The type-I error and power of this method 
were systematically investigated by manipulating four factors – the number of items in 
the secure and unsecure subset, the proportion of truly compromised items in the 
unsecure subset, and the estimation method to obtain the distribution of an individual’s 
proficiency parameter. This method was applied to detect item preknowledge on a set of 
known exposed items, and on each individual item, so its effectiveness at both the item-
set level and the item-level was evaluated. Secondly, this method was compared with 
three other methods to detect test compromise in two simulated situations that are likely 
 12 
to happen in reality: one in an MST design, and the other in a fixed form test design. 
Lastly, a real data analysis was conducted to demonstrate the practical use of the 
predictive checking method and to investigate its detection consistency with the three 
methods considered in the second simulation study. 
1.4 Educational Significance 
The educational significance of this study can be seen from two perspectives.  
From the practical perspective, as there is an increasing use of on-demand testing 
programs in large-scale high-stake assessments, test security is of primary concern. The 
method proposed in this study can contribute to building a forensic monitoring system in 
on-demand testing programs. This method can be used as a quality-control post-
administration analysis to identify potential test security problems in specific examinee 
subgroups. It could also be implemented during test administration if the test is 
administered on computer. As McLeod and Lewis (1999) and McLeod, Lewis and 
Thissen (2003) suggested, one way to rescue the test administration after an examinee is 
suspected of using item preknowledge is to administer some highly secure items. This 
could ensure measure accuracy to a certain extent so as to create a fairer testing 
environment. In addition, by detecting compromised item-sets/items, one can also expect 
to get more accurate proficiency estimate from uncompromised items.  
From a methodology perspective, on one hand, the evaluation of the predictive 
checking method and its comparison with other existing methods contribute to the 
literature of detecting test fraud using statistical methods, and it has methodological 
implications for choosing the appropriate method in different situations. On the other 
hand, the predictive checking method can be used as a general method to detect other 
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types of aberrant responses, so it is hoped that this study can contribute to the person-fit 
literature and provide new insight for more effective detection of person misfit.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review of existing methodologies to detect person-level aberrant responses both due to 
general misfit and specifically due to item preknowledge, with an emphasis on the latter. 
Chapter 3 describes the technical details for the implementation of the predictive 
checking method, and introduces three other methods to compare to the predictive 
checking. Chapter 4 summarizes the simulation study conducted to evaluate the statistical 
properties of the predictive checking method, including the simulation design, results and 
discussions for the results. Similarly, Chapter 5 summarizes the simulation study on the 
comparisons of different methods. Chapter 6 provides information about the nature of 
real data and summarizes the detection results by applying different methods to the real 
dataset. Lastly, Chapter 7 provides a general discussion on the implications of the 
findings, the limitations of the current study and possible directions of future study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, methods that can be applied to detect cheating due to item 
preknowledge are reviewed. Specifically, this chapter is organized into the following 
three sections:  
(1) In the first section, a brief overview of person-fit statistics is provided. Person-fit 
statistics are reviewed as they are typically used to detect response patterns that 
are inconsistent with the measurement model, and cheating responses are a 
specific type of inconsistent responses. Therefore, in theory, person-fit statistics 
can be directly applied to detect item preknowledge. Some problematic features 
with person-fit statistics as well as potential problems of using person-fit in 
detecting item preknowledge is discussed in the review. 
(2) In the second section, methods that have been proposed to specifically focus on 
detecting examinee aberrant responses due to item preknowledge are reviewed in 
details. The rationale and technical details of each method are described, and the 
studies conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of each method are summarized. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each method are discussed. 
(3) In the third section, a summary based on the literature review is provided. The 
characteristics of existing methods are summarized, providing the justification for 
the development of the new method in this study.  
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2.1 Overview of Person-fit Statistics 
Person-fit methods refer to a set of statistical methods for evaluating the fit of a 
person’s response vector on a set of items to a measurement model or to other response 
patterns in a sample of people (Meijer & Sijtsma, 2001). Misfitting response vector 
usually occurs when an individual’s responses are affected by some construct irrelevant 
factors, which are often called aberrant response behaviors, such as careless responding, 
test speededness, warm-up behavior (i.e. incorrect responses on the items at the 
beginning of a test due to the problem of getting started), etc. There exist over thirty 
statistics in the person-fit literature. Depending on whether an item response theory (IRT; 
see, Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991) model is assumed to fit an individual’s 
item responses, person-fit statistics can be classified as nonparametric and parametric.  
Most non-parametric statistics measure the deviation of an individual’s response 
pattern to the “Guttman perfect pattern”. A Guttman pattern does not permit a correct 
response on a relatively difficult item with an incorrect response on a relatively easier 
item. Therefore, for a person with summed score r out of a total of n items (consider 
dichotomously scored items only), a “Guttman perfect pattern” should only consist of 
correct responses on the r easiest items. Examples of non-parametric statistics include the  
G statistic (Guttman, 1944,1950) and normed G (van der Flier, 1977), which count the 
number of item response pairs that do not conform to Guttman pattern; person point-
biserial correlation (Donlan & Fischer, 1968), which is the correlation between an 
individual’s response vector and a vector of proportion correct across persons on each 
item; caution index C (Sato,1975) and modified caution index (Harnisch & Linn, 1981), 
which are based on the ratio of two covariances- one between an individual’s response 
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vector and a vector of proportion correct, and the other between the Guttman perfect 
pattern and a vector of proportion correct; agreement (A), disagreement (D), and 
dependability (E) indices (Kane & Brennan, 1980), which are based on the sum of item 
scores weighted by the proportion correct on each item and the maximum sum which is 
achieved when the response pattern is the Guttman perfect pattern); U3 and standardized 
U3 (van der Flier, 1980) which are based on the sum of item score weighted by the log-
ratio of the proportion correct on each item, and the sum of log-ratio of proportion correct 
over r easiest items as well as the sum of log-ratio of proportion correct over r hardest 
items; 𝐻𝑇 (Sijtsma, 1986), which measures the similarity between an individual’s 
response vector to the response vectors of the remaining sample.   
Among all non-parametric statistics, only U3 and standardized U3 have known 
asymptotic sampling distributions, which are asymptotically normal, so critical values 
from a normal distribution can be used to classify misfitting response patterns when using 
U3 or standardized U3. For the rest of the non-parametric statistics, their sampling 
distributions are unknown, so the significance probability for an observed value of a 
given statistic cannot be determined. This may not be a serious problem for using these 
statistics as descriptive measures, but it limits the usefulness of these statistics in 
hypothesis testing.  
In contrast to non-parametric statistics, parametric statistics compare an 
individual’s response pattern to the expected pattern under an IRT model. An IRT model 
specifies the probability of an individual with proficiency θ correctly responding to a 
dichotomous item i (i.e., 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)) by 
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𝑃𝑖(𝜃) = 𝑐𝑖 + (1 − 𝑐𝑖)
exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
1 + exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
 (1) 
where 𝑎𝑖 is the item discrimination parameter, 𝑏𝑖 is the item difficulty parameter, 𝑐𝑖 is the 
pseudo-guessing parameter. By setting  𝑎𝑖 = 1, 𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all items, one-parameter 
logistic model (1PLM) or the Rasch model (1960) is obtained. By setting  𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all 
items and allowing 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 to vary across items, the two-parameter logistic model 
(2PLM) is obtained. By further removing the constraints for 𝑐𝑖, the three-parameter 
logistic model (3PLM) is obtained.  
IRT-based parametric statistics can be further categorized as residual-based 
statistics, likelihood-based statistics, caution indices, and optimal statistics. Residual-
based statistics are based on the mean squared residuals across a set of items. For 
example, the statistic U  is the average squared residuals, and W is the sum of squared 
residuals weighted by the sum of variances on a set of items (Wright & Stone, 1979). The 
standardized version of U and W (i.e. ZU, and ZW) were also developed (Wright & 
Masters, 1982) to remove the dependency of their distribution on θ levels, and both 
standardized statistics were claimed to have an asymptotically standard normal 
distribution. However, both ZU and ZW were found to be poorly standardized (Drasgow, 
Levine, McLaughlin, 1987; Noonan, Boss, & Gessaroli, 1992). Poor standardization 
means the same value of a statistic can be classified as good fit for some θ levels but as 
poor fit for other θ levels if a single critical value is used for different θ levels. 
Likelihood-based statistics include 𝑙0 (Levine & Rubin, 1979) which is simply the 
log-likelihood function, and its standardized version 𝑙𝑧 (Drasgow, Levine, & Williams, 
1985), which follows an asymptotic standard normal distribution; M statistic (Molenaar 
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& Hoijtink, 1990, p.96), which is the term in 𝑙0 that depends on the response pattern 
under the Rasch model; normalized jackknife variance estimate (JK) and the ratio of 
observed and expected information (O/E; Drasgow, et al., 1987) which measure the 
flatness of the likelihood function. 𝑙𝑧 is most widely used in the person-fit literature, and 
it has been demonstrated to perform at least as well as or better than many other person-
fit statistics (e.g. Drasgow, et al., 1987; Li & Olejnik, 1997; Nering & Meijer, 1998). 
However, several studies (e.g. Li & Olejink, 1997; Reise, 1995; van Krimpen-Stoop & 
Meijer, 1999) have shown that the standard deviation of the empirical distribution of 𝑙𝑧 is 
less than 1 when 𝜃 is used at short to moderate test lengths (i.e. less than 60 items), and 
the empirical distribution of 𝑙𝑧 differed across different 𝜃 values. In addition, a larger 
difference between the empirical and asymptotic distribution is observed in adaptive test 
designs. Snijders (2001) proposed 𝑙𝑧
∗ to correct the decreased variance of 𝑙𝑧, and van 
Krimpen-Stoop and Meijer (1999) showed  𝑙𝑧
∗ could make a difference in correcting 
reduced variance in a short fixed form test, but the empirical distribution of 𝑙𝑧
∗ still 
deviated from the standard normal distribution in CAT. JK and O/E are well standardized 
but they are insensitive to misfitting responses (Drasgow et al., 1987). 
Caution indices (Tatsuoka & Linn, 1983) under IRT modeling are extensions of 
the caution index in the non-parametric framework. However, instead of comparing an 
individual’s response vector to the proportion correct across persons on a set of items, 
IRT-based caution indices compare a response vector to the IRT model-implied 
probability. Caution indices of ECI2, ECI3 compare an individual’s response vector to 
the mean probability across persons on a set of items, while indices of ECI4, ECI5, ECI6 
compare an individual’s response vector to his/her probability on a set of items. Tatsuoka 
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(1984) also derived the standardized form for ECI1, ECI2, ECI4, ECI5, but their 
theoretical sampling distributions are unknown. 
All statistics above test the fit of a response vector to a model in a general sense, 
without assuming a particular misfitting behavior for the misfitting responses (e.g. 
cheating responses, violation of local independence). To test the null model against an 
alternative model for a particular type of aberrant responses, several optimal statistics are 
proposed. They are called optimal in the sense that they can achieve the highest detection 
power at the same type-I error rate among all methods. By specifying a model for the 
misfitting behavior in advance, Levine and Drasgow (1988) used a likelihood ratio 
statistic to compute the ratio between the likelihood of a response vector under a 
misfitting model, and the likelihood under the IRT model. Klauer (1991) tested the 
invariance of an individual’s proficiency over subtests under a Rasch model by using a 
two-parameter exponential family to model misfitting responses with an extra person 
parameter η that represents the difference between 𝜃’s on two subtests (𝜂 = 𝜃1 − 𝜃2) and 
testing 𝐻0:⁡𝜂 = 0 against 𝐻1:⁡𝜂 ≠ 0.  
Although the idea of optimal detection rate sounds appealing, the use of these 
optimal methods in the cheating problem considered in this study may be limited. For 
instance, to use the likelihood ratio statistic, specifying the right model for the misfitting 
responses is necessary for obtaining the optimal power, but the right cheating model is 
hardly known in practice. For the invariance test by Klauer (1991), although the 
invariance problem seems similar to the test compromise problem considered here, the 
two problems may not be simply regarded as equivalent to each other. For misfit due to θ 
invariance, there is a systematic difference in 𝜃 between the two subtests, which means θ 
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is changed by the same amount on all items in one subtest. However, for misfit due to the 
cheating problem considered in this study, first of all, depending on the exposure scenario 
and how the secure and unsecure sections are formed, it’s possible that some items in the 
unsecure section are not compromised. Therefore, assuming 𝜃 is changed on every item 
in the unsecure section is unreasonable. Second, even when all the items in the unsecure 
section are compromised, the amount of change in 𝜃 on a particular item depends on a 
person’s memorization of that item, so the assumption that 𝜃 is changed by the same 
amount on all items seems too strong to be realistic. Based on the two arguments above, 
the optimal detection property may not hold when the invariance test is applied to the 
item-preknowledge detection here. 
The overview of person-fit statistics above suggests that although a lot of person-
fit statistics have been proposed in the literature, the effectiveness of many statistics may 
be limited by poor standardization, lack of a theoretical sampling distribution, as well as 
discrepancy between the empirical and asymptotic distribution. In addition, most 
statistics do not assume a particular type of aberrant responses, and for the optimal 
statistics that assume a specific aberrant responding behavior, the optimal detection rate 
may not be achieved in the problem in the present study due to the difficulty of 
specifying the right model for responses under item preknowledge. Therefore, the 
usefulness of person-fit statistics may be limited in detecting item preknowlege in 
particular. Other than using person-fit statistics, several other methods have been 
proposed to specifically focus on detecting item preknowledge.  
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2.2 Methods Specific to Detecting Item Preknowledge 
A detailed review of methods specific to detecting item preknowledge is provided 
in this section. First of all, two methods that do not draw information from secure items 
are reviewed, and then followed by methods that utilize information from secure items. 
2.2.1 Methods not using information from secure items 
𝒁𝑪. McLeod and Lewis (1999) proposed using a residual-based statistic, 𝑍𝐶 , to 
detect item preknowledge. 𝑍𝐶  is based on the standardized residual between an observed 
response (0/1) on each item and the probability of a correct response based on an IRT 
model. Instead of averaging the residual across all items in a test, 𝑍𝐶  divides the items 
into three categories according to their difficulty levels: easy, medium and difficult, and 
computes the residual difference between easy and difficult items. The formula for 𝑍𝐶  is 
 𝑍𝐶
=
𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑦[𝑃𝑖(𝜃) − 𝑢𝑖]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡[𝑃𝑖(𝜃) − 𝑢𝑖]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
√{∑
{𝑃𝑖(𝜃)[1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)]}
𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑦
2𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑦 } + {∑
{𝑃𝑖(𝜃)[1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)]}
𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡
2𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡 }
 (2) 
where 𝑢𝑖 is the response on item i, 𝑃𝑖(𝜃) is the probability of a correct response on item i 
under an IRT model, 𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑦 is the number of easy items, and 𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡 is the number of 
difficult items. Large positive values of 𝑍𝐶  indicate the examinee does not answer easy 
items correctly but answers hard items correctly, implying a misfit response pattern. 
The expected value of the numerator of 𝑍𝐶  is 0 in model-fit condition (since 
E(𝑢𝑖)=⁡𝑃𝑖(𝜃) in model-fit condition), and the two summation terms in the denominator 
each correspond to the residual variance on one type of item, so 𝑍𝐶  is a standardized 
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statistic. Analytically, 𝑍𝐶  has an asymptotic standard normal distribution when the 
Lindeberg condition (e.g. Billingsley, 1986) is satisfied, so critical values from standard 
normal distributions were used to flag misfitting responses. 
McLeod and Lewis compared 𝑍𝐶  to two other statistics- 𝑙𝑧 and 𝐸𝐶𝐼4𝑧 in detecting 
item preknowledge in CAT. They simulated item preknowledge on 50 relatively difficult 
items – the items that are most frequently exposed to the top 5% examinees – out of a 
bank consisting of 348 items, and evaluated the effectiveness of the statistics at two test 
lengths- 10 items and 28 items. They compared the conditional mean of each statistic 
(conditional on θ) between the null condition and item-preknowledge condition, and the 
distributional differences of each statistic between the null group and the cheating group. 
Their findings suggested that none of the three statistics were well standardized when 𝜃 
was used in the calculation – the mean of each statistic was less than 0 and the standard 
deviation was less than 1 in the null condition, indicating using a normal approximation 
for each statistic is inappropriate in short tests. They found that 𝑍𝐶  demonstrated larger 
distributional differences between the null and cheating group than the other two 
statistics, but the marginal power analysis showed that 𝑍𝐶  only had slightly larger power 
than the other two statistics when the false alarm rate was smaller than 0.025, and all 
three statistics generally had low power- for example, their power was lower than 0.2 at 
the false alarm rate of 0.05. In addition, McLeod and Lewis (1999) pointed out using 𝑍𝐶  
may be problematic in CAT since some examinees were not administered any easy or 
difficult items, which made it impossible to compute 𝑍𝐶  for those examinees. For 
instance, in their simulation, 𝑍𝐶  could not be computed for 481 out of 1,650 examinees 
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when the calculation was based on 28 items, and the number increased to 565 when only 
10 items were used for calculation. 
A Bayesian Method.  McLeod et al. (2003) proposed a Bayesian posterior log-
odds ratio approach to detect item preknowledge in CAT. The posterior log-odds ratio is 
defined as 
 
log⁡[
𝑝(𝑠 = 1|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛)/[1 − 𝑝(𝑠 = 1|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛)]
𝑝(𝑠 = 1)/[1 − 𝑝(𝑠 = 1)]
] (3) 
where s denotes an examinee’s item preknowledge status, 𝑠 = 1 means the examinee has 
had preknowledge on items in a certain bank, and 𝑠 = 0 means the examinee does not 
have item preknowledge; 𝑢𝑖 is the response on item I; so 𝑝(𝑠 = 1|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛) is the 
posterior probability that an examinee has item preknowledge, and 𝑝(𝑠 = 1) is the prior 
probability. To calculate the posterior probability, the likelihood of item responses given 
an examinee has item preknowledge needs to be known. McLeod et al. (2003) defined the 
probability of a correct response given an examinee is using item preknowledge as 
 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 = 1|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃) = 1 ∗ 𝑝(𝑚𝑖) + 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 = 1|?̅?𝑖, 𝜃) ∗ 𝑝(?̅?𝑖) (4) 
where 𝑚𝑖 denotes item i has been memorized and ?̅?𝑖 denotes item i has not been 
memorized. Equation (4) breaks the probability of a correct response into two 
components: one is the probability of responding correctly due to item memorization (i.e. 
if the examinee is administered an item that s/he has memorized) and the other is the 
probability of responding correctly due to the examinee’s real proficiency (i.e. if the 
examinee is administered an item that s/he has not memorized before). 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 = 1|?̅?𝑖, 𝜃) 
in equation (4) is simply the probability defined by the standard IRT model specified in 
equation (1).  𝑝(𝑚𝑖) is the probability that item i has been memorized. McLeod et al. 
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defined 𝑝(𝑚𝑖) with three classes of models: the first class assumes 𝑝(𝑚𝑖) to be a 
constant, the second class assumes 𝑝(𝑚𝑖) to be a function of item difficulty, and the third 
class defines 𝑝(𝑚𝑖) empirically using the exposure rate of item i among a certain number 
of examinees who are trying to steal the items obtained from a simulation study. 𝑝(?̅?𝑖) is 
simply 1-𝑝(𝑚𝑖). 
The posterior probability that an examinees uses item preknowledge is  
𝑝(𝑠 = 1|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛) =
∫ 𝑝(𝑢𝑛|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 1, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1)𝑑𝜃 ×
[∫ 𝑝(𝑢𝑛|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 1, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1)𝑑𝜃 +
∫𝑝(𝑢𝑛|𝑠 = 0, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 0, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1)𝑑𝜃]
−1  
(5) 
where 𝑝(𝑢𝑛|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃) is specified in equation (4), 𝑝(𝑢𝑛|𝑠 = 0, 𝜃) is specified in equation 
(1); 𝑝(𝑠 = 1, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1) or 𝑝(𝑠 = 0, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1) can be calculated in an iterative 
procedure by knowing that  
𝑝(𝑠, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−1) = 𝑝(𝑢𝑛−1|𝑠, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−2) ×
[∫ 𝑝(𝑢𝑛−1|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 1, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−2)𝑑𝜃 +
∫𝑝(𝑢𝑛−1|𝑠 = 0, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 0, 𝜃|𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛−2)𝑑𝜃]
−1  
(6) 
and 
𝑝(𝑠, 𝜃|𝑢1)
=
𝑝(𝑢1|𝑠, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠)𝑝(𝜃)
∫ 𝑝(𝑢1|𝑠 = 1, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 1)𝑝(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 + ∫𝑝(𝑢1|𝑠 = 0, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠 = 0)𝑝(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
 
(7) 
To use the final log-odds ratio to identify cheating examinees, a positive ratio 
indicates there is more suspicion an examinee is using item preknowledge given his/her 
responses on the test items than there was before test administration, and a negative ratio 
 25 
means the opposite. A ratio of 0 means the probability that an examinee is cheating is the 
same before and after test administration. Since there is not a sampling distribution for 
the log-odds ratio, a subjective decision needs to be made for the choice of the critical 
value. 
McLeod et al. evaluated the effectiveness of this procedure by simulating an 
organized item-theft scenario in a 28-item CAT. They first simulated source examinees 
who are taking the test in order to memorize all items administered to them, and then 
compiled a list of compromised items by combining each source’s memorized items. For 
examinees in the memorizing group, a correct response due to item preknowedge was 
introduced when one is administered an item from the compromised list. They 
investigated the difference between the empirical distribution of the log-odds ratio in the 
null and cheating group, and the marginal ROC curves, and their results suggested this 
statistic demonstrated a noticeable distributional differences between the null and the 
cheating group, especially when the cheating examinee had a low proficiency level and 
when there was a larger amount of compromised items. The ROC curves showed that this 
procedure could effectively detect item preknowledge when the probability of an item 
being memorized, i.e., 𝑝(𝑚𝑖), was defined empirically through simulation or defined in 
relation to item difficulty.  
As compared to most person-fit statistics, the Bayesian procedure defined a model 
for the cheating responses, and it demonstrated some promise for use as a test security 
control procedure. However, the choice of the detection criterion is relatively subjective, 
and the results implied that the null distribution of the log-odds ratio depended on how 
the cheating model was specified and varied among different θ levels, so the practical 
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usefulness of this procedure might depend to some extent on the choice of the detection 
criterion and the specification of the cheating model.   
2.2.2 Methods using information from secure items 
The methods reviewed in this section distinguish between secure and unsecure 
items according to their exposure rates, and use information from responses to secure 
items as a baseline for an examinee’s performance. Segall (2002) and Shu (2010, 2013) 
used expanded IRT models to decompose an examinee’s observed performance due to 
his/her real proficiency and the use of item-preknowledge. Belov (2013, 2014) compared 
the posterior distributions for θ obtained from the two types of items via Kullback-
Leibler divergence index (Kullback & Leiber, 1951). Li, Gu and Manna (2014) applied a 
regression-based method proposed by Haberman (2008) to identify group-level cheating 
due to item preknowledge. Wang, Li, and Gu (2014) calculated person-fit statistics using 
𝜃 from the secure items to eliminate the effect of systematic error in 𝜃 due to the 
presence of cheating responses on the effectiveness of person-fit statistics. 
Expanded IRT models. Segall (2002) specified a model for characterizing test 
compromise by incorporating a latent variable representing an examinee’s item-preview 
propensity in the standard IRT model. The conditional probability of a correct response is 
defined as  
 𝑃(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑗 , 𝑘𝑖𝑗) = 1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑖𝑗)(𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑐) − 1) (8) 
 𝑘𝑖𝑗~𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
) (9) 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
= 𝜙𝑖 ∗ 𝛷[𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝜔𝑗] (10) 
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 𝜔𝑗~𝑁(0,1) (11) 
𝜔𝑗 is the item-preview propensity parameter for examinee j,⁡𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the item 
parameters on the item-preview dimension, and 𝛷[𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝜔𝑗] is the normal ogive 
function to model the probability that examinee j has preknowlege on item i. 𝜙𝑖 is the 
indicator for item type: 𝜙𝑖 = 1 means an item is an unsecure item, and thus 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
=
𝛷[𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝜔𝑗], while 𝜙𝑖 = 0 means an item is a secure item, and thus 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
= 0, 
indicating that there is no possibility that an examinee has preknowledge on this item. 𝑘𝑖𝑗 
is the indicator for item-preknowledge status:  𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1 indicates examinee j has 
preknowledge on item i, and 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0 indicates no preknowledge, and the probability of 
𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1 is 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
. Equation (8) indicates that when  𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1, the probability of a correct 
response is 1, and when 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0, the probability of a correct response is 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑐)
, which is 
defined by the standard IRT model in equation (1). 
To characterize test compromise, a variable representing item-level score gain, 
𝑔𝑖𝑗, is also defined. 𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 1 only if an examinee cannot answer the item correctly based 
on real proficiency and guessing, and a correct answer is obtained through the use of item 
preknowledge, so  
 𝑔𝑖𝑗~𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖⁡(𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑔)
) (12) 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑔)
= 𝑘𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑐𝑖)(1 −
exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
1 + exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
) (13) 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC; e.g. Gelman et al., 2013) technique is used 
for model estimation. To quantify the extent of test compromise, posterior draws for 
model parameters are used to calculate four summary statistics. The first statistic is the 
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expected item preview frequency on each item across all examinees, i.e., ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝜔)
𝑗 . The 
second statistics is the expected score gain frequency on each item across all examinees, 
i.e., ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑔)
𝑗 . The third statistic is the total number of previewed items for each examinee 
on the entire test, i.e,⁡∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑗 , and the fourth statistic is the total test score gain for each 
examinee, i.e., ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗 . Segall conducted a simulation on 60 items in a linear test where 40 
items were possibly compromised and 20 items were secure. Zero, moderate to severe 
test compromise conditions were simulated by manipulating the proportion of 
compromised items (0%, 30%, 100%) in the unsecure item set, and compared the 
distribution of the four summary statistics to their true distributions. A small sample of 
100 examinees were used for model calibration. The findings suggested the distribution 
of the estimated statistics are close to their true values in all compromise conditions, 
indicating the power of this method is sufficiently large to detect preknowlege at both 
item and examinee level, and the type-I error is also under control. 
Different from methods based on person-fit measures, Segall’s model not only 
evaluates the test compromise at person level, but also provides diagnostic measures for 
item-level compromise, and the effect of item preknowledge on test score gain can be 
directly estimated. This provides more information than person-fit measures. 
Additionally, due to the distinction between the two types of items, an examinee’s true 
proficiency can be estimated without being affected by the presence of cheating 
responses, which greatly improves the power of the method too.  
Segall’s model makes an assumption that a correct response is made with 100% 
certainty when an examinee has preknowledge on an exposed item. Shu (2010, 2013) 
argued that assuming an examinee memorized every exposed item correctly and 
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successfully retrieved the correct answer during the test was too unrealistic, and thus it 
may limit the flexibility of the model. Shu (2010, 2013) proposed a deterministic gated 
IRT model to characterize item preknowledge. Similar as Segall’s model, Shu’s model 
uses two latent variables- one representing an examinee’s real proficiency (i.e., 𝜃𝑡𝑗), and 
the other representing an examinee’s cheating ability (i.e., 𝜃𝑐𝑗). The conditional 
probability of a correct response is defined as 
𝑃(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑡𝑗 , 𝜃𝑐𝑗 , ⁡𝑇𝑗 , 𝜙𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖)
=
{
 
 
 
 𝑃
𝑡(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑡𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛⁡𝜙𝑖 = 0, ⁡𝑇𝑗 = 0
𝑃𝑡(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑡𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛⁡𝜙𝑖 = 0, ⁡𝑇𝑗 = 1
𝑃𝑡(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑡𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛⁡𝜙𝑖 = 1, ⁡𝑇𝑗 = 0
𝑃𝑐(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑐𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛⁡𝜙𝑖 = 1, ⁡𝑇𝑗 = 1
 
(14) 
and 
 
𝑃𝑡(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑡𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖) =
exp⁡(𝜃𝑡𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖)
1 + exp⁡(𝜃𝑡𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖)
 (15) 
 
 
𝑃𝑐(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑐𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖) =
exp⁡(𝜃𝑐𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖)
1 + exp⁡(𝜃𝑐𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖)
 (16) 
 𝑇𝑗 = 1,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛⁡𝜃𝑡𝑗 < 𝜃𝑐𝑗 ⁡ (17) 
Equations (15) and (16) define the probability of a correct response due to one’s 
true proficiency and cheating ability respectively. They both take the form of the standard 
IRT models. 𝜙𝑖 denotes the type of an item. 𝜙𝑖 = 1 represents an unsecure item, and 
𝜙𝑖 = 0 represents a secure item. ⁡𝑇𝑗 is the indicator for cheater. 𝑇𝑗 = 1 represents 
examinee j has item preknowledge, and 𝑇𝑗 = 0 indicates the examinee does not. As 
equation (14) suggests, the probability only depends on an examinee’s cheating ability 
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when the examinee is a cheater and the item is unsecure. To solve the identification 
problem, ∑𝑏𝑖 = 0 is specified as a constraint.  
MCMC is used for model estimation. The posterior probability that an examinee 
has item preknowledge is used as the summary statistic, and it is compared to a cut-off 
(i.e. 𝑃𝐶) defined by the user to classify an examinee as being a cheater or not. A 
simulation study was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of this method in conditions 
with different proportions of compromised items in the entire test (0%, 30%, 50%, 70%), 
proportions of cheaters (5%, 35% and 70%) and different levels of score gains (high-, 
medium-, and low-effective). Responses to a 40-item linear test was simulated and a 
sample size of 2000 was used. The cut-off point of 0.9 was used, indicating only if the 
posterior mean of 𝑇𝑗 is greater than 0.9, an examinee was classified as cheater. Specificity 
analyses (i.e. the classification accuracy among non-cheaters) suggest that the 
classification accuracy among non-cheaters is above 0.96 in all conditions, indicating that 
the false positive rate of this method is small. The sensitivity analyses (i.e. the 
classification accuracy among cheaters) suggest that the sensitivity of this method is quite 
high when there is only a smaller proportion of cheaters. The sensitivity decreased when 
the proportion of cheaters increased, as a result of the negative influence of cheating 
responses on item parameter estimation. This method had the higher sensitivity when the 
amount of each type of item is about the same (i.e. 50% secure items and 50% unsecure 
items) compared to the unbalanced proportion between the two types of items (i.e. 30% 
secure vs 70% unsecure, or 70% secure vs 30% unsecure), since the estimation for 𝜃𝑡𝑗  
and  𝜃𝑐𝑗 was of equal precision when two types of items are of the same length. 
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Shu (2013) also applied this method to a real dataset, which consisted of 14 
unsecure items and 21 secure items with more than 15,000 examinees. Findings from the 
real dataset supported the applicability and validity of the model. As for the applicability 
of the model in practice, the MCMC estimation for the model parameters converged well 
in 8,000 iterations, indicating that stable estimations can be achieved in practice. As for 
the validity of the model, the real proficiency, 𝜃𝑡, estimated from the deterministic gated 
model had high correlation for the estimates obtained from the standard IRT models 
solely based on the unexposed items. The model consistently flagged the same proportion 
of examinees with item preknowledge in different random samples with the same sample 
size. Shu (2013) also analyzed the characteristics of the examinees that are identified as 
using preknowledge, and found that this model tended to identify examinees of 
low/medium true proficiency with significant score gains (i.e. large values of 𝜃𝑐 − 𝜃𝑡).  
Both the simulation study and the real data analysis suggested some success and 
promise of applying Shu’s model in detecting item preknowlege. However, there are two 
major limitations with this approach. First of all, the deterministic gated model was only 
developed based on the 1PL-IRT model, which often fails to demonstrate a reasonable fit 
to educational data. The model could be extended to the 2PL- or 3PL- IRT model, but 
that increases the estimation complexity and its practical applicability remains unknown. 
Second, Shu assumed that the cheating model takes the same form as the standard IRT 
model, and the only difference in the cheating and non-cheating condition lies in the 
difference in θ. This is equivalent to assuming lack of theta invariance between the two 
types of items. However, as discussed before, item preknowledge is not as simple as lack 
of theta invariance. By assuming the cheating model to be 𝑃𝑐(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑐𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖) =
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exp⁡(𝜃𝑐𝑗−𝑏𝑖)
1+exp⁡(𝜃𝑐𝑗−𝑏𝑖)
, we are assuming that as an item becomes easier, 𝑃𝑐(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑐𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖) 
increases, but the increase in 𝑃𝑐(𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑐𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖) probability is more relevant to the 
success of an examinee’s item memorization or the exposure rate of an item, instead of 
the item difficulty. Therefore, the assumption for the cheating model may be questioned. 
This is the similar problem with the method proposed by Segall (2002) and McLeod et al. 
(2003), where a cheating model needs to be specified. Since both Shu (2010, 2013) and 
Segall (2002) simulated cheating with the model they proposed, their simulation studies 
are free of the problem for mis-specifying the cheating model. But the flexibility of their 
models is limited by the extent to which a cheating mechanism can be adequately 
represented by a particular cheating model.  
Regression-based method. Regression is commonly used in practice to identify 
outliers which have large score difference on two subtests (Haberman, 2008; Lewis, Lee, 
& von Davier, 2012). For the detection of preknowledge, a simple linear regression 
model is built to predict an examinee’s score on the unsecure section using his/her score 
on the secure section, or the other way around, and examinees with large standardized 
residuals are flagged for further investigation. 
Li, Gu and Manna (2014) conducted a simulation study to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this method in detecting preknowledge in a state assessment. They built 
the regression model to predict an examinee’s score on the secure items using the score 
on the unsecure items. An outlier was identified if the residual was greater than two 
RMSE. Responses were simulated on 60 items in a linear test to mimic a typical state 
assessment. As the focus of their study was to evaluate the detection rate in different 
schools, schools with different sample sizes were simulated, and two variables were 
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manipulated – proportion of cheaters in each school (25%, 50%, 75%) and proportion of 
exposed items (5%, 17%, 33%). The regression model was built based on all the 
simulated schools, and the analysis was conducted for each school. The power in their 
study was very small- lower than 0.05 in all conditions, which implies that the practical 
usefulness of the method may be very limited.  
Person-fit Analysis with Purified ?̂?. Wang et al. (2015) applied two person-fit 
statistics to compare an examinee’s performance on the two types of items. Different 
from standard person-fit analysis, instead of obtaining 𝜃 from the entire response vector, 
𝜃 was estimated based on secure items only to prevent 𝜃 from being contaminated by the 
cheating responses on the possibly compromised items. The person-fit statistics were then 
calculated with the “purified” 𝜃. 
Two person-fit statistics were investigated: one is an adapted version of 𝑍𝑐 
(denoted as 𝑍𝑐
∗) and the other is 𝑙𝑧. For the calculation of 𝑍𝑐, instead of comparing the 
residuals between easy and hard items, Wang et al. compared the residuals between 
secure and unsecure items, so 𝑍𝑐
∗ takes the following form 
 𝑍𝑐
∗
=
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑[𝑃𝑖(𝜃) − 𝑢𝑖]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑃𝑖(𝜃) − 𝑢𝑖]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
√{∑
{𝑃𝑖(𝜃)[1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)]}
𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑
2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 } + {∑
{𝑃𝑖(𝜃)[1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)]}
𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒
2𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒 }
 (18) 
To increase the power of 𝑙𝑧, 𝑙𝑧 was calculated based on the exposed items only. 𝑙𝑧 takes 
the following form  
 
𝑙𝑧 =
𝑙0 − 𝐸(𝑙0)
[𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙0)]1/2
 (19) 
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where 𝑙0 = ∑ {𝑈𝑔𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑔(𝜃) + (1 − 𝑈𝑔)𝑙𝑛
𝑘
𝑔=1 [1 − 𝑃𝑔(𝜃)]} 
𝐸(𝑙0) = ∑ {𝑃𝑔(𝜃)𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑔(𝜃) + (1 − 𝑃𝑔(𝜃))𝑙𝑛
𝑘
𝑔=1 [1 − 𝑃𝑔(𝜃)]} , 
Var(𝑙0) = ⁡∑ 𝑃𝑔(𝜃) (1 − 𝑃𝑔(𝜃)) [𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑔(𝜃)
1−𝑃𝑔(𝜃)
]2𝑘𝑔=1   
Wang et al. investigated the effectiveness of the two statistics in two scenarios. In 
the first scenario, item parameters were known, so the cheating responses did not have 
any impact on item parameters. In the second scenario, item parameters were unknown 
and item calibration was conducted with the presence of cheating responses, so the 
impact of bias in item parameter estimates introduced by the cheating responses on the 
effectiveness of both person-fit statistics was evaluated. The empirical distributions of 
both statistics were also investigated and compared to their asymptotic distribution (i.e. 
N(0,1)). 
Wang et al. simulated dichotomous responses to 60 items in a linear test for both 
scenarios. In the first scenario, proportion of exposed items was manipulated (25%, 50%, 
75%). The empirical null distributions for both statistics showed a deviation from their 
theoretical distribution when 𝜃 was obtained from a small number of items (e.g. 15 
items), but empirical null distribution of 𝑍𝑐
∗ was much closer to its theoretical distribution 
than 𝑙𝑧. High detection power for both statistics were observed, and 𝑍𝑐
∗ was also found to 
be more powerful to detect item preknowledge among high-proficiency examinees than 
𝑙𝑧. In the second scenario, proportion of cheaters (10%, 30%) and proportion of exposed 
items (25%, 50%) were manipulated, and the results suggested large bias in item 
parameters could significantly reduce the power of both statistics, and greatly inflate the 
false positive rate, especially for 𝑙𝑧, which is similar as found by Shu (2013). 
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These findings suggest that the power of person-fit statistics could be largely 
improved by removing bias in 𝜃 caused by aberrant responses. However, the problem of 
discrepancy between the empirical and the theoretical null distribution still exists and 
may limit the effectiveness of person-fit analysis. Wang et al. conducted power analysis 
using the critical values from the empirical null distribution, which was simulated using 
the true θ for each examinee. True θ is never known in practice, and the empirical null 
distribution can only be simulated based on 𝜃, which contains estimation error, especially 
when 𝜃 is obtained from a small number of items. 
Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence. Belov, Pashley, Lewis and Armstrong (2007) 
first proposed the idea of using the KL divergence to detect item preknowledge. Belov 
(2013, 2014) extended the work by considering situations where the set of exposed items 
is unknown, and by detecting test compromise at both the group and person level. KL 
divergence measures the dissimilarity between two distributions, defined as 
 
𝐷(𝑃1||𝑃2) = 𝐸 (𝑙𝑛
𝑃1(𝑥)
𝑃2(𝑥)
) (20) 
where 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 represent two distributions for random variable x. For discrete 
distributions, 𝐷(𝑃1||𝑃2) = ∑ 𝑃1(𝑥𝑖)𝑙𝑛
𝑃1(𝑥𝑖)
𝑃2(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , and for continuous distributions, 
𝐷(𝑃1||𝑃2) = ∫𝑃1(𝑥𝑖)𝑙𝑛
𝑃1(𝑥𝑖)
𝑃2(𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥. Large values of  𝐷(𝐺||𝐻) indicate large difference 
between G and H.  
Belov et al. (2007) defined the person-level cheating index (ℎ) as the KL 
divergence between the posterior distributions of θ obtained from the two types of items, 
i.e., 
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 ℎ = 𝐷(𝑃(𝜃𝑗|𝒖𝟏)||𝑃(𝜃𝑗|𝒖𝟐)), (21) 
where 𝒖𝟏 and 𝒖𝟐 are response vectors on secure and unsecure items, respectively. To 
identify the aberrant groups, Belov (2013, 2014) defined the group-level index (𝑔𝑐) as the 
extended form of KL divergence between the distributions of ℎ in one group and its 
distribution in every other group, i.e.,   
 𝑔𝑐 =∑(𝐷(𝐻𝑐||𝐻𝑥) + 𝐷(𝐻𝑥||𝐻𝑐))
𝑥⋴𝐶
 (22) 
where 𝑐 is the index for a group, and C denotes the set of groups,⁡𝐻𝑐 and 𝐻𝑥 denote the 
distribution of ℎ in group c and x . The sum of two KL divergence in equation (22) is to 
balance the asymmetry between 𝐷(𝐻𝑐||𝐻𝑥) and 𝐷(𝐻𝑥||𝐻𝑐).  
To detect examinees using item preknowledge, Belov (2013) proposed a two-
stage detection method. In stage 1, 𝑔𝑐 was computed for each group, and the empirical 
distribution of 𝑔𝑐 was constructed using all the data. Given a significance level, groups 
with large values of 𝑔𝑐 at the tail of the empirical distribution were identified as the 
aberrant group. In stage 2, the empirical distribution for ℎ was constructed using data 
from the groups not identified in stage-1, and the critical value for h was found from the 
empirical distribution and used to identify aberrant examinees in the aberrant group 
identified in stage-1. Belov (2013) pointed out that the groups could be formed according 
to various relations between examinees. For instance, a group can consist of examinees 
taking the test in the same geographic location, or examinees from the same high school, 
same test-preparation center or same social networks. By conducting a two-stage 
detection, the aberrant groups were removed from building the empirical distribution of 
h, so that the empirical distribution is closer to that in the null condition. Furthermore, the 
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person-level detection is only limited to the individuals in the aberrant group, which can 
help reduce the type-I error rate. Simulations studies conducted by Belov (2013, 2014) 
demonstrated that this two-stage approach was more effective in reducing the type-I error 
rate than only conducting stage 2 without removing aberrant groups. 
Belov (2013) considered three detection situations. In the first situation, all groups 
have preknowlege on the same set of exposed items, and the compromised item-set is 
known. An example of this situation is that a test agency can find some exposed items on 
the Internet. In the second situation, each group has preknowledge on a different subset of 
exposed items. The compromised subset unique to each group is unknown, but each 
subset belongs to a known collection of compromised subsets 𝛺 = (𝑊1, … ,𝑊𝑚). An 
example is that various subsets of exposed items are found on different Internet sources. 
In the third situation, each group has preknowledge on a unique subset of exposed items, 
and each subset is unknown, which is the most realistic scenario.  
In the first situation, the two-stage procedure was implemented directly. In the 
second and third situation, a “3D” algorithm was applied to first detect the aberrant 
group, and then detect the compromised item-set corresponding to each aberrant group, 
and lastly detect the aberrant persons given the aberrant group and compromised subset. 
The basic idea for finding the compromised subset unique to each group is to calculate 𝑔𝑐 
based on different subsets of items for a given group c, and the subset that gives the 
largest value for 𝑔𝑐 is the compromised subset unique to group c. Therefore, for detection 
in the second situation, all the subsets in 𝛺 were compared to each other, while for 
detection in the third situation, since the number of all possible subsets is enormous, 
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Belov (2014) used a heuristic combinatorial optimization approach, called simulated 
annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, & Vecchi, 1983) to find the compromised subset.   
Belov (2013, 2014) conducted a series of simulation studies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the method in all three situations. A 50-item CAT was simulated using 
the item bank for the Law School Admission Test. Different proportion of aberrant 
groups (5%-20%) and different proportion of cheaters in an aberrant group (5%-20%) 
were manipulated in the simulation. In the first situation, item preknowledge was 
introduced to 4 and 12 items respectively, and the two-stage approach had low type-I 
error rate and high power even when the aberrant subset only consisted of 4 items. In the 
second and third situation, each aberrant group was assigned a unique compromised 
subset. Item preknowledge was introduced to around 40% and 20% of the test in second 
and third situation, respectively. In both situations, the 3D algorithm was found to greatly 
increase the power compared to the algorithm not identifying the compromised subset 
unique to each group.  
The method based on KL divergence proved to be effective in detecting the 
difference in an examinee’s performance between two subsets of items, and the use of 
combinatorial optimization is helpful for finding the compromised subset of items. 
However, the effectiveness of the method may be limited by one potential problem. An 
assumption underlying detection in different situations is that all examinees in one 
aberrant group have preknowledge on the same set of compromised items. Belov (2014) 
argued that “considering how small a group can be (e.g., class) or how specific 
corresponding relation can be (e.g. same group in a social network), this assumption is 
realistic”. Nevertheless, this poses a requirement for finding the correct relation among 
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examinees, so that each group only has one unique subset of compromised items. If the 
assumption is not satisfied, the power for detecting aberrant groups in stage 1 would be 
reduced, which would then affect the effectiveness at person-level detection. Belov 
(2014) proposes a method to take multiple relations among examinees into account, but 
multiple comparisons need to be conducted when multiple relations are considered and 
procedures used to control the familywise error rate would reduce the power to some 
extent. In addition, one purpose of using the two-stage detection algorithm is to make the 
empirical distribution of person-level index approximate to its empirical null distribution. 
Although the two-stage algorithm proved to be effective in this study, it only provides a 
less optimal solution to finding the null distribution for the statistic, and it relies on the 
effective detection of aberrant groups. As will be seen from the following section, the 
predictive checking method constructs the exact empirical null distribution in an easier 
way than the method based on KL divergence.  
2.3 Summary of Existing Methods 
To summarize existing methods in the literature, first of all, methods based on 
person-fit analysis are mostly aimed at detecting the general misfit of an individual’s 
response vector. With regular person-fit analysis, the cause of an aberrant response vector 
is not assumed, and thus a response vector flagged by a person-fit statistic could be due to 
other aberrant behaviors than item preknowledge. In applying person-fit statistics in 
detecting item preknowledge, one could obtain an individual’s proficiency estimate from 
the secure items and calculate the person-fit statistic on the unsecure items, as in Wang et 
al. (2014), but the point estimation of an individual’s proficiency does not take estimation 
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error into account, and Wang et al. (2015) showed the empirical null distribution of a 
statistic did not always approximate its asymptotic distribution, which is a common 
problematic feature with many person-fit statistics in short or medium-length tests.  
Second, for approaches that are developed to detect item preknowledge in 
particular, methods proposed by McLeod et al. (2003), Segall (2002) and Shu (2010, 
2013) all require the specification of a cheating model to characterize one’s performance 
given item preknowledge. It is hard to know the goodness-of-fit of a particular cheating 
model in practice, and the misspecification of cheating model may affect the 
effectiveness of the method to some extent. The regression-based approach used by Li et 
al. (2014) had very little power to detect preknowledge on exposed items, so its practical 
usefulness may be limited. The KL divergence measure used by Belov (2011, 2013, 
2014) demonstrated some promises to detect item preknowledge both at the group and at 
the person level, but the person-level detection relies on a group of individuals, and the 
sampling distribution used to flag person-level misfit is not strictly the null distribution of 
the person-level statistic. As will be seen in the next section, the predictive checking 
method can overcome some of the problems with the existing methods, and thus the 
present study has the potential for methodological contributions to the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter 3, the mathematical definition and statistical properties of the 
predictive checking method are first introduced, followed by an explanation of the 
technical details for implementing the method. Specifically, four aspects related to the 
method are discussed in detail, including the estimation approach, sampling procedure, 
choice of test statistics and detection at different levels.  For comparison with the 
predictive checking method, three other approaches, including the likelihood ratio test, 
adapted KL divergence and the regression-based method, are used and discussed here. 
The studies on the evaluation of the predictive checking method and on the comparison 
of the predictive checking method with the other methods are described in Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 6. 
For notation simplicity, the secure subset is denoted as T1, and the unsecure 
subset is denoted as T2 henceforth. Let Y=(𝑌1, 𝑌2, … , 𝑌𝑛) denote a random vector of 
responses on a set of items, and let y=(𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑛)  be a realization of Y. 
3.1 Predictive Checking Method 
3.1.1 Mathematical Definition and Properties 
Predictive checking is a general method to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of a given 
model based on predictive inference (Geisser, 1993). The basic idea under predictive 
checking is to predict the possible outcomes of future observations based on current 
observations, and when future observations become available, they are compared to the 
predictions to check the appropriateness of the model used for prediction. As the first step 
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in predictive checking, predictive inferences about unobserved data are made by 
constructing their distribution conditional on data that have been observed. Then the 
model-fit can be checked by comparing the observed data to the predictive distribution. 
To be specific, consider a test is divided into two subsets, and let 𝒚𝟏, 𝒚𝟐 be an 
examinee’s observed responses on subset I and II respectively. Let 𝝎 denote the 
unknown parameter(s) in the model, and 𝑝(𝝎⁡|𝒚𝟏) be the posterior distribution of⁡𝝎 
conditional on responses on subset I. Let ?̃?2 be the response data on subset II that would 
be observed (i.e., predictive data) if the responses on subset II come from the same model 
as 𝒚𝟏, and let  𝑝(?̃?2|𝝎⁡) be the likelihood distribution for predictive response vector ?̃?2 
given parameter(s)⁡𝝎. By “averaging” over all possible values of 𝝎, the distribution of 
?̃?2 conditional on 𝒚𝟏 is 
 𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏) = ∫𝑝(?̃?2|𝝎⁡) 𝑝(𝝎⁡|𝒚𝟏) 𝑑𝝎. (22) 
Predictive checking evaluates the model fit by comparing the observed responses 𝒚𝟐 to 
the distribution of predictive data ?̃?2. Typically, a test statistic T(𝐲)⁡is defined to measure 
the discrepancy between the observed and predictive data, so T(𝒚𝟐) is compared to the 
predictive distribution of  T(?̃?𝟐), and the predictive p-value is used to summarize the 
comparison. The predictive p-value in a one-tailed test is  
Pr(T(?̃?𝟐) ≥ T(𝒚𝟐)|𝒚𝟏) = ∫𝑇(?̃?2)≥T(𝒚𝟐)𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏)𝑑?̃?2 (23) 
for right-tailed test or  
Pr(T(?̃?𝟐) ≤ T(𝒚𝟐)|𝒚𝟏) = ∫𝑇(?̃?2)≤T(𝒚𝟐)𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏)𝑑?̃?2 (24) 
for left-tailed test, and the p-value in a two-tailed test is 2min⁡(Pr(T(?̃?𝟐) ≥
T(𝒚𝟐)|𝒚𝟏) , Pr(T(?̃?𝟐) ≤ T(𝒚𝟐)|𝒚𝟏)).   A p-value close to zero indicates the observed 
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response pattern is unlikely to be produced by the null model, and thus it indicates model 
misfit.  
In the context of this study, assuming item parameters are available, which is 
often the case in a continuous testing program, the unknown parameter in an IRT model 
is simply the person proficiency parameter θ. Assuming the true value of an examinee’s 
proficiency parameter is 𝜃0, as the number of items in T1 increases to infinity, 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏) 
will converge to the point mass distribution at 𝜃0 by posterior consistency (van der Vaart, 
1998), and thus 𝑝(𝑇(?̃?2)|𝒚𝟏) will converge to its true distribution 𝑝(𝑇(?̃?2)|𝜃0). Due to 
such consistency, the predictive p-value is an asymptotically frequentist p-value which 
has a uniform distribution over [0, 1] under the null model.  
The predictive checking procedure proposed here is similar to the posterior 
predictive checks (PPC) in a Bayesian framework, which is a common technique to check 
model fit in Bayesian analysis (e.g., Rubin, 1984; Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996; Gelman 
et al., 2013). PPC has been applied in assessing model fit or person fit in the IRT 
literature (e.g. Glas & Meijer, 2003; Sinharay, 2005; Sinharay, 2015; Sinharay & 
Johnson, 2003; Sinharay, Johnson, & Stern, 2006). However, in PPC, the construction of 
the posterior distribution of unknown parameters and the calculation of test statistics are 
based on the same dataset. The double use of the data causes the p-value in PPC to be 
conservative and thus it is less likely to reject the null hypothesis and to detect model 
misfit (e.g., Bayarri & Berger, 2000; Robins, van der Vaart, & Ventura, 2000). Different 
from PPC, the construction of the posterior distribution and the computation of the 
observed test statistic in the proposed method are performed on different sets of items, so 
the p-values in this method need not be conservative as in PPC.  
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This method provides several advantages over existing methods in detecting item 
preknowledge. Compared to methods that use person-fit statistics (e.g., Wang, Li, & Gu, 
2015) or KL Divergence (Belov, 2013, 2014), the sampling distribution of the test 
statistic constructed in predictive checking takes into account the uncertainty in θ 
estimation. In addition, the sampling distribution is not derived based on asymptotic 
theories, so it is expected to work well for small sample sizes. Compared to using 
expanded IRT models to characterize item preknowledge propensity (Segall, 2002; Shu, 
2010), no model for the examinee’s performance under preknowledge condition needs to 
be assumed with predictive checking, and it is much easier to implement and can be used 
either during or after test administration.  
3.1.2 Implementation of Predictive Checking 
The implementation of this method consists of three steps. The first step is to 
estimate the posterior distribution 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏) from T1. The second step is to construct the 
predictive distribution 𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏) on T2. The analytic form for 𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏) is hard to derive 
in the IRT framework, so simulation is used to construct 𝑝(?̃?2|𝒚𝟏). Specifically, K 
samples of θ, denoted (𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝐾), are first drawn from 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏). Then for each 𝜃
𝑘(𝑘 =
1, … , 𝐾), predictive response vectors on T2, ?̃?2
𝑘(𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾) are generated in the null 
condition assuming there is no item preknowledge. This will result in K sets of predictive 
response data. In the final step, a test statistic is chosen and the test statistic is calculated 
for each predictive dataset and thus the predictive distribution for the test statistic, 
𝑝(𝑇(?̃?2)|𝒚𝟏), is constructed. The test statistic computed from observed responses on T2 
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can then be compared to its predictive distribution.  The following four sections discuss 
the details for implementing each step in this study. 
3.1.2.1 Estimation of 𝒑(𝜽|𝒚𝟏) from T1 
The θ distribution can be constructed in three ways, including the normal 
approximation of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of 𝜃, the posterior 
distribution in Bayesian framework, and the fiducial distribution from generalized 
fiducial inference (Hannig, 2009; 2013). Normal approximation of the MLE of 𝜃 is not 
considered as the normal approximation may not work well when the number of secure 
items is small, and in practice, it is often hard to have a large number of secure items. 
Bayesian posterior distribution and fiducial distribution are considered here. Bayesian 
posterior distribution is used due to both its popular use in IRT estimation and its ease of 
implementation. Fiducial distribution can be interpreted as a posterior calculated from a 
data-dependent non-informative prior, and it is considered here because its application in 
IRT parameter estimation suggested it can lead to better item parameter recovery than 
Bayesian approach with a non-informative prior when sample size is small (Liu, 2015). 
3.1.2.1.1 Bayesian Posterior Distribution 
According to Bayes’ rule, 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏) ⁡∝ 𝑝(𝜃)𝑝(𝒚𝟏|𝜃), where  𝑝(𝜃) is the prior 
density and 𝑝(𝒚𝟏|𝜃) is the likelihood for response pattern on T1. As for the choice of 
prior distribution, standard normal distribution is often used as the prior distribution in 
IRT scoring estimation, but preliminary analyses suggested using N(0,1) as prior would 
lead to large inflation of type-I error at extreme theta levels when the number of secure 
items is small. Therefore, less-informative prior distributions are employed so that less 
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shrinkage is introduced to the resulting posterior distribution. Two less informative priors 
are explored: one is a normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 2 - 
i.e., N(0,22) and the other is Jeffreys’ prior. Jeffreys’ prior is considered here since it has 
been shown to result in good coverage-efficiency balance for the binomial proportion 
(e.g., Brown, Cai, & DasGupta, 2001). If item parameters are the same for all binary 
items, the problem for θ estimation is then isomorphic to the problem of binomial 
proportion estimation. This is because when all items have the same parameters, the item 
responses are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli trials, and the 
probability of a correct response can be estimated as a binomial proportion. Jeffreys’ 
prior is proportional to the square root of Fisher information for⁡𝜃: 
𝑝(𝜃) = 𝐼(𝜃)1/2 = [∑
[𝑃𝑖
′(𝜃)]2
𝑃𝑖(𝜃)𝑄𝑖(𝜃)
𝐼
𝑖=1
]1/2 (25) 
where i is the index for item, and I is the total number of items, 𝑃𝑖(𝜃) is the probability of 
a correct response on item i and 𝑄𝑖(𝜃) = 1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃). 𝑃𝑖
′(𝜃) is the first derivative of 𝑃𝑖(𝜃) 
with respect to 𝜃. 
3.1.2.1.2 Fiducial Distribution 
The idea of fiducial distribution was first introduced by Fisher (1930) as an 
attempt to make probability statements about unknown parameters without assuming a 
prior distribution. Basically, fiducial inference is based on the idea of switching the role 
between the parameters and the data. The logic of fiducial inference can be illustrated by 
a normal-location example. Suppose 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛 are i.i.d. random variables from N(µ, 𝜎
2), 
with known 𝜎2 but unknown µ. To make an inference about µ, as ?̅?⁡~⁡𝑁(µ, 𝜎2/𝑛), where 
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?̅? = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 /𝑛, ?̅? can be expressed as ?̅? = µ + 𝑈 ∙ 𝜎/√𝑛, where 𝑈 is a random variable 
from N(0,1). This is equivalent to µ = ?̅? − 𝑈 ∙ 𝜎/√𝑛. After observing ?̅? = ?̅?, the fiducial 
distribution for µ is 𝑁(?̅?, 𝜎2/𝑛).  
In generalized fiducial inference (Hannig, 2009; 2013), the definition of a fiducial 
distribution starts with defining the data generating equation, which is an expression 
representing the association among data (X), parameters in the model (𝝎) and 
randomness (U) whose distribution does not depend on 𝝎, i.e., 𝑿 = 𝐺(𝝎,𝑼). For 
instance, in the normal location example above, the data generation equation is ?̅? = µ +
𝑈 ∙ 𝜎/√𝑛. Then the solution set for 𝝎 is found from the data generating equation, denoted 
as 𝑄(𝑿,𝑼) = {𝝎:𝑿 = 𝐺(𝝎,𝑼)}. In the normal location example, the solution set for µ⁡is 
µ = ?̅? − 𝑈 ∙ 𝜎/√𝑛. The solution set for µ⁡is a singleton set, but sometimes the solution 
set may contain no solution or more than one solution. The empty solution case is 
avoided by conditioning the solution set on 𝑄(𝑿,𝑼) ≠ ∅. When there are multiple 
solutions, one needs to select one according to some possibly random rules, denoted 
𝑉(𝑄(𝒙, ⁡𝑼∗)). After observing 𝑿 = 𝒙, the generalized fiducial quantity is defined as 
𝑉(𝑄(𝒙, ⁡𝑼∗))|⁡{𝑄(𝒙,𝑼∗) ≠ ∅} (26) 
where 𝑼∗ is an independent copy of 𝑼. More details about generalized fiducial inference 
can be found in Liu and Hannig (2016), Hannig (2009; 2013), and Hannig, Iyer, Lai, and 
Lee (2016). 
In applications to IRT models, take the 2PL model as an example, the 2PL model 
takes the form of  
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 , 𝜃) =
exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
1 + exp⁡(𝑎𝑖(𝜃 − 𝑏𝑖))
 
(27) 
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The data generating equation for a person’s response to an item i, 𝑌𝑖, is 
𝑌𝑖 = {
1⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑈𝑖 ≤ 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖, 𝜃)
0⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑈𝑖 > 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖, 𝜃)
 
(28) 
where 𝑈𝑖 represents the randomness and 𝑈𝑖~Uniform(0,1). Equation 28 is equivalent to  
𝑌𝑖 = {
1⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝐴𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖𝜃 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
0⁡𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑖 > 𝑎𝑖𝜃 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
 
(29) 
where 𝐴𝑖 = ⁡𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑈𝑖
1−𝑈𝑖
, and 𝐴𝑖~Logistic(0,1). Assuming item parameters (𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖) are 
known, when 𝑎𝑖 > 0, the solution set for 𝜃 from one single response is 
𝜃 ⋴
{
 
 [
𝐴𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑎𝑖
, +∞) 𝑖𝑓⁡𝑌𝑖 = 1
(−∞,
𝐴𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑎𝑖
) ⁡𝑖𝑓𝑌𝑖 = 0
 
(30) 
Given a vector of responses on n items (𝑌1, 𝑌2, … , 𝑌𝑛), let 𝐼0 be the index sets for incorrect 
responses, i.e., 𝐼0 = {𝑖: 𝑌𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛}, and 𝐼1 be the index sets for correct 
responses, i.e., 𝐼1 = {𝑖: 𝑌𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛}. Let s=∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  be the observed total score, 
and let 𝑚0 = min
𝑖⋴𝐼0
𝐴𝑖+𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑎𝑖
 and 𝑚1 = max
𝑖⋴𝐼1
𝐴𝑖+𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑎𝑖
. The solution set for 𝜃 based on 
(𝑌1, 𝑌2, … , 𝑌𝑛) is 
𝜃 ⋴ {
[𝑚1, +∞),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑠 = 𝑛⁡
(−∞,𝑚0),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑠 = 0⁡⁡
(𝑚1, 𝑚0), 𝑖𝑓⁡1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 − 1
∅,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
(31) 
If the solution set is non-empty, it is an interval instead of a single value. So the 
following selection rule is applied: if 𝑠 = 𝑛, 𝜃 = 𝑚1; if 𝑠 = 0, 𝜃 = 𝑚0; if 1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 −
1, 𝜃 = 𝑚0⁡with probability of 0.5 and 𝜃 = 𝑚1⁡with probability of 0.5.  
Note that equation 31 combined with the selection rule gives a single point of⁡𝜃 
corresponding to a fixed vector of (𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛). The fiducial distribution of 𝜃 is 
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derived based on the joint distribution of (𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛). In particular, if 𝑠 = 𝑛⁡𝑜𝑟⁡0, 
𝐴𝑖
∗~Logistic(0,1) and 𝐴𝑖
∗′𝑠 are mutually independent, so 𝑓(𝐴1
∗ , 𝐴2
∗ , … , 𝐴𝑛
∗ ) = ∏ 𝑓(𝐴𝑖
∗)𝑛𝑖=1 . 
If 1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, in order for the solution to be non-empty, 𝐴𝑖
∗′𝑠 should subject to 
𝑚1 < 𝑚0, and each 𝐴𝑖
∗~Logistic(0,1), which means 𝐴𝑖
∗′𝑠 should be chosen such that the 
value of 
𝐴𝑖
∗+𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑎𝑖
 corresponding to any correct response is smaller than that corresponding 
to an incorrect response. The details of sampling for (𝐴1
∗ , 𝐴2
∗ , … , 𝐴𝑛
∗ ) from their joint 
distribution is discussed in the next section. 
3.1.2.2 Sampling From 𝒑(𝜽|𝒚𝟏) 
With Bayesian approach, to sample from the θ distribution, a discrete 
approximation to the posterior distribution is used by evaluating the posterior probability 
over a grid of θ values from -5 to 5 with an equal increment of 0.001. The probability at 
each 𝜃𝑔 (𝑔 = 1, . . . ,10001) is computed as 𝑝(𝜃𝑔|𝒚𝟏)/∑ 𝑝(𝜃𝑔|𝒚𝟏)
10001
𝑔=1 , and then the 
sample command in R (Version 3.1.1; R Core Team, 2014) is used to get a sample of θ 
values according to their probability. 
With fiducial approach, 1000 samples of vector 𝑨∗ = (𝐴1
∗ , 𝐴2
∗ , … , 𝐴𝑛
∗ ) are first 
drawn from their joint distribution, denoted as 𝑨∗(𝒌) = (𝐴1
∗ , 𝐴2
∗ , … , 𝐴𝑛
∗ )(𝑘) (k=1, 
2,…,1000). Then for a given sample 𝑨∗(𝒌), 𝜃(𝑘) is obtained based on equation (31) and 
the selection rule. To draw (𝐴1
∗ , 𝐴2
∗ , … , 𝐴𝑛
∗ )(𝑘) from their joint distribution, if 𝑠 = 𝑛⁡𝑜𝑟⁡0, 
𝐴𝑖
∗ is simulated from Logistic(0,1) for all i (i=1,2,…,n), and 𝜃(𝑘) simply takes 𝑚1 or 𝑚0. 
If 1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, Gibbs sampling (e.g. Gelman et al., 2013) technique is implemented. 
Gibbs sampler draws each 𝐴𝑖
∗ from its conditional distribution on all other parameters, so 
it decomposes the problem of drawing from a n-dimensional multivariate distribution into 
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drawing from a series of one-dimensional distributions. The algorithm starts with 
arbitrarily selected starting values of (𝐴1
∗(0)
, 𝐴2
∗(0)
, … , 𝐴𝑛
∗(0)
) which satisfies 𝑚1 < 𝑚0. The 
algorithm then proceeds to update each component in 𝑨∗ in turn in one sample. 
Specifically, at the tth sample (t=1, 2, …, 2000),  
𝐴1
∗(𝑡)
 is drawn from 𝑝(𝐴1
∗ |𝐴2
∗(𝑡−1)
, 𝐴3
∗(𝑡−1)
, … , 𝐴𝑛
∗(𝑡−1)
) 
𝐴2
∗(𝑡)
 is drawn from 𝑝(𝐴2
∗ |𝐴1
∗(𝑡)
, 𝐴3
∗(𝑡−1)
, … , 𝐴𝑛
∗(𝑡−1)
) 
⋮ 
𝐴𝑛
∗(𝑡)
 is drawn from 𝑝(𝐴𝑛
∗ |𝐴1
∗(𝑡)
, 𝐴2
∗(𝑡)
, 𝐴3
∗(𝑡)
, … , 𝐴𝑛−1
∗(𝑡)
). 
Let 𝑨∗(−𝑖) denote the vector 𝑨
∗ excluding component 𝐴𝑖. If the ith response is correct, 
𝑝(𝐴𝑖
∗|𝑨∗(−𝑖))  is the density of Logistic(0,1) truncated from above at 𝑎𝑖𝑚0 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖, and if 
the ith response is incorrect, 𝑝(𝐴𝑖
∗|𝑨∗(−𝑖)) is the density of Logistic(0,1) truncated from 
below at 𝑎𝑖𝑚1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖.   
The convergence of the algorithm was assessed visually via trace plots, and a 
preliminary analysis suggested convergence was reached quickly. The fiducial 
distribution was constructed using the last 1000 samples.  
3.1.2.3 Test Statistics 
Three test statistics are considered to use in predictive checking. The first statistic 
is the summed score on T2, the second statistic is the point estimate of θ (denoted as 𝜃) 
from T2, and the third statistic is the variance of the posterior distribution of θ from T2 
(i.e., var(𝜃|𝒚𝟐)). The first two statistics are supposed to be responsive to item 
preknowledge, as the direct statistical effect caused by item preknowledge is test score 
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increase. The summed score is easy to calculate, but it only provides partial information 
from the response pattern. For example, given a total of n binary items, there are 2𝑛 
possible response patterns, but there are only (n+1) possible summed scores (i.e. scoring 
from 0 to n). Also, when the number of items is small, the predictive distribution of the 
summed score only consists of a few categories, and the discreteness of the predictive 
distribution may limit the detection power. In contrast, 𝜃 provides more information than 
the summed score. The total number of possible 𝜃 can be as many as the total number of 
possible response patterns in a two-parameter or three-parameter IRT model. In this 
study, 𝜃 is computed via expected a posteriori (EAP), which is a commonly-used 
estimator for θ in IRT. The choice of the third statistic is similar to the two person-fit 
statistics proposed by Drasgow et al. (1987) to evaluate the flatness of the likelihood 
function. A large variance of the θ posterior may suggest that the likelihood function is 
flat, which implies that the responses provide less information for θ estimation. When the 
summed score or the EAP is used, a one-tailed test is conducted and an unusually large 
score is identified as being aberrant, since score increase is of primary concern in the case 
of item preknowledge. When variance of 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟐) is used, a two-tailed test is conducted, 
as the variance could be either too large or too small in the case of item preknowledge. 
3.1.2.4 Item-set Level and Item Level Detection 
Discussions above have been focused on applying predictive checking to the 
entire T2.  In practice, the choice of unsecure items could be difficult. In some situations, 
one may know exactly which items have high risks of being compromised, such as the 
items found being posted on the Internet. In that situation, predictive checking can be 
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applied on those items altogether. However, a more realistic scenario is that different 
examinees could have preknowledge on different subsets of items, and which items and 
how many items are compromised are unknown to us. In addition, the power of 
predictive checking could also be affected if a set of items only consists of a small 
proportion of truly compromised items. Therefore, a method for item-level detection is 
proposed here.  
The idea for item-level detection is to evaluate the change of 𝜃 from including a 
particular item to excluding that item. If a correct response on an item is due to item 
preknowledge, 𝜃 is expected to show a decrease by excluding the item from estimation. 
In contrast, if an item response (regardless of correct or incorrect response) fits the 
model, the change in 𝜃 by excluding the item from estimation is expected to be caused by 
estimation error or by the increased proportion of aberrant responses in the remaining 
response vector. Specifically, to conduct predictive checking for item i, one still obtains 
𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏) from secure items, draws N samples from 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏), and simulates N sets of 
predictive response data ?̃?𝟐 on a set of items including item i. Then 𝜃 is computed on 
each predictive dataset first with item i included (denoted as 𝜃(?̃?𝟐)), and then with item i 
excluded (denoted as 𝜃(?̃?𝟐
−𝒊)). Correspondingly,  𝜃 is computed on the observed 
responses on the same set of items first with item i included (denoted as 𝜃(𝒚𝟐)), and then 
with item i excluded (denoted as 𝜃(𝒚𝟐
−𝒊)). The difference between the two 𝜃’s  is used as 
the test statistic. The observed difference, ∆𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃(𝒚𝟐
−𝒊) − 𝜃(𝒚𝟐), is then compared to 
the predictive distribution of ∆̃𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃(?̃?𝟐
−𝒊) − 𝜃(?̃?𝟐). Although it is expected to see a 
negative change in 𝜃 after deleting a compromised item and thus a left-tailed test should 
be used, preliminary analyses suggest that using a one-tailed test could result in an 
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excessive inflation of type-I error rates at medium 𝜃 levels. Therefore, a two-tailed test 
was used to flag unusually large |∆𝜃𝑖| in this study. 
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 below describe the three methods used to compare to the 
predictive checking method. These three methods are the likelihood ratio test, the adapted 
KL divergence and the regression-based method. The reason to choose each method for 
comparison is also justified in each of the sections below.  
3.2 Likelihood Ratio Test  
Likelihood ratio test is considered here as it is commonly used to compare the 
goodness of fit between two nested models in statistics and it has an asymptotic sampling 
distribution. For the purpose of this study, the two models compared here are a) the 
person’s ability remains constant throughout T1 and T2, and b) the person’s ability on T1 
is lower than that on T2. This is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis  
𝐻0:⁡𝜃1 = 𝜃2 
against the alternative hypothesis  
𝐻1:⁡𝜃1 < 𝜃2 
where 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 represent a person’s ability on T1 and T2 respectively. The idea of the 
likelihood ratio test used here is similar to the invariance test used by Klauer (1991), as 
discussed in Chapter 2. It is also similar to the likelihood ratio statistic proposed by 
Levine and Drasgow (1988), but the test used here does not specify a particular misfitting 
model, so the optimal detection property does not hold here. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, unless we can find the right model to characterize an examinee’s performance 
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under the preknowledge situation, the optimal detection will not be achieved by any 
means.   
The likelihood ratio test is very easy to implement. It compares the maximum 
likelihood of a response pattern under 𝐻0 to that under 𝐻1. Specifically, the maximum 
likelihood of the response pattern on two subtests under 𝐻0 is  
𝐿(𝜃) = ∏ 𝑃𝑖(𝜃)
𝑌𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃))
1−𝑌𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1   (32) 
where n is the total number of items on two subtests, 𝑌𝑖 is the item response on item i, and 
𝜃 is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) based on the responses throughout T1 and 
T2. The maximum likelihood under 𝐻1 is 
𝐿(𝜃1, 𝜃2) = ∏ 𝑃𝑖(𝜃1)
𝑌𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝜃1))
1−𝑌𝑖𝑛1
𝑖=1 ∗ ∏ 𝑃𝑖(𝜃2)
𝑌𝑖(1 −𝑛2𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖(𝜃2))
1−𝑌𝑖  
(33) 
where 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 are the number of items on T1 and T2, 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are the MLE obtained 
from the responses on T1 and T2 respectively. 
𝐿(?̂?1,?̂?2)
𝐿(?̂?)
 is the likelihood ratio, and small 
values of the likelihood ratio gives evidence to 𝐻0. By taking the logarithm of the 
likelihood ratio, i.e., ∆=𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝜃1, 𝜃2)-⁡𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝜃), 2∆ is used as the test statistic in a two-
sided test (i.e. 𝐻1:⁡𝜃1 ≠ 𝜃2), and it follows asymptotically a chi-square distribution with 
df = 1 when 𝐻0 is true (Lehmann, 1999, p. 526-527). With 𝐻1 being directional in our 
study, the following statistic is used in a one-sided test: 
𝑅 = {
√2∆, 𝑖𝑓𝜃1 < 𝜃2
−√2∆⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝜃1 ≥ 𝜃2
 (34) 
Given 𝐻0 is true, the likelihood ratio test is asymptotically equivalent to a Wald test 
(Casella & Berger, 2002, p. 493) and by the Wald test,  𝜃1 − 𝜃2 follows asymptotically a 
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normal distribution with mean of 0. Therefore, 𝑃(𝜃1 < 𝜃2) = 𝑃(𝜃1 > 𝜃2) under 𝐻0, and  
as a result, R follows asymptotically a standard normal distribution. Large values of 𝑅 
leads to the rejection of 𝐻0.  
3.3 Adapted KL Divergence 
The KL divergence is considered here as it is similar to the predictive checking 
method and existing research (e.g. Belov, 2013; 2014) has shown promising results 
regarding its performance. The KL divergence aims at comparing the posterior 
distributions of 𝜃 between T1 and T2, while the predictive checking in this study aims at 
detecting the shift of 𝜃. A key difference between the two methods is how the sampling 
distribution of the test statistic is constructed. Predictive checking constructs the sampling 
distribution using the predictive inference, while Belov used information from the 
examinee group and attempted to construct the sampling distribution through a 
purification process. Using group information to construct the sampling distribution has a 
potential problematic feature in that even after a purification process, the group could still 
consist of some compromised responses, and thus the sampling distribution is not strictly 
the null distribution of the statistic. Using group information to construct the sampling 
distribution could have another problem with an adaptive test design, as examinees 
within a group may take different test items, and thus the sampling distribution of the KL 
divergence may depend on the item parameters used to estimate the 𝜃 posterior 
distributions. Therefore, as one adaptation from Belov’s approach, this study employs a 
simulation approach to construct the sampling distribution instead of using group 
information.  
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The KL divergence used by Belov takes the form of  
ℎ = 𝐷(𝑃(𝜃|𝒚𝟏)||𝑃(𝜃|𝒚𝟐)) = ∑𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟏)𝑙𝑛
𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟏)
𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟐)
𝑄
𝑞=1
 (35) 
where q is the index for quadrature points, and Q is the total number of quadrature points, 
𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟏) and 𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟐) are the posterior probability at 𝜃𝑞 from T1 and T2 respectively. 
The value of ℎ measures how the two posterior distributions distinguish from each other, 
but does not reflect the direction to which the posterior distribution shifts. For the 
purpose of detecting test compromise, we are more concerned with the change in the 
direction of 𝜃1 < 𝜃2, so as a second adaptation, a signed KL divergence statistic is 
developed to use in a one-sided test. The signed statistic takes the form of  
𝑠 = {
ℎ, 𝑖𝑓𝜃1 < 𝜃2
−ℎ⁡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝜃1 ≥ 𝜃2
 (36) 
Large values of s supports the alternative hypothesis of 𝜃1 < 𝜃2. 
To implement the adapted KL divergence approach, the KL statistic is first 
calculated for each person according to equation 35 and 36. In this study, 41 quadrature 
(Q=41) points from -4 to 4 with an equal increment of 0.20 are used. 𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟏) and 
𝑃(𝜃𝑞|𝒚𝟐) are both obtained with the Bayesian approach using the Jeffreys prior. Then the 
sampling distribution of s in the null condition is constructed based on the definition of 
the test size in a composite null hypothesis: sup𝜃∈𝛩0𝑃(reject H0|𝜃) (Casella & Berger, 
2002, p. 385). It is obtained by using the most conservative sampling distribution at a 
number of 𝜃⁡values that cover the typical range of possible values of 𝜃 in practice. The 
use of the most conservative sampling distribution ensures the largest type-I error rate for 
𝜃 in the null space does not exceed the nominal level.  
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Specifically, in this study, the construction of the sampling distribution of s 
involves the following two steps: 
1. Choose a total of 61 𝜃⁡values from -3 to 3 with an equal increment of 0.1. For 
each 𝜃𝑘
∗(𝑘 = 1,… ,61), simulate responses on T1 and T2 in the null condition 
given 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃𝑘
∗, where 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 represent a person’s ability on T1 and T2, 
and then calculate 𝑠 based on the simulated responses. Repeat the simulation 
process for N times (N=1000 in this study) at each 𝜃𝑘
∗, and this results in the 
sampling distribution of s at 𝜃𝑘
∗, denoted as 𝑝(𝑠|𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃𝑘
∗).  
2. Identify the cut-off value, 𝑐𝑘, corresponding to the nominal right-tailed α=0.05 for 
each 𝑝(𝑠|𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃𝑘
∗). The sampling distribution with the largest cut-off value 
is used as final sampling distribution of s to identify unusually large outliers, i.e. 
𝑝(𝑠|𝜃1 = 𝜃2) = 𝑝(𝑠|𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃𝑚
∗ ), where 𝑚 = argmax
𝑘
𝑐𝑘.  
3.4 Regression-based approach 
The regression-based approach is chosen here due to its common use in practice 
to model the inconsistency between test section scores (Haberman, 2008), and also 
because it does not need to be based on an IRT model. To implement this approach, a 
linear regression model is built based on a group of examinees to predict the summed 
score on T2 using the summed score on T1, i.e., 
𝑠𝑗2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑠𝑗1 + 𝜀𝑗 
𝜀𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)⁡and σ(𝜀𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖) = 0 
(37) 
where 𝑠𝑗1 and 𝑠𝑗2 are summed scores on T1 and T2 respectively for person j. Summed 
score is used because it is easy to calculate and more importantly, there is no need to 
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assume a parametric model to get summed score. Summed score on T2 is predicted by 
that on T1 instead of in the opposite direction since analytical result shows if there is a 
score increase due to preknowledge, the standardized residual tends to be larger this way 
when the assumptions for standard linear regression model hold (i.e. homoscedasticity 
and normal residual) and thus it is more powerful to detect preknowledge. The 
standardized residual for an observation j is calculated as  
𝑍𝑟𝑗 =
𝑠𝑗2 − ?̂? + ?̂?𝑠𝑗1
?̂?
 (38) 
where ?̂?2 is the unbiased estimate of error variance (i.e., 𝜎2) and ?̂? =
√
1
𝑁−2
∑ (𝑠𝑗2 − ?̂? − ?̂?𝑠𝑗1)2
𝑁
𝑗=1 . If 𝑍𝑟𝑗 > 1.65, person j is flagged as an outlier
1.  
Regression-based method is different from the other three methods in that the 
regression model needs to be constructed based on a group of examinees, while the 
analysis in the other methods is simply based on the response vector of one examinee. 
When evaluating the regression-based method, responses in the null condition are 
generated for 5000 examinees with θ~N(0,1). In the cheating condition, compromised 
responses are simulated on 5% examinees. A relatively small number of cheaters is 
chosen here because cheating is still a low-probability event in a high-stakes operational 
testing program. Furthermore, considering the estimation of the regression line will be 
                                                 
1 In regression analysis, residuals are typically standardized using studentized residual: 
𝑡𝑖 =
𝑠𝑗2−?̂?+?̂?𝑠𝑗1
?̂?√(1−ℎ𝑖𝑖)
, where ℎ𝑖𝑖 is the ith diagonal element in the hat matrix. In practice, 
standardized residual is calculated with ?̂? only in the denominator, since as the sample 
size is large, the two types of standardized residuals give very similar values, and using ?̂? 
simplifies the calculation. The critical value of 1.65 is the 95th percentile in a t-
distribution with degree of freedom (n-2), which is the sampling distribution of the 
studentized residual. 
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affected to different extent if cheaters follow different proficiency distributions, two 
distributions are assumed for the proficiency of cheaters: θ~N(0,1) and N(-1,1)2. These 
two distributions are chosen based on the assumption that examinees with low to 
moderate proficiency levels have higher motivation to cheat. 
 
  
                                                 
2 The cheating group with θ~N(0,1) was chosen by randomly sampling 250 examinees 
from the 5000 examinees with θ~N(0,1). For the cheating group with  θ~N(-1,1), a group 
of 250 was simulated from θ~N(-1,1) first, and then another group of 4750 was simulated 
from θ~N(250/4750,1), and these two groups were combined to mimic a group of 5000 
examinees with θ~N(0,1). The mixture distribution does not follow exactly a standard 
normal distribution. The mean of the mixture distribution is 0, and the standard deviation 
is slightly larger than 1, but the difference is small enough to have any practical 
consequences for the purpose of this study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 1: EVALUATION OF PREDICTIVE CHECKING 
4.1 Study Design 
To evaluate the statistical properties of the predictive checking method, a 
simulation study (labeled as Study 1) was conducted to evaluate the influence of different 
factors on the effectiveness of the predictive checking method in detecting item 
preknowledge at both the item-set level and the item level. The effectiveness of different 
test statistics was also compared. Four factors were systematically manipulated: the 
number of items in T1, the number of items in T2, the proportion of truly compromised 
items in T2, and the estimation method to obtain 𝑝(𝜽|T1). 
Number of items in T1. The first factor influences the dispersion of 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏)  and 
then further to affect the predictive distribution 𝑝(𝑇(?̃?𝟐)|𝒚𝟏). As the number of items in 
T1 increases, 𝑝(𝜃|𝒚𝟏)  will be more concentrated around the true value of θ, and 
accordingly 𝑝(𝑇(?̃?𝟐)|𝒚𝟏) will be closer to its true distribution. Theoretically, the longer 
T1 is, the better this method will work. However, one may not have many items in this 
set in practice, due to the cost of producing new items to be used as secure items or the 
limited number of pretest items an examinee receives in a test. Therefore, this study 
investigated three levels of relatively short test length for T1: 5, 10, and 20. 
Number of items in T2. The second factor determines the discreteness of the 
predictive distribution of the test statistic, and further influences the power of the method. 
With fewer items in T2, the test statistic will have fewer categories and thus the power 
may be limited by the discreteness of the predictive distribution. The sample size of T2 is 
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likely to vary in practice. Depending on different exposure scenarios, T2 may consist of 
only a few items (such as items found posted on the Internet), or consist of a larger set of 
items (such as all items that have been repeatedly used before). Three test lengths of T2 
were explored: 5, 10 and 20.  
Proportion of truly compromised items in T2. The third factor may have opposite 
effects on power when detecting at the item-set level and at the item level. At the item-set 
level, fewer compromised items will result in smaller effect on score increase and thus 
the test statistic is less likely to lie at the tail of the predictive distribution. On the 
contrary, deleting one compromised item may result in a larger change in 𝜃 when the 
remaining items are all uncompromised than when the remaining items are all 
compromised. Therefore, smaller proportion of compromised items is likely to increase 
the power at item level. For the item-set level, two proportions were examined-60% and 
100% - to see how power drops when some noise (i.e. uncompromised items) was 
introduced to T2. Compromised items were randomly selected from T2. For the item-
level detection, two smaller proportions were examined- 20% and 40% to get an 
understanding of the effect of increased noise (i.e. compromised items in this case) on 
power. 
Estimation methods. As discussed in sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2, 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦1) can be 
obtained using three approaches: the bayesian approach with two less-informative priors - 
N(0,22) and Jeffreys prior, and the fiducial distribution. 
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4.2 Data Simulation 
The probability of correctly answering an item in the null condition was specified 
by the 2PL IRT model. 2PLM was considered here since it typically demonstrates much 
better fit than the 1PLM to empirical data and it does not have the problem with the 
estimation for the pseudo-guessing parameter in the 3PLM. In addition, due to the de-
emphasis on the use of multiple-choice questions in educational tests, multiple-choice 
items are partly replaced by short constructed-response items, so less guessing is 
involved in item response, and 2PLM could demonstrate a reasonable fit in that case.   
Dichotomous responses were simulated at five theta levels, i.e., θ=-2, -1, 0, 1, 2 to 
investigate the detection effectiveness at low to high theta levels. The level of examinee 
proficiency is related to the ease of preknowledge detection. It can be expected that it is 
easier to detect preknowledge among low-performance examinees than that among high-
performance examinees. Responses were first simulated in the null condition according to 
the 2PLM in each condition. For responses in the item-preknowledge condition, the 
probability of a correct response in the null condition was increased by 0.5 on 
corresponding compromised items (the probability was set to 1 if it exceeds 1 after 
manipulation). The “0.5” probability increment was chosen to represent a medium effect 
size on score increase due to item preknowledge. Data generation at each θ level was 
replicated for 1000 times. The item discrimination parameters for both subsets in all 
conditions were randomly sampled from a truncated lognormal distribution with mean 
around 1.1 and standard deviation around 0.5 (i.e. log N(0,0.2)) between 0.75 and 2, 
which represents a realistic range adopted in most person-fit studies (Rupp, 2013). Item 
difficulty parameters for both subsets were randomly sampled from a truncated N(0,1) 
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with lower and upper bound of -2 and 2. Item parameter values were summarized in 
Table A.1 in Appendix A. The true item parameters were used in person-level analysis in 
study 1. 
4.3 Evaluation Criteria  
To evaluate different estimation methods for obtaining 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦1), bias and mean 
squared error (MSE) were computed to evaluate the recovery of 𝜃 using different 
estimation methods. Bias was computed as
∑ (?̂?𝑟−𝜃)
𝑅
𝑟=1
𝑅
 , and MSE was computed as 
∑ (?̂?𝑟−𝜃)
2𝑅
𝑟=1
𝑅
,⁡where R is the total number of replications. 𝜃 is the point estimate for 𝜃, 
which is EAP in the Bayesian approach, and the median in the fiducial approach. 
To evaluate the detection effectiveness at item-set level, empirical type-I error and 
power of this method in different conditions using different test statistics were evaluated 
at a nominal level of α=0.05. The type-I error rate at the item-set level was computed as 
the proportion of times each T2 was flagged as being compromised in the null condition, 
and power was computed as the proportion of times each compromised T2 was flagged in 
the preknowledge condition. 
For the item-level detection, the empirical type-I error rate was computed for a 
randomly-selected item in the null condition. As for power calculation, due to 
computational burden, the detection rate for only one compromised item was computed 
as the power rate in each preknoweldge condition. In addition, the detection rate for one 
non-compromised item in the preknoweldge condition was also computed to obtain the 
false discovery rate. The item parameters for each of the two selected items were set to be 
the same across different preknowledge conditions, so that the comparisons among 
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different conditions were not confounded by the difference in item parameters. 
Specifically, the item parameters for the compromised item for which the power was 
calculated for were fixed to be a=1.0, and b=1.0, while the item parameters for the non-
compromised item for which the false discovery rate was calculated for were fixed to be 
a=1.0 and b=0.0. The compromised item was chosen to be a relatively difficult item so as 
to create a favorable situation for evaluating power. If the power is low for a hard item, 
one would not expect item-level detection to be useful in practice.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Recovery of 𝜽 by Different Estimation Methods 
The bias results in Table 4.1 show that using the fiducial distribution results in 
larger bias than the two Bayesian priors when T1 only consists of 5 items, and when T1 
consists of 10 or 20 items, compared to using the two Bayesian priors, using the fiducial 
distribution results in larger bias at the lowest 𝜃 level but smaller bias at the highest 𝜃 
level. However, the MSE results show that using the fiducial distribution results in the 
lowest MSE in general while using the Jeffreys prior tends to lead to the highest MSE for 
all 𝜃 levels. As MSE accounts for the balance between the bias and variance, from this 
perspective, the fiducial distribution leads to a better point estimate for 𝜃 than the two 
Bayesian priors.  
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Table 4.1: Bias and MSE from Different Estimation Methods 
  BIAS  MSE 
Approach θ T1=5 T1=10 T1=20  T1=5 T1=10 T1=20 
Fiducial -2 0.258 0.188 -0.126  0.453 0.224 0.372 
 -1 0.022 -0.079 -0.011  0.749 0.373 0.137 
 0 -0.018 -0.024 0.015  0.786 0.289 0.168 
 1 -0.118 0.029 0.119  0.498 0.338 0.391 
 2 -0.617 -0.046 0.046  0.575 0.218 0.417 
Normal Prior -2 0.212 -0.044 -0.100  0.660 0.398 0.315 
 -1 0.080 -0.152 -0.003  0.810 0.475 0.142 
 0 0.051 -0.046 0.050  0.799 0.305 0.177 
 1 0.038 0.033 0.155  0.744 0.372 0.378 
 2 -0.271 0.084 0.044  0.544 0.403 0.413 
Jeffreys Prior -2 -0.009 -0.128 -0.147  0.778 0.532 0.381 
 -1 -0.044 -0.151 -0.017  0.976 0.537 0.140 
 0 0.016 -0.024 0.021  0.954 0.300 0.171 
 1 0.108 0.054 0.147  0.967 0.388 0.437 
 2 -0.099 0.148 0.134  0.651 0.485 0.570 
4.4.2 Type-I error at the item-set level 
Table 4.2 summarizes the type-I error rates when fiducial distribution and the 
Jeffreys prior are used. Results for the rest of the conditions are summarized in Table A.2 
to A.3 in Appendix A. The nominal level for the type-I error is 0.05, and a 95% normal-
approximation confidence interval for a type-I error rate of 0.05 out of 1000 replications 
is (0.036, 0.063). Results shows that when T2 is short, using the summed score or the 
EAP often leads to conservative type-I error rates, especially at extreme θ levels, which is 
due to the fact that the predictive distribution concentrates on very few values when T2 is 
short. When T2 is long, using the posterior variance leads to inflated type-I errors at θ=0 
when T1 is short, but when T1 is long, the type-I error rates all fall below the upper 
bound of the 95% confidence interval. Three estimation methods lead to similar results in 
most conditions, except that using N(0,22) leads to slightly inflated type-I error for the 
EAP when T1 is short and T2 consists of 20 items. 
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Table 4.2: Empirical Type-I Error Using Fiducial and Jeffreys Prior  
  T1=5, T2=5  T1=5, T2=20  T1=20, T2=5  T1=20, T2=20 
Stat1 θ JEF 1 FID1  JEF FID  JEF FID  JEF FID 
Sum -2 0.002 0.004  0.006 0.000  0.021 0.021  0.045 0.041 
 -1 0.014 0.020  0.039 0.012  0.018 0.019  0.033 0.029 
 0 0.033 0.033  0.047 0.031  0.018 0.019  0.025 0.020 
 1 0.012 0.012  0.033 0.029  0.001 0.002  0.036 0.030 
 2 0.001 0.001  0.039 0.026  0.000 0.000  0.037 0.031 
EAP -2 0.004 0.010  0.009 0.001  0.036 0.037  0.057 0.056 
 -1 0.033 0.042  0.051 0.014  0.039 0.038  0.046 0.046 
 0 0.037 0.040  0.053 0.041  0.024 0.026  0.040 0.034 
 1 0.014 0.014  0.051 0.035  0.001 0.002  0.044 0.043 
 2 0.001 0.001  0.061 0.038  0.000 0.000  0.053 0.039 
VAR -2 0.004 0.004  0.025 0.014  0.016 0.017  0.050 0.048 
 -1 0.038 0.042  0.034 0.017  0.024 0.023  0.047 0.043 
 0 0.037 0.047  0.099* 0.090*  0.026 0.023  0.040 0.040 
 1 0.035 0.034  0.017 0.009  0.033 0.034  0.057 0.049 
 2 0.002 0.002  0.021 0.017  0.005 0.006  0.041 0.029 
Note. 1Stat=test statistics, JEF=Jeffreys prior, FID=fiducial distribution, 
* represents p-value exceeds the upper bound of the 95% normal-approximation 
confidence interval for the type-I error of 0.05 
 
4.4.3 Power at the item-set level 
Table 4.3 summarizes the detection power when using the fiducial distribution 
and the Jeffreys prior. Results for the remaining conditions are summarized in Table A.4 
to A.6 in Appendix A. The power increases as the lengths of T1 and T2 increases. When 
T2 is short, it is hard to detect preknowledge among high proficiency examinees: the 
power of all test statistics is less than 0.1 for 𝜃 ≥ 1 when T2 only consists of 5 items; 
when T2 is increased, using the summed score or the EAP leads to power above 0.5 for 
𝜃 = 1 when the entire T2 is compromised. The power for the summed score and the EAP 
both decreases to a large extent as the compromise rate in T2 drops from 100% to 60%, 
but the power for the posterior variance shows an increase for 𝜃 ≤ −1 when T2 is long. 
This is because as the compromise rate drops, the effect of compromised responses on the 
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score inflation decreases, but the 𝜃 posterior distribution becomes more flat due to the 
presence of more reversed Guttman patterns in low-proficiency examinees’ response 
patterns. As for the comparison among three statistics, when T2 is short, such as when T2 
only consists of 5 items, using the EAP leads to larger power than using the summed 
score, especially when the compromise rate is only 0.6. As T2 becomes longer, the power 
difference between the EAP and the summed score is very small, only up to the second 
decimal place in most conditions. The posterior variance demonstrates lower power than 
the other two statistics, partly because a two-sided test was conducted for it while one-
sided tests were conducted for the other two statistics. Lastly, the difference among the 
three methods is at the second or third decimal places in many conditions. In conditions 
where the difference is as large as 0.1 or 0.2- such as when T2 contains 20 items and 
when T1 only consists of 5 items- the two Bayesian approaches have more similar power, 
while they exhibit slightly larger power than the fiducial approach. 
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Table 4.3: Power Rate Using Fiducial and Jeffreys Prior 
   T1=5, T2=5 T1=5, T2=20 T1=20, T2=5 T1=20, T2=20 
Stat Rate1 θ FID JEF FID JEF FID JEF FID JEF 
Sum 1 -2 0.398 0.426 0.737 0.775 0.702 0.701 0.993 0.994 
  -1 0.368 0.371 0.619 0.676 0.616 0.615 0.978 0.978 
  0 0.262 0.262 0.600 0.653 0.374 0.386 0.929 0.934 
  1 0.051 0.053 0.408 0.590 0.016 0.017 0.737 0.778 
  2 0.001 0.002 0.144 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.291 0.354 
 0.6 -2 0.140 0.177 0.308 0.457 0.373 0.379 0.833 0.842 
  -1 0.140 0.148 0.296 0.339 0.243 0.244 0.705 0.708 
  0 0.099 0.099 0.216 0.254 0.083 0.083 0.464 0.478 
  1 0.018 0.019 0.126 0.166 0.006 0.005 0.212 0.229 
  2 0.001 0.002 0.057 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.089 
EAP 1 -2 0.430 0.516 0.746 0.788 0.786 0.786 0.996 0.996 
  -1 0.382 0.399 0.617 0.684 0.671 0.665 0.976 0.979 
  0 0.262 0.262 0.609 0.668 0.387 0.395 0.933 0.940 
  1 0.051 0.053 0.408 0.609 0.016 0.017 0.764 0.801 
  2 0.001 0.002 0.144 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.291 0.354 
 0.6 -2 0.268 0.340 0.351 0.469 0.587 0.598 0.876 0.881 
  -1 0.220 0.252 0.298 0.345 0.412 0.416 0.711 0.710 
  0 0.127 0.134 0.217 0.258 0.122 0.125 0.479 0.489 
  1 0.026 0.028 0.133 0.174 0.007 0.006 0.229 0.251 
  2 0.001 0.002 0.058 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.108 
VAR 1 -2 0.134 0.171 0.231 0.365 0.274 0.265 0.705 0.720 
  -1 0.119 0.144 0.018 0.044 0.243 0.242 0.064 0.065 
  0 0.113 0.168 0.058 0.124 0.225 0.226 0.765 0.782 
  1 0.013 0.029 0.056 0.175 0.005 0.003 0.465 0.503 
  2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.041 
 0.6 -2 0.197 0.223 0.242 0.396 0.321 0.316 0.763 0.770 
  -1 0.117 0.125 0.178 0.222 0.096 0.102 0.302 0.298 
  0 0.021 0.037 0.006 0.009 0.043 0.045 0.064 0.069 
  1 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.137 0.170 
  2 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.035 0.000 0.002 0.036 0.040 
Note. 1Rate=compromise rate in T2 
4.4.4 Type-I Error at the item level  
Item-level empirical type-I error rates were examined for the two items that were 
used in the evaluation of power and false positive rate- one item with a=1.0 and b=1.0, 
and the other with a=1.0 and b=0.0. Table 4.4 summarizes item-level type-I error rates 
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for several length combinations of T1 and T2. Results for the remaining conditions are 
summarized in Table A.7 in Appendix A. Results show that the item-level type-I error is 
likely to be inflated as T2 contains more items, and this inflation occurs regardless of the 
estimation method being used.  
Table 4.4: Empirical Type-I Error at Item Level 
  T1=5, T2=5 T1=5, T2=20 T1=20, T2=5 T1=20, T2=20 
Estimation θ b=1 b=0 b=1 b=0 b=1 b=0 b=1 b=0 
FID -2 0.031 0.002 0.030 0.041 0.037 0.015 0.054 0.057 
 -1 0.031 0.028 0.063 0.054 0.030 0.023 0.065* 0.051 
 0 0.040 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.031 0.030 0.049 0.064* 
 1 0.020 0.024 0.040 0.038 0.026 0.022 0.053 0.042 
 2 0.008 0.006 0.064* 0.062 0.022 0.011 0.046 0.058 
N(0,22) -2 0.028 0.004 0.036 0.052 0.030 0.019 0.046 0.050 
 -1 0.048 0.021 0.052 0.066* 0.032 0.018 0.055 0.063 
 0 0.048 0.037 0.062 0.056 0.039 0.026 0.052 0.041 
 1 0.018 0.028 0.044 0.048 0.023 0.025 0.065* 0.069* 
 2 0.003 0.007 0.061 0.050 0.019 0.008 0.054 0.057 
JEF -2 0.030 0.015 0.041 0.054 0.031 0.021 0.049 0.054 
 -1 0.059 0.030 0.062 0.072* 0.035 0.018 0.053 0.062 
 0 0.048 0.040 0.066* 0.056 0.040 0.023 0.051 0.038 
 1 0.017 0.036 0.048 0.056 0.021 0.026 0.063 0.074* 
 2 0.004 0.010 0.060 0.053 0.020 0.014 0.058 0.067* 
4.4.5 Power and False Positive Rate at the item level 
Table 4.5 summarizes the power and false positive rate when the Jeffreys prior 
and the fiducial distribution are used. Results for the remaining conditions are 
summarized in Table A.8 to A.9 in Appendix A. It can be seen that there is not much 
power at the item level: the empirical power rate is between 0.2 and 0.3 at the lowest θ 
level, and lower than 0.2 for the rest of the θ levels. A higher compromise rate leads to a 
lower power, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of compromised 
items after deleting one item will add noise to the detection. The impact of lengths of T1 
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and T2 on item-level power shows different patterns from those observed in the item-set 
level detection. The item-level power does not show a uniformly increasing pattern in 
different conditions as T1 becomes longer. For instance, when the compromise rate is 
20%, increasing the length of T1 results in a smaller power at the lowest three 𝜃 levels, 
but when the compromise rate is 40%, increasing the length of T1 leads to a larger power 
when T2 contains 10 or 20 items. Although the effect of T1 length is not consistent in 
different conditions, further analyses show that the power results do converge to those 
obtained from the true predictive distribution (i.e., evaluated at the true θ) of the test 
statistics as T1 becomes longer. The fact that a shorter length of T1 results in a larger 
power in certain conditions is probably due to the uncertainty in the predictive 
distribution constructed through 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦1). As for the effect of T2 length, when T1 is long, 
which approximates the situation where the predictive distribution is constructed using 
the true θ, the power tends to increase first as the length of T2 increases from 5 to 10 and 
then the power decreases as the length of T2 increases from 10 to 20. The phenomenon is 
possibly due to the discrete nature of the test statistic’s distribution, which may cause a 
non-monotonic change of the empirical rejection rate as the length of T2 changes. 
However, it is necessary to consider more test length conditions in order to verify this 
conjecture. Researchers such as Brown, Cai, and DasGupta (2001) also found this 
oscillation phenomenon when studying the coverage probability of the confidence 
interval for the binomial proportion. Regarding the comparison among three estimation 
methods, using the Jeffreys prior or N(0,22) results in slightly larger power than using the 
fiducial distribution. 
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The false positive rate is high at the lowest two θ levels, and it increases as the 
compromise rate increases. Increase in the length of T2 tends to result in a larger false 
positive rate, especially when T1 is long, and the Jeffreys prior can result in a larger false 
positive rate than the other two procedures when the compromise rate is 40%. 
Table 4.5: Item-Level Power and False Positive Rate 
   Power False Positive 
   Rate=0.2 Rate=0.4 Rate=0.2 Rate=0.4 
 T2 θ T1=5 T1=20 T1=5 T1=20 T1=5 T1=20 T1=5 T1=20 
JEF 5 -2 0.314 0.214 0.155 0.176 0.042 0.086 0.263 0.365 
  -1 0.172 0.068 0.087 0.055 0.067 0.065 0.224 0.251 
  0 0.091 0.084 0.048 0.033 0.050 0.036 0.147 0.135 
  1 0.026 0.038 0.006 0.007 0.032 0.012 0.061 0.027 
  2 0.008 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.004 
 20 -2 0.334 0.270 0.213 0.305 0.056 0.197 0.246 0.511 
  -1 0.136 0.065 0.075 0.112 0.090 0.112 0.160 0.295 
  0 0.071 0.060 0.047 0.056 0.076 0.083 0.131 0.168 
  1 0.014 0.018 0.002 0.004 0.080 0.099 0.133 0.110 
  2 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.074 0.075 0.090 0.085 
N(0,22) 5 -2 0.266 0.203 0.152 0.166 0.020 0.074 0.105 0.208 
  -1 0.156 0.068 0.101 0.064 0.053 0.063 0.150 0.180 
  0 0.097 0.088 0.057 0.046 0.044 0.033 0.126 0.122 
  1 0.027 0.039 0.012 0.010 0.028 0.011 0.063 0.021 
  2 0.007 0.024 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.001 
 20 -2 0.281 0.220 0.117 0.266 0.035 0.176 0.185 0.511 
  -1 0.129 0.076 0.076 0.114 0.070 0.115 0.132 0.302 
  0 0.062 0.039 0.044 0.046 0.086 0.094 0.130 0.182 
  1 0.014 0.035 0.003 0.007 0.080 0.064 0.126 0.096 
  2 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.081 0.067 0.094 0.083 
FID 5 -2 0.283 0.229 0.152 0.197 0.021 0.071 0.099 0.210 
  -1 0.153 0.076 0.108 0.084 0.057 0.067 0.156 0.186 
  0 0.081 0.052 0.054 0.037 0.060 0.045 0.150 0.153 
  1 0.026 0.046 0.006 0.012 0.034 0.015 0.070 0.023 
  2 0.010 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.002 
 20 -2 0.271 0.241 0.082 0.300 0.017 0.185 0.107 0.513 
  -1 0.116 0.070 0.052 0.119 0.060 0.124 0.131 0.306 
  0 0.043 0.034 0.026 0.050 0.075 0.092 0.121 0.187 
  1 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.003 0.082 0.065 0.132 0.103 
  2 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.084 0.073 0.104 0.089 
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4.5 Discussion 
Study 1 evaluated the empirical type-I error and power of the predictive checking 
method under different lengths of T1 and T2 as well as different test compromise rates. 
Considering the posterior distribution of 𝜃 estimated from a short secure section might be 
largely affected by the use of an inappropriately specified prior distribution, study 1 
investigated the performance of two less-informative Bayesian priors and the fiducial 
distribution which does not need to specify a prior distribution. The 𝜃 recovery results 
showed that using the fiducial distribution led to smaller MSE for the point estimate of 𝜃, 
but the detection effectiveness among the three methods was quite similar, especially as 
the secure section consists of 10 or more items.  
Regarding the detection effectiveness under different factors, results suggested 
that the length of both sections played an important role in the detection. In one extreme 
condition where the secure section only consisted of five items, the detection power was 
low except when a large set of items were compromised. This suggests using just five or 
ten secure items has the potential to detect severe test compromise situations. In the other 
extreme condition where the possibly compromised section only consisted of five items, 
high detection power could be achieved if all items in this section were compromised and 
if a long secure section was available, and using the EAP as the test statistic could lead to 
higher power than using the summed score or the posterior variance. In addition, if a 
large possibly compromised section only contains a small proportion of truly 
compromised items, the detection power of the summed score or the EAP could reduce to 
a large extent. For instance, compared to the condition where the possibly compromised 
set only consisted of five items but all of them were compromised, the detection power of 
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the summed score or the EAP was slightly lower when there were six truly compromised 
items in a 10-item possibly compromised set. Therefore, in order to maintain the 
detection power, one can apply predictive checking to items that are most likely to be 
compromised. Alternatively, one can only include relatively difficult items in the 
possibly compromised subset, as it is hard to detect preknowledge on easy items by any 
means.  
Item-level detection does not turn out to be effective in this study. Low power 
was observed even at the lowest 𝜃 level, and high false positive rate occurred as the 
compromise rate increased. This result is not surprising given that each item only has two 
response categories. Item-level detection may have larger power on a polytomous item 
with a larger number of response categories. However, given the “leave-one-out” nature 
of the item-level detection, it can be expected that the high false positive rate will remain 
a problem.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 2: COMPARISON OF METHODS 
5.1 Background 
Following study 1, which mainly aimed at understanding the statistical properties 
of the predictive checking method in different conditions, another simulation study 
(labeled as Study 2 hereinafter) was conducted to evaluate this method in two simulated 
test compromise situations that are likely to happen in practice, and compare this method 
with other approaches, so as to add more practical implications to this project. Study 2 is 
specific to the research plan initiated by ETS under the Harold Gulliksen Psychometric 
Research Fellowship Program. The author would like to thank researchers at ETS for 
their contribution to this study.   
Study 2 consisted of two smaller simulation designs, each mimicking a practical 
test compromise situation. The first situation has been discussed mostly up to now, which 
is preknowledge of items due to the use of a limited item pool in an on-demand testing 
program (hereinafter called as “shallow pool situation”), and the second situation is a 
more serious security breach problem in which the keys to an entire operational test 
section are exposed (hereinafter called as “key exposure situation”). This could occur on 
tests administered internationally, where the time-zone difference provides an 
opportunity for examinees taking the test later to get access to the keys to an entire 
operational test section. In both situations, the pretest section could serve as a baseline to 
infer whether an examinee has preknowledge on the operational section: in the first 
situation, the pretest section has very low exposure rate, so examinees rarely have chance 
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to see them beforehand; in the second situation, pretest sections are usually randomly 
assigned and thus different people usually get different pretest sections, so examinees 
may not have the keys or may use the wrong keys for the pretest section.  
5.2 Shallow Pool Simulation 
The shallow pool situation was simulated using an MST design. The MST design 
was adopted because it is becoming increasingly popular and it is currently used by 
several operational testing programs (e.g., GRE). Since current testing programs that use 
MST designs are on-demand, they are likely to have to deal with the item exposure 
problem. A 1-3 MST design was employed to mimic the design used by the Revised 
GRE. The 1-3 MST design consisted of two operational stages. Based on a person’s 
responses to the routing module in the first stage, subject to the routing rule, one of the 
three modules in the second stage was administered. In this study, the routing was based 
on a person’s proficiency estimate (i.e., 𝜃) in Stage 1. If 𝜃<-0.43, the easy module was 
administered, and if 𝜃>0.43, the hard module was administered. Otherwise, the module 
with moderate difficulty was administered. The thresholds of ±0.43 are the 33rd and 66th 
percentile in the standard normal distribution, and they were chosen as the routing 
thresholds such that each module would have roughly the same exposure rate among the 
examinee population with θ~N(0,1). The two stages served as the possibly compromised 
section (i.e. T2) in this study. Each stage consisted of 20 items, so T2 consisted of 40 
items in total. In addition, a pretest section, served as the uncompromised section (i.e., 
T1), consisting of 20 items was administered. It was assumed that the administration of 
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the pretest section was not subject to any routing rule, and the items in the pretest section 
were chosen to have a broad range of item difficulty. 
The 3PL IRT model was used to generate the responses and the true item 
parameters for each section are summarized in Table 5.1 below. Instead of using item 
parameter estimates from a real dataset or sampling item parameters from a distribution, 
each parameter was set to several fixed values, and each value for a given parameter was 
crossed with all possible values in the other parameters to create the data-generating 
parameter set for a given MST module. Specifically, two values were chosen for the a-
parameter: 1.0 and 1.4 to represent moderate and high discriminating items on the logistic 
scale. Two values were chosen for the c-parameter: 0.0 and 0.15 to represent the c-
parameter value for short constructed response items and multiple choice items. Five 
values were chosen for the b-parameter: for pretest section and stage 1-routing module, 
five values between -1.5 and 1.5 with an increment of 0.75 were chosen; for stage-2 easy 
module, five values between -1.5 and 0.5 with an increment of 0.5 were chosen; for 
stage-2 middle difficulty module, five values between -1 and 1 with an increment of 0.5 
were chosen, and for stage-2 hard module, five values between -0.5 and 1.5 with an 
increment of 0.5 were chosen. These values represent the typical parameter values in a 
high-stakes large scale assessment, and this way of choosing item parameters aimed at 
representing a more general case, so as to increase the generalizability of the results.  
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Table 5.1: True Item Parameters in Shallow Pool Situation in Study 2 
 Pretest section Stage 1- 
Routing 
Stage 2-  
Easy 
Stage 2- 
Middle 
Stage 2- 
Hard 
a  1, 1.4 1, 1.4 1, 1.4 1, 1.4 1, 1.4 
b -1.5,  
-0.75, 
0, 
0.75, 
1.5 
-1.5,  
-0.75, 
0, 
0.75, 
1.5 
-1.5, 
-1, 
-0.5, 
0,  
0.5 
-1.0,  
-0.5,  
0,  
0.5, 
1.0 
-0.5,  
0,  
0.5,  
1, 
1.5 
c 0, 0.15 0, 0.15 0, 0.15 0, 0.15 0, 0.15 
Note. Each value for a given parameter is crossed with all possible values in the other 
parameters to create the data-generating parameter set for a given section. Item 
discrimination parameter is on logistic scale. 
 
To simulate compromised responses in this situation, preknowledge was 
introduced to the hardest items in a given section, and a correct response was assigned to 
the compromised item. Three factors were manipulated to simulate different compromise 
conditions. The first factor was the proportion of compromised items in T2: 0%, 10%, 
20% and 40%. The level of 10% was used since it represented a realistic level in practice, 
as not many items would be compromised in practice due to careful test designs and 
exposure rate control procedures. The level of 20% and 40% were used to represent 
worse scenarios and to investigate whether the detection methods had sufficient power to 
detect more serious test compromise situations. The average theta estimation error (𝜃 −
𝜃) across replications was calculated to evaluate the consequences of item preknowledge 
on score inflation, where 𝜃 was estimated using MLE based on responses to the entire T2 
(i.e. two stages). In the null condition, the bias, variance, and root mean square error for 𝜃 
were calculated as a baseline reference to compare to the score inflation in each 
compromise condition.   
The second factor was the compromised MST stage: item preknowledge could 
occur at stage 1 or 2 or both. It was expected that preknowledge would be harder to detect 
 78 
if it occurred in a stage that contained easier items (relative to a person’s ability) than that 
contained harder items. The third factor was the presence of item parameter errors in 
person-level analysis. Person-level analysis was conducted first using true item 
parameters, and then using item parameter estimates, so that the effect of error in item 
parameter estimation on detection was investigated.  To obtain item parameter estimates, 
item calibrations were conducted using correctly or incorrectly specified models 
respectively. To be specific, response data were first generated for 5000 examinees with 
𝜃~𝑁(0,1), and then item calibration was conducted by fitting 3PLM and 2PLM, 
respectively. This set-up was used to mimic the practical situation where item parameter 
estimates often contain error due to either sampling variability or model misfit. Table 5.2 
below summarizes the conditions under investigation. 
Table 5.2: Conditions in Shallow Pool Situation  
Factor Condition 
 Stage 1 
Compromised stage Stage 2 
 Stage 1 & 2 
% of compromised 
item in T2 
0% 
10% 
20% 
 40% 
 No error: true item parameter used 
 
Estimation error: item parameter estimates 
from the correctly specified model 
Item parameter error Model misfit & estimation error: item 
parameter estimates from the incorrectly 
specified model  
In the shallow pool situation, only the likelihood ratio test and the adapted KL 
divergence were chosen to compare to the predictive checking method. The regression 
method was not used mainly because it needs to be implemented based on responses by a 
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group of examinees. With an MST design, examinees in a group typically do not take the 
same test items, and thus the simple linear regression model built on their summed scores 
on each section may be affected to some extent by the fact that the summed scores are not 
calculated based on the same sets of items for everyone in the group3. 
5.3 Key Exposure Simulation 
Different from the shallow pool situation, key exposure situation represents a 
much more serious security breach problem where a large number of keys are exposed. It 
is more likely to happen on a fixed-form test, as there is less overlap among the items 
administered to different examinees in an adaptive test. Therefore, a fixed-form test with 
60 items was simulated. Out of the 60 items, the pretest section consisted of 20 items, and 
the operational section consisted of 40 items. It was assumed that there were multiple 
pretest sections and they were randomly administered to examinees in different test 
administrations, while the same operational section was repeatedly used across test 
administrations.  
In key exposure situation, two scenarios were considered: in the first scenario, an 
examinee answered the pretest items based on his/her real proficiency, instead of relying 
on the keys. This could happen when examinees have some information about the items 
when they get the keys, so they can judge which keys are for which items and when they 
realize that the pretest items they are administered do not match those provided by the 
                                                 
3 This problem could be overcome by building the simple linear regression based on 
examinees’ 𝜃 instead of summed scores. However, in practice, the regression is typically 
run on simple summed score to avoid fitting an IRT model. Therefore, the regression 
method is not considered in the shallow pool situation.  
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source of the keys (due to the random assignment of the pretest sections), they respond to 
the pretest section based on their real proficiency. In the second scenario, an examinee’s 
responses on the pretest section were based on the wrong key or based on random 
responses. This could happen when examinees do not have information about the items 
but only have the keys, so they will apply the keys directly to all items they are 
administered. It could also be the case where examinees recognize the keys provided by 
the source do not match the pretest section they are administered, and thus they realize it 
is the pretest section that does not count towards their scores, so they simply randomly 
respond to those items. In this scenario, we assume an examinee’s responses to the pretest 
section are correct by chance and their responses to the operational section are based on 
the keys provided by a high-proficiency source examinee.  
Within each of the two scenarios above, two conditions were considered: in one 
condition, an examinee memorized the keys provided by the source perfectly (i.e. 0% 
incorrect memorization), and in another condition, an examinee memorized 20% keys on 
the operational section incorrectly (i.e. 20% incorrect memorization), as memorizing keys 
on all items could be hard in a moderate to long test. The incorrect memorization was 
simulated to 20% items in the operational section with the largest item difficulty. The 
hardest items were chosen for three reasons: (1) an examinee is more likely to recognize 
a key is wrong on easier items than on a harder item; (2) an examinee is more likely to 
make gridding errors later in a section than earlier in the section, and the items at the end 
of a section tend to be harder items; (3) an examinee is more likely to forget keys at the 
end of a list.  
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The two factors above- responses to the pretest section and the operation section-
are crossed, resulting in four simulation conditions. In addition to the four conditions, the 
null condition in which responses to both subsets are based on one’s real proficiency was 
also simulated to investigate the type-I error rate; and the condition in which responses to 
the pretest section are random or based on wrong answers, but responses to the 
operational section are based on one’s real proficiency was also simulated to evaluate the 
false positive detection when responses to T1 do not reflect one’s proficiency.  Table 5.3 
below summarizes the six simulation conditions. 
Table 5.3: Simulation Conditions in Key Exposure Situation 
Responses to the pretest 
section 
Responses to the 
operational section  
Condition 
Label 
Based on real 
proficiency 
Based on real 
proficiency 
T1N_T2N 
 Identical with the keys 
provided 
T1N_T2C 
 With 20% memorization 
error on the keys 
T1N_T2C2 
Random 
responses/based on 
wrong key 
Based on real 
proficiency 
T1R_T2N 
 Identical with the keys 
provided 
T1R_T2C 
 With 20% memorization 
error on the keys 
T1R_T2C2 
 
As for data simulation, to simulate responses on the pretest section, in the first 
scenario where the pretest section was not compromised, the responses were simulated 
using the 3PLM, whereas in the second scenario where the pretest section was randomly 
responded to, responses on the pretest section were simulated to be correct with 
probability of 0.25. To simulate the compromised responses on the operational section, 
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instead of assuming an examinee had perfect keys, keys were simulated by using a 
response pattern from a source examinee of high-proficiency. Specifically, θ=2 was used 
as the source ability, and if P(𝑌𝑖=1|θ=2) is greater than 0.7, a correct response was 
assigned, otherwise, an incorrect response was assigned. In the condition with 0% 
incorrect memorization, an examinee’s responses were identical with the keys, while in 
condition with 20% incorrect memorization, an incorrect response was assigned to the 
incorrectly memorized items. The true item parameters in each section are summarized in 
Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Summary of True Item Parameters in Key Exposure Generation 
 Pretest section Operational section  
a  1, 1.4 1, 1.4 
b b/w -1.5 and 1.5, with 
mean=0  
(-1.5, -0.75, 0, 0.75, 1.5) 
b/w -1.5 and 1.5, with 
mean=0  
(-1.5, -1.17, -0.83, -0.5, -
0.17, 0.17, 0.5, 0.83, 1.17, 
1.5) 
c 0, 0.15 0, 0.15 
In the key exposure scenario, the likelihood ratio test, the adapted KL divergence, 
and the regression-based method were all used to compare to the predictive checking 
method. The regression-based method is different from the other three methods in that it 
needs to be conducted based on a group of examinees, while the analysis in the other 
methods is simply based on the response vector of one examinee. When evaluating the 
regression-based method, responses in the null condition were generated for 5000 
examinees with θ~N(0,1). In the cheating condition, compromised responses were 
simulated on 5% examinees. A relatively small number of cheaters were chosen here 
because cheating is still a low-probability event in a high-stakes operational testing 
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program. Furthermore, considering the estimation of the regression line would be 
affected to a different extent if cheaters follow different proficiency distributions, two 
distributions were assumed for the proficiency of cheaters: θ~N(0,1) and N(-1,1)4. These 
two distributions were chosen based on the assumption that examinees with low to 
moderate proficiency levels have a higher motivation to cheat. Other assumptions could 
be adapted but they were not in this study. 
5.4 Evaluation Criteria 
For each method proposed here, detection rate at both person level and group 
level are evaluated. Person-level detection is evaluated at nine θ levels from -2 to 2 with 
equal increment. For each given theta, response generation is replicated for 1000 times, 
and the detection rate under no preknowledge condition is calculated as the false positive 
rate and that under preknowledge condition is the hit rate. For the regression-based 
approach, considering the sampled examinee group does not contain theta values that 
equal exactly to the eleven theta levels under investigation, the theta value closest to each 
theta level under investigation is replaced by it, and data generation is replicated for 1000 
times for the entire group.  
                                                 
4 The cheating group with θ~N(0,1) was chosen by randomly sampling 250 examinees 
from the 5000 examinees with θ~N(0,1). For the cheating group with  θ~N(-1,1), a group 
of 250 was simulated from θ~N(-1,1) first, and then another group of 4750 was simulated 
from θ~N(250/4750,1), and these two groups were combined to mimic a group of 5000 
examinees with θ~N(0,1). The mixture distribution does not follow exactly a standard 
normal distribution. The mean of the mixture distribution is 0, and the standard deviation 
is slightly larger than 1, but the difference is small enough to have any practical 
consequences for the purpose of this study.  
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For the group-level detection rate in all methods except the regression analysis,  
the detection rates at 13 θ levels from -3 to 3 were first obtained, and then the person-
level detection rate was multiplied by the population weight at each θ in a given 
distribution. The weighted sum was the group-level detection rate. Two distributions 
were assumed for the ability of examinees with preknowledge: θ~N(0,1) and N(-1,1). The 
group-level detection rate in the regression method was simply calculated by the average 
detection rate in each cheating group across replications.    
5.5 Results in Shallow Pool Simulation 
5.5.1 Theta estimation error 
 Table 5.5 summarizes the θ recovery results - the bias, variance (Var) and root 
mean squared error (RMSE) for 𝜃– in the null condition. Table 5.6 presents the 𝜃 
inflation in different test compromise conditions. Results on θ recovery in the null 
condition suggest that using item parameter estimates from either the 3PLM or the 2PLM 
does not lead to a large difference from using the true item parameters at most θ levels. 
Moderate differences occur at the lower or higher end of the θ continuum. Specifically, 
using item parameter estimates from the 3PLM leads to larger negative bias for θ at the 
lower end, while using item parameters from the 2PLM leads to slightly larger positive 
bias for θ at the higher end. Results on the variance of 𝜃 and the RMSE also suggest that 
using the 3PLM estimates leads to less efficient estimates for lower θ levels, and using 
estimates from the 2PLM leads to less efficient estimates for higher θ levels.  
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Table 5.5: BIAS and RMSE in Null Condition 
 BIAS  VAR  RMSE 
𝜃 True* 3PLM* 2PLM*  True 3PLM 2PLM  True 3PLM 2PLM 
-2 -0.15 -0.54 0.03  0.35 0.67 0.16  0.61 0.98 0.40 
-1.5 -0.04 -0.19 0.01  0.16 0.29 0.11  0.40 0.57 0.33 
-1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  0.14 0.21 0.11  0.38 0.46 0.34 
-0.5 0.01 0.05 -0.02  0.11 0.12 0.10  0.33 0.35 0.32 
0 0.00 0.04 -0.03  0.11 0.10 0.11  0.33 0.32 0.33 
0.5 0.01 0.04 0.00  0.10 0.09 0.12  0.32 0.31 0.34 
1 -0.01 -0.01 0.02  0.12 0.10 0.14  0.34 0.31 0.37 
1.5 0.05 -0.01 0.14  0.14 0.12 0.19  0.38 0.34 0.46 
2 0.08 -0.02 0.28  0.19 0.15 0.29  0.44 0.39 0.61 
*Represents the type of item parameter used. True=true item parameters, 
3PLM=parameter estimates from 3PLM, and 2PLM=parameter estimates from 2PLM.   
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Table 5.6: Average θ̂ Inflation (θ̂ − θ) under Test Compromise Conditions 
 
  True Item Parameters  3PLM Estimates  2PLM Estimates 
𝜃 % S1* S2* S12*  S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12 
-2 0.1 0.57 0.52 0.50   0.52 0.45 0.43   0.48 0.52 0.38 
-1.5  0.50 0.44 0.44  0.54 0.46 0.47  0.40 0.41 0.30 
-1  0.44 0.38 0.38  0.50 0.44 0.44  0.33 0.32 0.23 
-0.5  0.40 0.36 0.36  0.46 0.42 0.42  0.29 0.31 0.20 
0  0.36 0.32 0.32  0.42 0.37 0.38  0.27 0.27 0.17 
0.5  0.35 0.33 0.32  0.37 0.35 0.34  0.31 0.31 0.21 
1  0.31 0.31 0.29  0.29 0.28 0.27  0.33 0.33 0.22 
1.5  0.36 0.36 0.33  0.29 0.28 0.26  0.47 0.48 0.35 
2  0.39 0.39 0.35   0.26 0.26 0.23   0.61 0.63 0.49 
-2 0.2 1.19 1.00 1.06  1.27 1.06 1.14  0.97 0.94 0.90 
-1.5  1.02 0.85 0.93  1.11 0.93 1.03  0.83 0.78 0.77 
-1  0.89 0.71 0.84  0.98 0.80 0.93  0.72 0.65 0.68 
-0.5  0.77 0.67 0.77  0.83 0.72 0.85  0.64 0.60 0.63 
0  0.67 0.60 0.73  0.71 0.63 0.78  0.58 0.55 0.61 
0.5  0.63 0.61 0.72  0.63 0.59 0.73  0.60 0.59 0.67 
1  0.55 0.57 0.68  0.51 0.51 0.64  0.59 0.62 0.70 
1.5  0.56 0.62 0.76  0.47 0.50 0.66  0.70 0.78 0.90 
2  0.58 0.64 0.78   0.44 0.47 0.63   0.85 0.94 1.06 
-2 0.4 2.14 1.73 2.04  2.24 1.81 2.15  2.00 1.65 1.73 
-1.5  1.77 1.45 1.84  1.86 1.53 1.93  1.66 1.40 1.57 
-1  1.50 1.23 1.70  1.57 1.30 1.76  1.41 1.19 1.46 
-0.5  1.24 1.12 1.56  1.29 1.15 1.57  1.19 1.09 1.39 
0  1.02 1.02 1.46  1.04 1.02 1.43  1.00 1.02 1.36 
0.5  0.89 1.00 1.44  0.87 0.95 1.37  0.92 1.06 1.44 
1  0.76 0.93 1.39  0.71 0.83 1.27  0.87 1.07 1.50 
1.5  0.73 0.94 1.48  0.62 0.78 1.29  0.93 1.20 1.74 
2  0.72 0.93 1.40   0.56 0.72 1.18   1.05 1.35 1.81 
*Represents the test compromise stage. S1=stage 1 only, S2=stage 2 only, S12=stage 1 
and 2  
Results on the 𝜃 inflation show that even with 10% compromised responses, 𝜃 
could be inflated for about one standard error, and 20% or 40% compromise could lead to 
inflation up to two to four standard errors at all θ levels. Using item parameter estimates 
from the 3PLM tends to result in slightly larger inflation for lower θ levels, and smaller 
inflation for higher θ levels compared to using true item parameters, while using item 
parameter estimates from the 2PLM demonstrates a reversed pattern. Using item 
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parameter estimates does not lead to a large difference in 𝜃 inflation for medium 𝜃 levels 
from using true item parameters, but it could lead to a difference as large as 0.2 to 0.4 for 
θ at the higher or lower end. 
  Regarding the comparisons of 𝜃 inflation across different compromise stages, 
when the compromise rate is 10%, the comparison does not show a consistent pattern 
across different θ levels or across the use of different item parameters. As the 
compromise rate gets to 20% or higher, more consistent patterns are observed. 
Specifically, when the compromise rate is 20%, the preknowledge on both stages results 
in the largest score inflation for 𝜃 ≥-0.5, and the preknowledge in stage 1 only results in 
the largest score inflation for 𝜃 <-0.5. When the compromise rate is 40%, the 
preknowledge at both stages results in the largest score inflation for most θ levels. The 
different patterns at different compromise rates are related to the routing error. For 
instance, with the compromise rate being 0.2, when test compromise occurs at both 
stages, for low θ levels, the 𝜃 inflation due to the compromised responses in stage 1 may 
not be large enough to change the routing. Therefore, low-ability examinees will still be 
routed to the easy module in stage 2, and the compromised items for them will be easier 
than those if the preknowledge occurs at stage 1 only. Aberrantly correct response on 
easier items are likely to result in smaller inflation in 𝜃. In comparison, for high 𝜃 levels, 
especially for those near the routing threshold, when the preknowledge occurs at both 
stages, they are very likely to be routed to a harder module. Therefore, they will have 
correct responses on harder items than if the preknowledge only occurs in stage 1, which 
is likely to result in larger inflation in 𝜃. Similarly, when the compromise rate increases 
to 40%, when the preknowledge occurs at both stages, the inflation in 𝜃 with stage-1 
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compromise responses may be large enough for most θ levels to be routed to a harder 
module, so it will lead to aberrantly correct responses on harder items than if the 
prekonwledge only occurs in stage 1, and thus result in larger inflation in 𝜃.  
 When the preknowledge occurs at one stage only, with the compromise rate being 
20% or higher, the preknowledge on stage 1 results in larger 𝜃 inflation at low or medium 
θ levels (θ≤0.5) and the preknowledge at stage 2 results in larger inflation for higher θ 
levels (θ>0.5). This is because with the item parameters used in this study and with the 
items to which preknowledge is simulated, for low or medium θ levels, stage-1 
compromised items are harder than stage-2 compromised items, while for high θ levels, 
stage-2 compromised items are harder than those at stage-1.   
5.5.2 Detection rate at the person-level  
The empirical type-I error rate at individual θ levels are presented in Figure 5.1. 
The nominal level for the type-I error rate is 0.05, and a 95% normal-approximation 
confidence interval for the empirical type-I error rate out of 500 replications is (0.031, 
0.069). Based on this criterion, the empirical type-I error rates for the predictive checking 
approach and the KL divergence are conservative at the lower end of the θ continuum 
when item parameters estimates from the 3PLM are used, but when true item parameters 
or item parameter estimates from the 2PLM are used, the empirical type-I error fall in the 
95% confidence interval at most θ levels. In comparison, the likelihood ratio test has 
higher type-I error rates. The type-I error of the likelihood ratio test exceeds the upper 
bound of the nominal level at θ=2 when true item parameters are used, but it falls in the 
95% confidence interval at all θ levels when item parameter estimates are used.  
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Figure 5.1: Type-I error rate at person level. The two dotted lines represent the upper and 
lower bound of the 95% normal-approximation confidence interval for the empirical 
type-I error rate at nominal level of 0.05. “True” represents using true item parameters, 
3PLM and 2PLM represent using item parameter estimates from 3PLM and 2PLM 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.7 to Table 5.9 summarize the person-level power with true item 
parameters, and item parameter estimates from different models.  
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Table 5.7: Power with True Item Parameters 
  Predictive Checking  KL  Likelihood Ratio 
 % S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12 
-2 0.1 0.162 0.140 0.126  0.112 0.120 0.026  0.220 0.220 0.126 
-1.5  0.182 0.148 0.160  0.094 0.116 0.054  0.122 0.140 0.094 
-1  0.164 0.152 0.140  0.132 0.114 0.060  0.158 0.130 0.098 
-0.5  0.162 0.132 0.138  0.138 0.116 0.084  0.166 0.142 0.118 
0  0.126 0.112 0.124  0.114 0.114 0.072  0.144 0.140 0.104 
0.5  0.132 0.116 0.116  0.108 0.088 0.072  0.132 0.102 0.094 
1  0.114 0.112 0.106  0.130 0.112 0.104  0.148 0.128 0.122 
1.5  0.082 0.096 0.084  0.096 0.100 0.082  0.118 0.128 0.102 
2  0.070 0.070 0.054  0.078 0.082 0.062  0.110 0.108 0.096 
-2 0.2 0.484 0.398 0.440  0.360 0.348 0.324  0.438 0.416 0.398 
-1.5  0.472 0.336 0.384  0.320 0.298 0.296  0.394 0.356 0.366 
-1  0.426 0.298 0.386  0.332 0.258 0.272  0.384 0.306 0.324 
-0.5  0.330 0.298 0.328  0.276 0.246 0.266  0.330 0.294 0.310 
0  0.254 0.230 0.306  0.248 0.238 0.260  0.292 0.280 0.296 
0.5  0.250 0.224 0.300  0.202 0.186 0.250  0.230 0.222 0.292 
1  0.188 0.196 0.230  0.186 0.178 0.224  0.206 0.204 0.268 
1.5  0.144 0.180 0.220  0.160 0.168 0.202  0.198 0.204 0.244 
2  0.092 0.118 0.146  0.106 0.124 0.164  0.160 0.172 0.222 
-2 0.4 0.960 0.840 0.940  0.936 0.824 0.860  0.958 0.864 0.890 
-1.5  0.878 0.718 0.906  0.860 0.722 0.812  0.896 0.770 0.844 
-1  0.828 0.638 0.888  0.750 0.610 0.776  0.786 0.668 0.824 
-0.5  0.664 0.590 0.860  0.650 0.522 0.778  0.704 0.602 0.826 
0  0.498 0.494 0.754  0.510 0.472 0.720  0.546 0.502 0.776 
0.5  0.378 0.446 0.704  0.356 0.424 0.636  0.384 0.480 0.700 
1  0.264 0.352 0.558  0.266 0.344 0.562  0.314 0.392 0.632 
1.5  0.188 0.286 0.488  0.204 0.254 0.444  0.234 0.304 0.552 
2  0.118 0.198 0.354  0.144 0.190 0.288  0.206 0.258 0.440 
 
  
 91 
Table 5.8: Power with Item Parameter Estimates from 3PLM 
  Predictive Checking  KL  Likelihood Ratio 
 % S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12 
-2 0.1 0.070 0.060 0.062  0.006 0.000 0.000  0.076 0.104 0.052 
-1.5  0.138 0.112 0.116  0.016 0.024 0.004  0.100 0.132 0.072 
-1  0.144 0.144 0.144  0.062 0.072 0.026  0.146 0.134 0.096 
-0.5  0.168 0.130 0.136  0.108 0.102 0.072  0.156 0.148 0.114 
0  0.126 0.110 0.114  0.104 0.114 0.076  0.136 0.138 0.108 
0.5  0.144 0.114 0.112  0.104 0.094 0.078  0.130 0.102 0.096 
1  0.106 0.114 0.108  0.126 0.114 0.108  0.152 0.130 0.124 
1.5  0.080 0.096 0.090  0.096 0.102 0.080  0.122 0.124 0.106 
2  0.070 0.074 0.062  0.086 0.082 0.068  0.110 0.110 0.092 
-2 0.2 0.408 0.280 0.328  0.050 0.040 0.024  0.280 0.314 0.224 
-1.5  0.428 0.314 0.402  0.108 0.140 0.080  0.312 0.330 0.254 
-1  0.424 0.300 0.404  0.198 0.200 0.190  0.336 0.302 0.288 
-0.5  0.332 0.306 0.342  0.244 0.240 0.232  0.316 0.306 0.312 
0  0.246 0.226 0.294  0.236 0.236 0.244  0.288 0.276 0.302 
0.5  0.242 0.226 0.298  0.204 0.184 0.244  0.228 0.220 0.288 
1  0.186 0.200 0.226  0.186 0.184 0.234  0.212 0.204 0.266 
1.5  0.138 0.170 0.220  0.162 0.166 0.204  0.204 0.198 0.250 
2  0.094 0.118 0.146  0.108 0.124 0.172  0.152 0.174 0.220 
-2 0.4 0.956 0.838 0.938  0.856 0.644 0.504  0.950 0.848 0.818 
-1.5  0.882 0.732 0.910  0.806 0.648 0.668  0.888 0.768 0.814 
-1  0.828 0.668 0.894  0.726 0.602 0.710  0.786 0.696 0.794 
-0.5  0.666 0.598 0.842  0.646 0.534 0.762  0.700 0.624 0.828 
0  0.494 0.504 0.744  0.516 0.486 0.710  0.552 0.520 0.774 
0.5  0.364 0.442 0.690  0.362 0.432 0.646  0.390 0.478 0.688 
1  0.266 0.344 0.550  0.276 0.330 0.566  0.324 0.378 0.636 
1.5  0.192 0.288 0.480  0.210 0.246 0.456  0.238 0.298 0.552 
2  0.114 0.194 0.338  0.152 0.180 0.296  0.204 0.252 0.438 
Note. The italic bold numbers represent the power rates that are different from the power 
with true item parameters by 0.1. 
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Table 5.9: Power with Item Parameter Estimates from 2PLM 
  Predictive Checking  KL  Likelihood Ratio 
 % S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12  S1 S2 S12 
-2 0.1 0.178 0.142 0.148  0.150 0.174 0.110  0.184 0.208 0.144 
-1.5  0.190 0.166 0.156  0.106 0.134 0.090  0.138 0.154 0.104 
-1  0.174 0.132 0.148  0.124 0.120 0.104  0.158 0.144 0.120 
-0.5  0.160 0.130 0.136  0.130 0.106 0.100  0.156 0.138 0.122 
0  0.126 0.108 0.108  0.098 0.096 0.072  0.132 0.126 0.096 
0.5  0.130 0.118 0.110  0.094 0.084 0.066  0.118 0.096 0.082 
1  0.106 0.116 0.112  0.106 0.094 0.078  0.134 0.134 0.104 
1.5  0.090 0.098 0.100  0.084 0.092 0.068  0.116 0.124 0.084 
2  0.082 0.088 0.064  0.068 0.068 0.056  0.116 0.110 0.094 
-2 0.2 0.490 0.390 0.418  0.392 0.392 0.360  0.438 0.430 0.404 
-1.5  0.442 0.346 0.410  0.332 0.334 0.334  0.396 0.396 0.392 
-1  0.408 0.302 0.404  0.324 0.258 0.276  0.372 0.318 0.330 
-0.5  0.318 0.290 0.322  0.274 0.242 0.244  0.312 0.302 0.304 
0  0.246 0.218 0.286  0.226 0.192 0.230  0.268 0.260 0.274 
0.5  0.240 0.228 0.288  0.168 0.162 0.196  0.216 0.208 0.262 
1  0.196 0.208 0.232  0.168 0.166 0.196  0.206 0.192 0.240 
1.5  0.154 0.190 0.238  0.142 0.160 0.174  0.184 0.192 0.234 
2  0.120 0.128 0.176  0.092 0.100 0.134  0.164 0.174 0.222 
-2 0.4 0.958 0.838 0.904  0.934 0.812 0.838  0.952 0.844 0.884 
-1.5  0.872 0.734 0.892  0.858 0.724 0.770  0.886 0.760 0.828 
-1  0.824 0.650 0.882  0.730 0.594 0.736  0.772 0.658 0.776 
-0.5  0.664 0.586 0.854  0.632 0.504 0.746  0.680 0.588 0.774 
0  0.494 0.488 0.744  0.496 0.428 0.662  0.536 0.502 0.706 
0.5  0.374 0.448 0.704  0.320 0.378 0.552  0.386 0.460 0.626 
1  0.288 0.364 0.578  0.252 0.318 0.498  0.306 0.374 0.572 
1.5  0.214 0.322 0.512  0.186 0.218 0.400  0.236 0.308 0.518 
2  0.150 0.222 0.394  0.134 0.170 0.238  0.212 0.282 0.450 
The power for all three methods is small when the compromise rate is only 10% - 
the power among the lowest θ levels is less than 0.2 for the predictive checking approach, 
and less than 0.1 for the other two approaches. The power increases to a large extent as 
the compromise rate increases to 40% - moderate to high power rates are observed among 
medium to low θ levels. The three methods demonstrate similar power when true item 
parameters and item parameter estimates from 2PLM are used: the power difference 
between the predictive checking and the likelihood ratio test is smaller than 0.1 and both 
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of them tend to have slightly higher power than the KL divergence at lower θ levels. 
When item parameter estimates from 3PLM are used, using the predictive checking could 
have slightly larger power at lower θ levels than the likelihood ratio test, and both of 
them have much higher power at lower θ levels than the KL divergence. As for the power 
comparisons across different compromised stages for each method, when the compromise 
rate is 20% or higher, the power comparisons demonstrate very similar patterns as the 
score inflation across different compromised stages for the predictive checking approach. 
This is consistent with the expectation that a larger score inflation is easier to be detected. 
As for the KL divergence and the likelihood ratio test, the power comparison patterns 
become similar to the pattern of score inflation when the compromise rate is 40%. The 
lack of similarity between the power pattern and the score inflation pattern when the 
compromise rate is small could be attributed to the fact that both methods measure more 
than the shift in the point estimate of θ: the KL divergence measures the discrepancy 
between the θ posterior distributions on the two types of items, and the likelihood ratio 
test measures the difference in likelihoods under null and alternative hypotheses. When 
the compromise rate is small, the value of the KL divergence statistic or the likelihood 
ratio statistic does not simply reflect the shift of 𝜃, but when the compromise rate gets 
larger, the large value of either statistic is dominated by the shift of 𝜃. 
 In terms of the effect of using item parameter estimates on the detection power, as 
can be seen from Table 5.8 and 5.9, the power differences between using the true item 
parameters and the 2PLM item parameter estimates are very small at most θ levels: all 
differences are up to the second decimal place. Using 3PLM item parameter estimates 
could result in power reduction for greater than 0.1 at the lowest one or two θ levels (θ=-
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2 or -1.5) for all three methods, especially for the KL divergence: that the power 
reduction for the KL divergence could be as large as 0.2 to 0.5 when the 3PLM item 
parameter estimates are used. This effect is likely to be caused by the fact that the 
presence of the c-parameter reduces the Fisher information, and thus the likelihood 
function becomes flatter in the 3PLM. Particularly, for the KL divergence method, as 
illustrated from Figure 5.2, the presence of the c-parameter makes the θ posterior 
distributions flatter than those estimated from the true item parameters or 2PLM item 
parameter estimates, and the log posterior ratios between the two posterior distributions 
(𝑙𝑛
𝑃(𝜃|𝒚𝟏)
𝑃(𝜃|𝒚𝟐)
), which are part of the integrand in the KL divergence calculation, also become 
much smaller. These two outcomes together result in smaller values for the KL 
divergence, and thus the power is reduced with the 3PLM item parameter estimates. 
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Figure 5.2: The left panel shows the θ posterior distributions on T1 and T2 in the 
condition with 40% compromised responses in both stages. The red, black and blue lines 
represent the use of true item parameters, 3PLM item parameter estimates and 2PLM 
item parameter estimates. The right panel shows the log posterior ratio between T1 and 
T2 when the three types of item parameters are used. 
5.5.3 Detection rate at the group level  
 Figure 5.3 displays the type-I error at group level, and Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display 
the detection power among examinees with ability distributions of N(0,1) and N(-1,1), 
respectively. Figure 5.3 shows that the empirical type-I error for the KL divergence is 
slightly conservative among N(-1,1), while the empirical type-I error rates for the other 
two methods both fall into the 95% normal approximation confidence interval. Same as 
the pattern at the person-level, the KL divergence has the lowest type-I error rate, due to 
the use of the most conservative cutoff value, and the likelihood ratio test has the highest 
type-I error rate. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show that the detection power among both ability 
groups is low when there is a small compromise rate – the detection power is below 0.4 
for both groups when the compromise rate is 10% or 20%. With 40% compromised 
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items, moderate to high detection power is observed. Consistent with the detection rate at 
individual θ levels, the predictive checking and the likelihood ratio test have very similar 
power, and the KL divergence has the lowest power. When the compromise rate is less 
than 40%, the difference in the detection power among different MST stages is small for 
both ability groups. With 40% compromise rate, the detection power is slightly higher 
when the preknowledge occurs in both stages, due to the fact that preknowledge at both 
stages results in larger 𝜃 inflation among most θ levels. 
 
Figure 5.3: Type-I error rate of the three methods (PC=Predictive checking, KL=KL 
divergence, and LR=likelihood ratio) among different examinee ability groups. The x-
axis represents the type of item parameter used, and the two dotted lines represent the 
upper and lower bound of the 95% normal-approximation confidence interval for the 
empirical type-I error rate at nominal level of 0.05.  
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Figure 5.4: Detection power among examinees with ability distribution of N(0,1). Each 
plot shows the detection rates of the three methods at different compromised stages 
(S1=stage 1 only, S2=stage 2 only, S12=Stage 1 and 2). The first row shows the detection 
power with true item parameters, the second row shows the power with 3PLM item 
parameter estimates, and the third row shows the power with 2PLM item parameter 
estimates.  
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Figure 5.5: power among examinees with ability distribution of N(-1,1). 
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5.6 Results in Key Exposure Simulation 
5.6.1 Person-level Detection Result 
 
Figure 5.6: Person-level detection rate across different conditions. Reg1 represents the 
regression method when the cheating group follows θ~N(0,1), and Reg2 represents the 
regression method when the cheating group follows θ~N(-1,1). 
 The detection rates of different methods in the six conditions are summazied in 
Figure 5.6. Regarding the type-I error of different methods, the type-I error of the 
predictive checking method is slighlty conservative at lower θ levels, and the KL 
divergence has conservative type-I error at many θ levels, due to the use of the most 
conservative cut-off value. Similar to the findings in the shallow pool situation, the 
likelihood ratio test has larger type-I error than the predictive checking and the KL 
divergence, and it has inflated type-I error at θ=-2. The type-I error of the simple linear 
regression shows an increasing pattern as θ increases. This is due to the fact that the 
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residuals tend to be smaller at lower θ levels and larger at higher θ levels, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.7.  
 As for the detection power when T1 responses are based on one’s real proficiency 
but the entire T2 is compromised, all methods have large power to detect security breach 
on T2 for 𝜃 ≤ 0. When responses to T2 are identical with the keys (i.e. no memorization 
error), the three IRT-based methods have larger power than the regression method: at 
relatively high 𝜃 levels (𝜃 = 0.5⁡𝑜𝑟⁡1), the power of the predictive checking and the 
likelihood ratio test is about 0.2 higher than the regession method, and the power of the 
KL divergence is about 0.1 higher than the regression method. The comparison among 
the three IRT-based methods shows that the likelihood ratio test has the highest power, 
and the KL divergence has the lowest power. When responses to T2 contain 20% 
memorization error, all methods only have moderate or low power to detect 
preknowledge among medium to high θ levels (𝜃 ≥ 0.5). Under this condition, the power 
comparison among all four methods shows the same pattern as in the condition where 
responses to T2 contain no memorization errors, but the difference between methods is 
much smaller.   
 When responses to T1 are random or based on the wrong key, all methods have 
high power to detect score difference between T1 and T2. On one hand ,when T2 is 
uncompromised, all methods have a very high chance of falsely identifying a high-abiltiy 
person as a cheater. On the other hand, when the entire T2 is compromised, all methods 
will correctly identify a cheater with the probability of 1 for all θ levels.  
 It is also seen that although the regression is a group-based method and the 
regression line could be affected to differnet extent when the cheating group follows 
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different ability distributions, in this study, the person-level detection rate in the 
regression method is very similar when the cheating group follows different ability 
distributions. This is mainly due to the fact that there is not a large proportion of cheating 
examinees in this study, so the impact of outliers on the regression line is very small.  
 
Figure 5.7: Distribution of standardized residuals at different θ levels. 
 102 
5.6.2 Group-level Detection Results 
 
Figure 5.8: Group-level detection rate across different conditions.  
 Regarding the detection rate at the group level, the type-I error rate for all 
methods fall in the 95% normal approximation confidence interval for both ability 
groups. The likelihood ratio test and the regression method have larger type-I error rates 
than the other two methods. Same as person-level detection results, when T1 responses 
are based on one’s real proficiency, all methods have high power to detect security 
breach: the power is above 0.6 for the group with θ~N(0,1), and above 0.8 for the group 
with θ~N(-1,1). When responses to T1 are random or based on the wrong key, if security 
breach happens, all methods will correctly detect it with a probability of almost 1, but 
they will also falsely detect it with a high prbability if the security breach does not 
happen.  
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5.7. Discussion 
 Study 2 mimicked two test compromise situations that are likely to happen in 
practice, and compared the predictive checking method with several other approaches. In 
the shallow pool situation with small to moderate test compromise rates, the likelihood 
ratio test and the adapted KL divergence were compared to the predictive checking in an 
MST design. The results suggest that the predictive checking and the likelihood ratio test 
have very similar power in all conditions, and both of them slightly outperformed the 
adapted KL divergence. The slightly lower power of the adapted KL divergence could be 
partly attributed to the fact that the most conservative sampling distribution is used to 
ensure the type-I error rate does not exceed the nominal level in the null space of θ. Both 
the predictive checking method and the adapted KL divergence method use simulation to 
approximate the exact distribution of the test statistic in the null condition, while the 
likelihood ratio test relies on an asymptotic distribution. The results in this study suggest 
that using the asymptotic distribution does not lead to either too conservative or too 
liberal type-I error rate at the nominal level of 0.05 for most θ levels, but the type-I error 
of the likelihood ratio test is slightly larger than the other two methods. Considering the 
likelihood ratio test is less computationally intensive than the other two methods, one can 
consider using the likelihood ratio test if both subtests (T1 and T2) contain more than 20 
items in practice. However, it should be noted that the asymptotic distribution for the 
likelihood ratio test may not work well when either subtest is not long enough, and in that 
case, the predictive checking method is a useful alternative, as it does not need an 
asymptotic distribution.  
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 In the shallow pool simulation, the detection effectiveness was also investigated 
under different test compromise rates, different compromised MST stages, and different 
types of item parameters. The findings suggest that none of the three methods has 
sufficient power to detect preknowledge on only 10% items, even though 10% test 
compromise rate could result in 𝜃 inflation of one standard error. The predictive checking 
method and the likelihood ratio test have moderate power to detect 20% test compromise 
among low-ability examinees, and both of them have moderate to large power to detect 
40% test compromise among low to medium-ability examinees. Preknowledge at 
different stages will result in different amount of 𝜃 inflation, depending on the difficulty 
of the compromised items relative to a person’s ability, and in general, the detection 
power increases with larger 𝜃 inflation. Lastly, regarding the use of different types of 
item parameters, the power of the KL divergence at the lower end of θ is greatly reduced 
by the use of the 3PLM item parameter estimates, possibly due to the impact of c-
parameter on the likelihood function and the θ posterior distribution. The predictive 
checking method and the likelihood ratio test are only slightly affected by the use of 
3PLM item parameter estimates, but not by the use of the 2PLM estimates, even though 
the 2PLM has slight misfit to the data.  
 In the security breach situation with extreme test compromise, the predictive 
checking was compared to the likelihood ratio test, the adapted KL divergence and the 
simple linear regression in a fixed-form test. Results suggest that all methods are 
effective in detecting the extreme security breach. The regression method and the 
likelihood ratio test have inflated type-I error rate at the higher or lower end of θ 
continuum, while the type-I error of the predictive checking and the KL divergence are 
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below the upper bound of the nominal level at all θ levels. Although previous research 
suggests that the regression method is ineffective to detect test compromise, the 
regression method showed sufficient power to detect score difference between T1 and T2 
in this study and its power is not substantially lower the other IRT-based methods. The 
difference between findings in this study and in the previous study could be attributed to 
the difference in the level of simulated security breach. In this study, we considered an 
extreme situation where the keys to all 40 items in T2 are exposed. If such an extreme 
situation occurs in reality, our findings suggest that the regression method can effectively 
identify those cheaters. The regression method has slightly lower power than the IRT-
based methods partly because the assumptions of simple linear regression is slightly 
violated with this simulated dataset. Additional analysis (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B) 
suggest that the homoscedasticity assumption is slightly violated: compared to the error 
variance at the middle range of T1 scores, the error variance at the two ends of T1 scores 
is smaller. Furthermore, because the data were simulated with the IRT model, the 
comparison is slightly biased towards the IRT-based methods.  
 The results in the security breach simulation also suggest that if responses on T1 
are aberrant, the detection methods are still effective in detecting the score difference 
between T1 and T2 in the extreme security breach condition. However, some examinees 
may be falsely identified as cheaters. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, the statistical 
evidence should only be used as a screening procedure to flag out some problematic 
examinees. Further investigation needs to be conducted to gather more evidence to 
conclude an examinee conducts cheating or not.  On the other hand, this finding suggests 
that it is important to check the person-fit on T1 responses when using all the methods 
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proposed here. If person-fit analysis suggests that T1 responses involve some aberrancy, 
it implies that we cannot use T1 responses as a valid baseline to estimate a person’s real 
proficiency, and thus a higher score on T2 does not necessarily imply that the person 
conducts cheating on T2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REAL DATA APPLICATION 
6.1 Data Description 
A real dataset was used to illustrate the practical use of the predictive checking 
method and the other detection methods. The dataset comes from a state assessment 
measuring students’ math proficiency in grade 4. The original dataset consists of 23583 
examinees’ responses to 63 items. Since some items are randomly assigned to examinees, 
there are a lot of missing responses in the file. To remove the missingness, 21 items that 
are randomly assigned among examinees were deleted. The remaining 42 items consisted 
of 38 dichotomous items and 4 polytomous items, and the polytomous items were all 
scored from 0 to 3. In addition, as the analysis was conducted at the person level, instead 
of using the entire examinee population, a sample of 5000 randomly selected examinees 
was used to simplify the analysis.  
Instead of using the original response dataset, responses to some items were 
modified to create an artificially compromised dataset. Specifically, 21 items (19 
dichotomous items and 2 polytomous items) were randomly selected from the 42 items as 
unsecure items. Then 5% examinees were randomly selected from the examinee sample 
and their responses to 8 items (7 dichotomous items and 1 polytomous item) in the 
unsecure subset were modified to create the compromised responses. The 8 compromised 
items were randomly selected from the unsecure subset for each examinee, so different 
examinees had compromised responses on different items. An examinee’s response on a 
compromised dichotomous item was modified to be correct and one’s score on the 
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compromised polytomous item was increased by 2-if the score after manipulation 
exceeded the maximum possible score, it was set to the maximum. 
6.2 Data Analysis 
As the first step of the analysis, the person-fit of responses on the artificially 
secure section (denoted “T1”) was evaluated for each examinee. As the predictive 
checking method assumes that the responses on T1 fit the IRT model, and considering 
that all methods could have high false positive rates if the responses to T1 do not reflect 
one’s real proficiency (as shown in study 2), only response vectors not identified as 
having misfit problems were kept in further analysis. The person-fit of responses on “T1” 
was evaluated using the popular person-fit statistic 𝑙𝑧 (Drasgow et al., 1985; Sinharay, 
2015), which has been shown to perform at least as well as or better than many other 
person-fit statistics (e.g. Drasgow, Levine, & McLaughlin, 1987). Previous studies have 
shown that when 𝜃 is used in the 𝑙𝑧 calculation, the empirical distribution of 𝑙𝑧(?̂?) 
deviates from the asymptotic distribution derived for 𝑙𝑧(𝜃). Sinharay (2015) constructed 
the null distribution of 𝑙𝑧(𝜃)  using the Bayesian PPC approach in a mixed-format test, 
and found it led to more power than using the asymptotic distribution, and the PPC p-
value did not have the problem of being conservative in the case with 𝑙𝑧(𝜃). Therefore, 
PPC was used to construct the null distribution of 𝑙𝑧 in the present study. A nominal level 
of 0.05 was used to identify misfitting responses. 
The four methods discussed in this chapter- the predictive checking method, 
likelihood ratio test, simple linear regression and modified KL divergence- were applied 
to the modified dataset. In the implementation of the predictive checking method, the 
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summed score and the posterior variance were used as test statistics. The EAP was not 
used as study 1 showed that the summed score and the EAP had very similar performance 
when both subtests consisted of 20 items or more, and the summed score was 
computationally much easier than the EAP. N(0,22) was used as the prior distribution as 
the simulation in study 1 showed that the difference between prior configurations was 
small when both T1 and T2 were long, and using N(0,22) led to an easier computation. 
Item parameter estimates from the examinee population were used in person-level 
analysis. The 3PL model and the graded response model (GRM; Samejima, 1997) were 
used as the scoring models for dichotomous and polytomous items, respectively.  
To evaluate the detection effectiveness among different methods, first of all, the 
detection rates among the examinees whose responses were modified (i.e. modified 
examinees) and the remaining examinees (i.e. unmodified examinees) were calculated. 
Second, the classification consistency- the agreement of classifying an examinee as a 
cheater or non-cheater- between every two methods was computed. The classification 
consistency was calculated in two approaches. The first approach was to count the 
observed proportion of detection agreement between two methods directly, denoted 𝑃𝑂. 
The second approach used Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960), which corrected for the 
decision consistency by chance (𝑃𝐶). Cohen’s Kappa takes the form of  
𝜅 =
𝑃𝑂 − 𝑃𝐶
1 − 𝑃𝐶
 (37) 
𝑃𝐶 can be calculated with the formula 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃1.𝑃.1 + 𝑃0.𝑃.0, where 𝑃1. represents the 
detection power by the first method, and 𝑃.1 represents the detection power by the second 
method, 𝑃0. = 1 − 𝑃1. and 𝑃.0 = 1 − 𝑃.1. Lastly, the common cases flagged by all 
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methods as well as the unique cases flagged by each method only were identified. The 
posterior distributions of θ on T1 and T2 were plotted for each of the cases to explore the 
characteristics of cases detected by different methods. If there were more than one cases 
flagged by all methods, or by one method uniquely, the case with the smallest p-value 
was chosen to make the plot. In addition, the unique cases detected by different methods 
were also highlighted in the scatterplots of examinees’ summed scores/ EAP scores on T1 
and T2 to further explore the detection characteristics of different methods. For 
comparison purposes, only cases showing an increase in 𝜃 were included in the plots.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Detection rate 
Table 6.1: Detection Rate (EAP change) of Different Methods 
 PC(sum) PC(var) LRT KL Reg 
Modified examinees 0.183 0.085 0.248 0.171 0.301 
 (1.883) (0.049) (1.766) (1.928) (1.602) 
Unmodified examinees 0.012 0.098 0.036 0.015 0.032 
 (1.719) (-0.517) (1.487) (1.733) (1.422) 
Note. PC(sum) = predictive checking using the summed score, PC(var) = predictive 
checking using the posterior variance, LRT=likelihood ratio test, KL=KL divergence, and 
Reg=regression. The numbers in the parenthesis represent the average EAP increase from 
T1 to T2 among the examinees detected by each method. 
Table 6.1 shows the detection rates among modified and unmodified examinees 
by each method. Different from the simulation results in study 2, the regression method 
has a better detection rate than the IRT-based method. This is probably because in the 
simulation in study 2, response data were generated based an IRT model, and there were 
some violations to the assumptions of the simple linear regression. However, with real 
data, the IRT model inevitably tends to have some misfit to the dataset, while the 
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assumptions of simple linear regression are well satisfied, as shown in Figure B.2 in the 
Appendix B. The comparisons among the three IRT-based methods demonstrate the same 
pattern among modified examinees as in the simulation in study 2: the likelihood ratio 
test has the largest detection rate, followed by the predictive checking method with the 
summed score; the KL divergence has slightly lower power than the predictive checking 
with the summed score and the predictive checking with the posterior variance has the 
lowest power, partly due to the use of a two-sided test for the posterior variance. Among 
unmodified examinees, the predictive checking using the posterior variance has the 
highest detection rate. The likelihood ratio test and the regression method detect more 
examinees than the KL divergence and the predictive checking with the summed score. It 
is also observed that the detection rates of the predictive checking with the summed score 
and the KL divergence are both substantially below the nominal type-I error rate. This 
could happen for several reasons. One possible cause is that a right-tailed test was 
conducted for these two methods to detect score increase on T2, but the observed score 
on T2 could be lower than the expected score due to some aberrant responses patterns 
such as careless responding or lack of motivation. Therefore, it is possible that the 
empirical distribution of the test statistic shifts to the left of the null distribution instead 
of to the right, and thus the empirical detection rate is lower than the type-I error from a 
right-tailed test. Another possible cause is that the test statistic’s null distribution in the 
two methods were simulated from an IRT model, but the IRT model has some misfit to 
the observed responses in reality, and thus there is some discrepancy between the null 
distribution used here and the truth.  
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Results on the EAP change from T1 to T2 suggest that the predictive checking 
with the posterior variance could detect examinees with only slight change or even 
negative change in 𝜃. This is because this method is not aimed at detecting score change, 
but at evaluating the flatness of the likelihood function. This implies that in order to use 
this method to detect preknowledge in particular, one can first use this statistic to identify 
examinees with flat likelihood functions (as implemented in this study), and then based 
on the direction of 𝜃 change, only examinees with positive 𝜃 change are further flagged 
out as possible “cheaters”. Among the rest of the methods, on average, examinees 
detected by the regression method and the likelihood ratio test show slightly smaller EAP 
increase than those detected by the KL divergence and the predictive checking with the 
summed score. This suggests that the regression and the likelihood ratio test are better at 
detecting examinees with a smaller score increase than the other two methods.  
6.3.2 Classification Consistency  
Table 6.2 below shows the classification consistency between every two methods. 
The observed classification consistency is high between every two methods, but after 
correcting for the chance agreement, it is clear that the predictive checking with the 
posterior variance detected quite difference cases than the rest of the methods. Both the 
predictive checking with summed score and the likelihood ratio test have the highest 
classification consistency with the KL divergence, and the regression method has the 
highest classification consistency with the likelihood ratio test.   
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Table 6.2: Classification consistency among different methods  
 PC(Sum) PC(Var) LRT KL Reg 
PC(Sum) 1 -0.024 0.561 0.733 0.559 
PC(Var) 0.884 1 -0.025 -0.011 -0.032 
LRT 0.972 0.862 1 0.656 0.627 
KL 0.989 0.883 0.977 1 0.558 
Reg 0.972 0.862 0.968 0.971 1 
Note. The upper triangle shows the kappa coefficient, and the lower triangle shows the 
observed classification consistency. 
6.3.3 Detection Characteristics by Different Methods 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below display the θ posterior distributions of modified and 
unmodified examinees detected by all methods, and the examinees detected by one 
method only. It turns out the KL divergence does not have unique detection- all the cases 
detected by the KL divergence were detected by the other methods, and among 
unmodified examinees, the predictive checking with the summed score does not have 
unique detection. Both Figures 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that for the case detected by all 
methods, the θ posterior distribution shows a large shift from T1 to T2. Both figures also 
indicate that the predictive checking with the posterior variance can detect only slight 
shift in θ posterior distributions; the likelihood ratio test can better detect θ posterior 
distribution shift for very low or very high θ levels, and the regression can better detect θ 
posterior distribution shift for medium θ levels. This point is further supported by the 
pattern shown in Figure 6.3, which highlights the unique cases detected by different 
methods. It is clear from Figure 6.3 that the likelihood ratio test tends to have unique 
detection at the lower or higher end of the ability continuum, while the regression method 
tends to have unique detection in the middle of the ability continuum. The predictive 
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checking with posterior variance detects many cases close to the fitted simple linear 
regression line.  
 
Figure 6.1: Posterior distribution of θ for cases detected by different methods among 
modified examinees. The first plot shows the case detected by all methods, and the rest of 
the plots show cases detected by one method only but not by the other methods. PC 
(summed score) represents predictive checking using the summed score, PC (variance) 
represents predictive checking using the posterior variance, LRT represents likelihood 
ratio test.  
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Figure 6.2: Posterior distribution of θ for cases detected by different methods among 
unmodified examinees. 
 
Figure 6.3: Scatterplot of summed score (left) and EAP (right) on T1 and T2. The solid 
line on each plot represents the fitted simple linear regression line based on the summed 
score or EAP. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study focuses on a test security problem where examinees might have 
preknowledge on repeatedly-used items in a continuous testing program. A predictive 
checking method was proposed to detect whether an examinee uses preknowledge on 
exposed items by using information from secure items. To investigate the effectiveness of 
this method, three studies were conducted in sequence. The first study aims at 
understanding the statistical properties of this method, and a simulation study was 
designed to evaluate the empirical type-I error and power of this method under different 
lengths of secure and unsecure sections, by considering different prior configurations and 
different test statistics. The second study aims at comparing this method to three other 
methods in two simulated test compromise situations that are likely to happen in practice. 
The third study aims at demonstrating the practical use of different methods, and 
investigating their detection consistency in a real dataset.  The following three paragraphs 
summarize some general findings from the three studies. 
First of all, regarding the detection effectiveness of the predictive checking 
method at the item-set level, both study 1 and 2 have suggested that the type-I error of 
this method gets close to the nominal level of 0.05 when both subsets are long (e.g. 
containing 20 items or more). With a secure subset containing 20 or more items, this 
method has moderate to large power to detect preknowledge on 20% or more items in the 
unsecure subset among low to medium-ability individuals by using the summed score or 
the EAP as test statistics. In the extreme situation where a large number of unsecure items 
are compromised, using only five or ten secure items can lead to sufficient detection 
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power. Using the variance of the θ posterior distribution does not exhibit large power by 
itself, but both the simulation and the real data analysis suggest using it along with the 
summed score or the EAP can help detect examinees with a relatively small score 
increase. However, caution needs to be taken if two statistics are used to evaluate the 
same response vector at the same time, as multiple hypothesis tests are conducted 
simultaneously and the family-wise error rate needs to be controlled. In this study, the 
detection difference between prior configurations is small, and this suggests that one can 
simply choose a less-informative prior that leads to easier computation in practice. The 
item-level detection does not turn out to be successful in this study, as the power is too 
low and the false positive rate is too high.   
Second, regarding the comparison between the predictive checking and three 
other methods (i.e. the likelihood ratio test, adapted KL divergence, and the simple linear 
regression), the simulation results suggest that the predictive checking and the likelihood 
ratio test have larger power than the other methods. The predictive checking has very 
similar power to the likelihood ratio test, but the likelihood ratio test has a larger type-I 
error rate. However, as mentioned in the discussion section in Chapter 5, the likelihood 
ratio test relies on an asymptotic sampling distribution, which may not work well when 
either subtest is short. The predictive checking, in comparison, can be used with short 
subtests at a cost of being more computationally intensive. Study 2 also suggests that the 
power of the adapted KL divergence may be affected to a large extent when item 
parameter estimates from the 3PLM are used, which could limit its effectiveness in 
detecting preknowledge among low-ability examinees. The simple linear regression also 
demonstrates large power in detecting the extreme security breach. Its performance in the 
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simulation study is slightly worse than the other methods in that it has inflated type-I 
error among high θ levels, and it has slightly lower power than the other methods, but this 
result could be related to the data generation model adopted in study 2.  
Third, the real data application gives some different results regarding the 
comparison among different methods. The simple linear regression has the highest 
detection rates than the other methods among artificially cheating examinees. The 
comparison among the three IRT-based methods in the real dataset demonstrates a similar 
pattern as in the simulation study: the likelihood ratio test flags more suspicious 
examinees than the predictive checking, and the KL divergence flags slightly fewer 
examinees among artificial cheaters than the predictive checking. The real data analysis 
also suggest that although the four methods (i.e. predictive checking with the summed 
score, adapted KL divergence, likelihood ratio test, and simple linear regression) have 
high detection consistency, one method may perform better in detecting a particular type 
of score increase than the others. For instance, the likelihood ratio is more likely to detect 
score increase among high- or low-ability individuals, while the simple linear regression 
is more likely to detect score increase in the middle of the ability continuum.  
The findings in this study have several practical implications. The results in the 
key exposure situation suggest that if one’s primary goal is to detect severe security 
breach due to item preknowledge, the simple linear regression can be considered as the 
first choice, since it is the easiest to implement among all the methods under investigation 
in this study, and it does not need to be based on the IRT model. To detect small to 
moderate test compromise, the likelihood ratio test can be used when both subsets have 
more than 20 items, while the predictive checking method can be used when either subset 
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is short. To increase the detection power under small to moderate test compromise 
situations, one can narrow the possibly compromised subset down to items that are most 
likely to be compromised or items with moderate to high difficulty level. Items that are 
more likely to be compromised can be determined through some external information 
regarding item leakage. Alternatively, it can be determined through some systematic 
investigation, such as monitoring the statistical behavior of each item over time and 
identifying items that become aberrantly easier at a certain time point. Those items can be 
flagged as potentially compromised items, and can be included in the possibly 
compromised section at the person-level investigation.  
This study has several limitations. First of all, except for one condition in the 
security breach simulation in study 2, the simulations in this project assume the responses 
to the secure items fit the IRT model well. This is unlikely to happen in practice. For 
instance, those responses are likely to be affected by some aberrant response behaviors 
other than preknowledge, such as careless responding, test speededness, etc. The only 
condition in study 2 that incorporates aberrant responses in secure items considered an 
extreme case where the responses to all items in the 20-item secure section only have a 
0.25 chance of being correct. This makes the secure section useless in inferring a person’s 
proficiency. Future study can evaluate the performance of the predictive checking and 
other methods when there is some small to moderate level of misfit in responses to the 
secure items, such that the responses to the secure items still provide some valid 
information to infer a person’s ability, but contain some noises. 
The second limitation is that all studies in this project only evaluated the type-I 
error and power of the detection methods at the nominal level of 0.05. This particular 
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nominal level was chosen due to its common use in hypothesis testing, but it only 
provides partial information for the performance of a method in the null and alternative 
condition. To better justify the use of a statistical test, one can evaluate the p-value 
distribution of the test statistic in the null condition and see whether it asymptotically 
approximates a uniform distribution5. In addition, to more comprehensively evaluate the 
power of a statistical test, one can look at the ROC curve which plots the power against 
different type-I error rates and report the area-under-curve (AUC) indices for each 
method. 
The third limitation relates to the use of the data-generating model in the 
simulation studies. As implied by the findings from the real-data analysis, where the 
comparison between the regression method and the other methods showed a different 
pattern from that in the simulation study, the comparison among methods may depend on 
the model we used to generate the data in the null and alternative condition. In all 
simulation studies, the IRT model was used to generate response data in the null 
condition, which gave a bias to all IRT-based approaches. Future studies could consider 
using a non-parametric model to generate response data. In addition, the data-generating 
models in the preknowledge condition are relatively simple in study 1 and in the shallow 
pool simulation in study 2: the compromised responses were generated by adding a 
constant to the probability in the null condition or changing the responses to correct. 
Different data-generating models are likely to have an impact on the performance of each 
method and the comparison between methods. Future studies can consider several 
                                                 
5 The author did evaluate the p-value distribution of the predictive checking in the null 
condition, but did not evaluate this for the other methods in the null condition. 
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different data-generating models in the preknowledge condition by using some existing 
models in the literature, such as the model proposed by McLeod et al. (2003) and the one 
by Shu et al. (2013), and then evaluate the impact of different data-generating models on 
the detection effectiveness of different methods.  
The fourth limitation is related to the use of different item parameters in the 
person-level analysis. In the shallow pool simulation in study 2, it was found that the use 
of item parameters from different models did not have a large impact on the detection 
effectiveness for the predictive checking method and the likelihood ratio test. This was 
partly because a large calibration sample (i.e. with 5000 sample size) was used, and thus 
the estimation error in item parameters might be negligible compared to the variance of 
the θ posterior distribution. Future studies can further evaluate this factor by considering 
a smaller calibration sample, such as a sample size of 2000 or fewer.  
As for future research directions, in addition to overcoming the four limitations 
above, future studies can consider three more directions. The first is to incorporate 
response time information into the predictive checking. By adopting a response time 
model and by considering the joint distribution of the latent person-level variables in the 
IRT model and the response time model, one can both predict a person’s responses and 
response times on the possibly compromised items. This will provide more information 
for a person’s response behavior than using the responses alone. In addition, as response 
time is a continuous quantity, the item-level detection using response times is expected to 
be more promising as we can have a continuous predictive distribution of response time 
on a single item, instead of working with dichotomous response variables.  
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Second, in this study, the item-level detection does not show any success, mainly 
because each response only has two categories and the item-level detection is based on 
the idea of “leaving-one-out”. As mentioned above, item-level detection is expected to 
have some promise if working with some continuous variables (such as response time) or 
variables with multiple categories (such as polytomous item with more than five 
categories). In that case, it is not necessary to use the “leave-one-out” method to conduct 
item-level detection. One can just obtain the predictive distribution of the relevant 
variable on a single item, and compare the observed value to the predictive distribution. 
This can overcome the problem of high false positive rates.  
Third, the item-level detection in this project is at the person-level. In other 
words, it is aimed at detecting whether a person uses preknowledge on a single item. As 
shown in study 1 that addressed dichotomous responses, this type of item-level detection 
does not work well. Future study can extend the idea of item-level detection to the group 
level. In other words, instead of focusing on detecting suspicious examinees, the interest 
can be shifted to monitoring a single item’s performance. This is another type of quality 
control procedure, aiming at identifying problematic items over test administrations. 
Predictive checking may be applied to this context as well by first predicting a person’s 
responses to an item and then aggregating the prediction to a group level. 
Lastly, there is a final cautionary point that should be made when using statistical 
methods to detect examinee preknowledge. All the methods considered in this project 
belong to the frequentist hypothesis testing procedures. In general, in hypothesis testing, 
rejecting the null hypothesis does not necessarily mean the alternative hypothesis is true, 
and similarly, not rejecting the null hypothesis does not necessarily mean the null 
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hypothesis is true. This implies that all the methods can only be used as a screening 
procedure to identify suspicious examinees who might have used preknowledge. If an 
examinee is flagged by a certain method, further investigation needs to be conducted to 
gather additional evidence to prove that an examinee does use preknowledge to gain 
unfair score increase or not. It is not our intention to recommend using statistical methods 
alone to make a judgement about an examinee’s testing taking behavior. Instead, we 
recommend using these methods as a quick screening process and using them to infer the 
extent of test compromise in a certain examinee group. By identifying potential test 
security problems in an examinee group, one can take actions to improve the security for 
their testing programs as early as possible, so as to create ensure the validity and fairness 
of testing.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES 
Table A.1: True Item Parameters in Study 1 
T1=5  T2=5 
a b  a b 
0.960 0.960  1.656 -0.311 
1.199 1.199  1.782 -1.517 
0.985 0.985  1.279 0.525 
1.237 1.237  1.244 0.387 
1.161 1.161  0.793 -0.640 
T1=10  T2=10 
a b  a b 
1.625 1.625  0.893 0.172 
1.286 1.286  0.872 -0.017 
1.490 1.490  1.310 0.741 
1.066 1.066  1.024 0.097 
1.214 1.214  1.419 -1.244 
1.680 1.680  1.118 -0.191 
1.336 1.336  1.347 1.692 
1.008 1.008  1.961 -0.418 
1.875 1.875  1.021 1.147 
1.547 1.547  1.430 -0.198 
T1=20  T2=20 
a b  a b 
0.872 0.872  1.752 -0.743 
1.166 1.166  0.897 -1.385 
1.131 1.131  1.269 0.052 
1.192 1.192  0.837 0.009 
1.164 1.164  0.936 -1.090 
1.640 1.640  1.025 -1.248 
1.976 1.976  0.759 -0.160 
1.755 1.755  1.022 -0.817 
1.031 1.031  1.592 -1.622 
1.679 1.679  0.990 -0.461 
0.880 0.880  1.104 -0.115 
1.606 1.606  1.213 -0.536 
1.298 1.298  1.114 0.779 
0.785 0.785  0.879 0.878 
1.161 1.161  1.511 1.106 
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1.831 1.831  1.288 -1.049 
1.043 1.043  1.456 -1.019 
1.618 1.618  0.825 -0.539 
1.443 1.443  1.355 -0.357 
0.780 0.780  1.045 -0.406 
 126 
Table A.2: Empirical Type-I Error at Item-set Level Using Fiducial and Jeffreys Prior 
  Sum  EAP  Var 
 θ JEF FID  JEF FID  JEF JEF 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.002 0.000  0.015 0.000  0.013 0.008 
 -1 0.024 0.009  0.043 0.021  0.034 0.019 
 0 0.030 0.025  0.048 0.034  0.067* 0.061 
 1 0.029 0.021  0.045 0.033  0.044 0.035 
 2 0.018 0.013  0.034 0.025  0.001 0.001 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.023 0.018  0.050 0.047  0.020 0.018 
 -1 0.021 0.020  0.044 0.044  0.035 0.034 
 0 0.022 0.018  0.041 0.034  0.040 0.039 
 1 0.026 0.021  0.045 0.037  0.055 0.051 
 2 0.013 0.009  0.017 0.015  0.017 0.011 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.003 0.008  0.015 0.021  0.006 0.007 
 -1 0.024 0.026  0.046 0.045  0.029 0.025 
 0 0.029 0.027  0.038 0.035  0.029 0.028 
 1 0.011 0.010  0.012 0.011  0.027 0.030 
 2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.008 0.010 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.004 0.001  0.018 0.003  0.007 0.001 
 -1 0.026 0.020  0.050 0.031  0.041 0.025 
 0 0.026 0.027  0.056 0.053  0.046 0.045 
 1 0.030 0.027  0.042 0.041  0.041 0.040 
 2 0.009 0.007  0.013 0.011  0.017 0.009 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.005 0.000  0.009 0.002  0.021 0.016 
 -1 0.039 0.019  0.051 0.028  0.045 0.028 
 0 0.046 0.039  0.057 0.055  0.062 0.064* 
 1 0.045 0.041  0.062 0.056  0.042 0.032 
 2 0.020 0.014  0.042 0.032  0.028 0.015 
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Table A.3: Empirical Type-I Error at Item-set Level Using Normal Prior  
  T2=5  T2=10  T2=20 
Stat θ T1=5 T1=10 T1=20  T1=5 T1=10 T1=20  T1=5 T1=10 T1=20 
Sum -2 0.002 0.002 0.020  0.002 0.004 0.017  0.003 0.004 0.038 
 -1 0.014 0.014 0.019  0.022 0.026 0.020  0.020 0.039 0.031 
 0 0.033 0.027 0.021  0.028 0.029 0.021  0.034 0.047 0.024 
 1 0.012 0.009 0.001  0.028 0.032 0.022  0.033 0.047 0.033 
 2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.018 0.010 0.010  0.039 0.020 0.037 
EAP -2 0.004 0.006 0.039  0.005 0.016 0.044  0.004 0.005 0.053 
 -1 0.023 0.033 0.040  0.033 0.046 0.040  0.028 0.049 0.044 
 0 0.039 0.038 0.027  0.040 0.059 0.038  0.043 0.069* 0.037 
 1 0.015 0.010 0.001  0.043 0.045 0.039  0.048 0.064* 0.043 
 2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.033 0.014 0.014  0.069* 0.042 0.051 
Var -2 0.003 0.005 0.015  0.013 0.005 0.019  0.021 0.015 0.041 
 -1 0.040 0.024 0.024  0.025 0.039 0.035  0.024 0.042 0.046 
 0 0.036 0.033 0.024  0.059 0.048 0.039  0.095* 0.063* 0.046 
 1 0.021 0.025 0.033  0.038 0.043 0.053  0.014 0.039 0.058 
 2 0.001 0.003 0.004  0.001 0.014 0.011  0.016 0.024 0.034 
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Table A.4: Power at Item-set Level Using Fiducial and Jeffreys Prior When Compromise 
Rate is 100%  
  Sum  EAP  Var 
 θ JEF FID  JEF FID  JEF FID 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.691 0.627  0.760 0.692  0.375 0.274 
 -1 0.583 0.544  0.636 0.593  0.079 0.055 
 0 0.466 0.424  0.502 0.446  0.010 0.000 
 1 0.258 0.253  0.268 0.255  0.014 0.000 
 2 0.066 0.066  0.066 0.066  0.003 0.000 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.938 0.935  0.961 0.960  0.647 0.640 
 -1 0.886 0.879  0.930 0.929  0.109 0.099 
 0 0.764 0.755  0.792 0.790  0.356 0.339 
 1 0.431 0.409  0.432 0.412  0.272 0.240 
 2 0.062 0.054  0.062 0.054  0.023 0.021 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.533 0.475  0.658 0.583  0.191 0.162 
 -1 0.552 0.520  0.590 0.571  0.222 0.224 
 0 0.363 0.356  0.370 0.364  0.192 0.191 
 1 0.028 0.029  0.028 0.029  0.009 0.008 
 2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.838 0.804  0.878 0.856  0.444 0.356 
 -1 0.804 0.787  0.852 0.847  0.095 0.075 
 0 0.700 0.694  0.735 0.721  0.199 0.182 
 1 0.498 0.478  0.503 0.482  0.291 0.257 
 2 0.050 0.039  0.050 0.039  0.013 0.012 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.941 0.930  0.947 0.939  0.463 0.354 
 -1 0.912 0.902  0.911 0.904  0.057 0.032 
 0 0.920 0.900  0.922 0.915  0.576 0.535 
 1 0.789 0.782  0.826 0.810  0.561 0.510 
 2 0.305 0.270  0.305 0.270  0.036 0.025 
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Table A.5: Power at Item-set Level Using Fiducial and Jeffreys Prior When Compromise 
Rate is 60% 
  Sum  EAP  Var 
 θ JEF FID  JEF FID  JEF FID 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.326 0.197  0.340 0.202  0.264 0.170 
 -1 0.255 0.215  0.254 0.199  0.266 0.244 
 0 0.192 0.167  0.178 0.149  0.127 0.124 
 1 0.092 0.079  0.096 0.071  0.010 0.008 
 2 0.037 0.032  0.037 0.033  0.001 0.000 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.650 0.641  0.662 0.648  0.528 0.518 
 -1 0.485 0.487  0.452 0.448  0.291 0.296 
 0 0.289 0.287  0.248 0.241  0.109 0.099 
 1 0.116 0.108  0.117 0.106  0.059 0.048 
 2 0.022 0.018  0.022 0.018  0.008 0.005 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.220 0.167  0.420 0.350  0.233 0.206 
 -1 0.209 0.186  0.345 0.325  0.107 0.106 
 0 0.092 0.092  0.137 0.133  0.034 0.035 
 1 0.010 0.012  0.011 0.012  0.005 0.003 
 2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.431 0.352  0.455 0.351  0.333 0.207 
 -1 0.391 0.364  0.361 0.334  0.281 0.274 
 0 0.262 0.260  0.224 0.214  0.105 0.110 
 1 0.132 0.119  0.131 0.118  0.045 0.039 
 2 0.027 0.021  0.027 0.021  0.010 0.009 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.617 0.503  0.649 0.542  0.494 0.351 
 -1 0.509 0.488  0.536 0.516  0.239 0.214 
 0 0.418 0.404  0.415 0.395  0.037 0.027 
 1 0.236 0.219  0.268 0.247  0.160 0.135 
 2 0.077 0.058  0.102 0.080  0.040 0.034 
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Table A.6: Power at Item-set Level Using Normal Prior 
    T2=5   T2=10   T2=20             
Stat Rate θ T1:5 T1:10 T1:20 T1:5 T1:10 T1:20 T1:5 T1:10 T:20 
Sum 1 -2 0.400 0.517 0.699 0.678 0.841 0.936 0.751 0.946 0.992 
  -1 0.368 0.558 0.606 0.576 0.812 0.881 0.663 0.915 0.977 
  0 0.262 0.370 0.374 0.461 0.708 0.749 0.654 0.924 0.930 
  1 0.053 0.029 0.016 0.259 0.499 0.419 0.599 0.800 0.784 
  2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.053 0.056 0.384 0.318 0.400 
 0.6 -2 0.140 0.191 0.371 0.308 0.435 0.639 0.388 0.627 0.836 
  -1 0.141 0.215 0.235 0.238 0.405 0.473 0.307 0.525 0.698 
  0 0.099 0.096 0.080 0.182 0.274 0.266 0.240 0.432 0.457 
  1 0.019 0.010 0.005 0.092 0.134 0.111 0.165 0.244 0.213 
  2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.028 0.018 0.106 0.083 0.093 
EAP 1 -2 0.467 0.650 0.783 0.719 0.882 0.960 0.763 0.950 0.996 
  -1 0.384 0.593 0.657 0.617 0.859 0.925 0.663 0.915 0.977 
  0 0.262 0.379 0.380 0.498 0.740 0.778 0.672 0.926 0.936 
  1 0.053 0.029 0.016 0.268 0.506 0.425 0.636 0.835 0.810 
  2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.053 0.056 0.384 0.318 0.400 
 0.6 -2 0.314 0.411 0.585 0.306 0.452 0.653 0.419 0.657 0.879 
  -1 0.230 0.353 0.409 0.214 0.380 0.439 0.311 0.552 0.704 
  0 0.132 0.142 0.114 0.163 0.242 0.236 0.242 0.428 0.469 
  1 0.028 0.011 0.006 0.090 0.135 0.112 0.174 0.273 0.230 
  2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.028 0.018 0.123 0.108 0.113 
Var 1 -2 0.182 0.238 0.324 0.320 0.420 0.632 0.308 0.474 0.716 
  -1 0.153 0.246 0.251 0.066 0.088 0.085 0.035 0.062 0.066 
  0 0.140 0.201 0.208 0.018 0.178 0.289 0.162 0.570 0.774 
  1 0.025 0.009 0.002 0.032 0.295 0.256 0.392 0.760 0.688 
  2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.177 0.214 0.202 
 0.6 -2 0.198 0.239 0.326 0.206 0.320 0.513 0.331 0.492 0.765 
  -1 0.118 0.121 0.100 0.254 0.290 0.283 0.196 0.247 0.291 
  0 0.031 0.036 0.041 0.158 0.113 0.100 0.010 0.036 0.065 
  1 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.043 0.053 0.024 0.155 0.156 
  2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.052 0.056 0.055 
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Table A.7: Empirical Type-I Error at Item Level 
  JEF  N(0,22)  FID 
 θ b=1 b=0  b=1 b=0  b=1 b=0 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.043 0.030  0.039 0.024  0.035 0.018 
 -1 0.053 0.047  0.047 0.044  0.041 0.040 
 0 0.052 0.072*  0.049 0.071*  0.046 0.059 
 1 0.063 0.054  0.059 0.051  0.043 0.033 
 2 0.020 0.040  0.018 0.041  0.013 0.047 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.054 0.031  0.053 0.027  0.057 0.032 
 -1 0.043 0.032  0.043 0.030  0.042 0.029 
 0 0.040 0.069*  0.042 0.070*  0.040 0.068* 
 1 0.058 0.053  0.056 0.049  0.057 0.052 
 2 0.026 0.059  0.019 0.049  0.018 0.046 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.025 0.015  0.020 0.013  0.026 0.002 
 -1 0.046 0.031  0.043 0.029  0.036 0.018 
 0 0.042 0.029  0.041 0.029  0.036 0.036 
 1 0.026 0.034  0.026 0.032  0.024 0.028 
 2 0.018 0.010  0.016 0.009  0.016 0.010 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.044 0.026  0.041 0.022  0.038 0.018 
 -1 0.050 0.052  0.049 0.054  0.038 0.041 
 0 0.057 0.066*  0.057 0.067*  0.054 0.062 
 1 0.059 0.064*  0.060 0.063  0.057 0.051 
 2 0.024 0.046  0.023 0.040  0.017 0.037 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.036 0.042  0.033 0.040  0.026 0.040 
 -1 0.050 0.056  0.050 0.054  0.057 0.043 
 0 0.058 0.064*  0.058 0.068*  0.063 0.063 
 1 0.061 0.061  0.061 0.060  0.051 0.056 
 2 0.063 0.045  0.061 0.041  0.053 0.040 
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Table A.8: Empirical Power at Item Level 
  Rate=0.2  Rate=0.4 
 θ JEF N(0,22) FID  JEF N(0,22) FID 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.363 0.319 0.304  0.251 0.174 0.320 
 -1 0.164 0.148 0.140  0.113 0.097 0.128 
 0 0.071 0.070 0.061  0.051 0.046 0.052 
 1 0.029 0.025 0.005  0.003 0.002 0.010 
 2 0.003 0.002 0.001  0.001 0.000 0.006 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.302 0.285 0.313  0.313 0.297 0.029 
 -1 0.100 0.099 0.105  0.126 0.125 0.068 
 0 0.046 0.048 0.047  0.047 0.045 0.065 
 1 0.038 0.039 0.037  0.013 0.013 0.057 
 2 0.024 0.015 0.011  0.011 0.008 0.059 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.287 0.235 0.216  0.140 0.144 0.121 
 -1 0.117 0.112 0.109  0.066 0.092 0.099 
 0 0.083 0.080 0.066  0.036 0.056 0.038 
 1 0.038 0.038 0.036  0.006 0.013 0.010 
 2 0.025 0.022 0.022  0.004 0.001 0.002 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.332 0.306 0.282  0.258 0.231 0.159 
 -1 0.127 0.117 0.107  0.115 0.116 0.103 
 0 0.058 0.057 0.055  0.045 0.048 0.040 
 1 0.038 0.036 0.030  0.009 0.009 0.004 
 2 0.016 0.016 0.005  0.014 0.013 0.004 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.291 0.220 0.215  0.196 0.144 0.072 
 -1 0.090 0.081 0.079  0.090 0.095 0.081 
 0 0.061 0.063 0.060  0.055 0.049 0.049 
 1 0.019 0.023 0.022  0.002 0.005 0.003 
 2 0.015 0.008 0.014  0.006 0.005 0.004 
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Table A.9: False Positive Rate at Item Level 
  Rate=0.2  Rate=0.4 
 θ JEF N(0,22) FID  JEF N(0,22) FID 
T1=5, T2=10 -2 0.084 0.058 0.029  0.285 0.239 0.188 
 -1 0.086 0.069 0.068  0.183 0.165 0.159 
 0 0.084 0.078 0.065  0.148 0.141 0.140 
 1 0.060 0.058 0.057  0.081 0.080 0.087 
 2 0.053 0.054 0.059  0.057 0.053 0.059 
T1=20, T2=10 -2 0.159 0.148 0.150  0.468 0.460 0.467 
 -1 0.100 0.097 0.094  0.292 0.291 0.300 
 0 0.078 0.077 0.075  0.176 0.168 0.169 
 1 0.062 0.055 0.058  0.074 0.070 0.072 
 2 0.060 0.052 0.048  0.042 0.044 0.042 
T1=10, T2=5 -2 0.053 0.048 0.030  0.304 0.159 0.099 
 -1 0.073 0.077 0.055  0.237 0.189 0.159 
 0 0.042 0.043 0.051  0.135 0.127 0.145 
 1 0.026 0.025 0.022  0.030 0.037 0.035 
 2 0.002 0.002 0.004  0.002 0.002 0.000 
T1=10, T2=10 -2 0.090 0.082 0.050  0.343 0.333 0.266 
 -1 0.108 0.109 0.087  0.271 0.273 0.247 
 0 0.077 0.080 0.072  0.156 0.162 0.151 
 1 0.057 0.057 0.049  0.076 0.075 0.077 
 2 0.045 0.041 0.042  0.042 0.038 0.040 
T1=10, T2=20 -2 0.081 0.075 0.026  0.308 0.304 0.176 
 -1 0.102 0.084 0.056  0.213 0.241 0.195 
 0 0.073 0.091 0.085  0.160 0.168 0.151 
 1 0.079 0.088 0.077  0.141 0.121 0.113 
 2 0.064 0.060 0.065  0.081 0.079 0.084 
 
 
 
  
 134 
APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure B.1: Plots to check assumptions in simple linear regression in study 2. 
 
 135 
 
Figure B.2: Plots to check assumptions in simple linear regression in real data analysis. 
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